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ABSTRACT
A number of writers working in the fields of history and industrial relations have 
claimed a correlation between long-wave economics and the changing fortunes of 
political and social movements of the left and right. They have suggested both particular 
patterns of development and causations but often on the basis of piecemeal evidence, 
lacking a comprehensive theoretical and empirical basis.
This thesis tests the validity of such a correlation through a comparative historical 
analysis of the domestic political histories of Britain, France, Germany and the USA over 
the four long-waves that have occurred in modem times; those of 1803-1848, 1848-1896, 
1896-1948 and 1948-1998. It finds, that since industrialization, there has been a distinct 
and repeating pattern of political and social development that can be correlated with long­
wave economics. Common ground is found with existing theoretical patterns, though also 
notable areas of difference, and this thesis provides a more comprehensive pattern of 
development.
The thesis proceeds to explore possible causations for the pattern found. It does so by 
using existing political science theories explaining political change; those concerning 
voting behaviour, class struggle and party competition. It finds that aspects of these 
theories can be used to explain the pattern of development found. Above all, populations 
experiencing the different economic phases of the long-wave undergo significant 
motivational changes that are reflected in the shifting fortunes of the left and right.
The thesis concludes by analyzing these findings and highlighting advances made on 
existing accounts. It also discusses those events within modem history that could be 
regarded as anomalous, with the intention of further understanding this process. Finally, 
it discusses the implications of the findings of this thesis for long-wave and political 
science theory.
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CHAPTER ONE 
LONG-WAVE ECONOMICS AND THE LEFT AND RIGHT
1.1 The Last Fifty Years
Within liberal democracies, the political changes of the last fifty years appear to have 
turned full circle. The post-war era began with a period of political consensus, the 
proclamation of the ‘end of ideology’, and the construction and establishment of a 
‘middle way’ between collectivist and class-struggle Socialism and Communism on the 
left, and laissez-faire Conservatism and Fascism on the right. The mid-1990s have now 
seen what appears to be the emergence of a new political consensus, that also seeks a 
‘third way’, though this time between redistributive social democracy and the neo­
liberalism of the New Right, and once again predictions that the old left-right dichotomy 
is no longer applicable to the politics of liberal democracies.
The period immediately after WW2 saw gradual, but progressive social change based 
upon the mixed economy and redistributive social democracy that came to represent the 
‘middle way’. Much of this was carried out by the parties of the centre-left, often in 
government in the late 1940s and establishing the basis of a society charaterised by the 
welfare state, full employment and Keynesian demand management. By the 1950s 
though, it was mostly parties of the right that had occupied government, and this decade 
was renowned for its political conservatism, and little in the way of political change 
occurred. It was this phenomenon that gave rise to many political scientists proclaiming 
that a political consensus had arisen.
This consensus politics was perceived as variously occurring at intellectual, electoral, 
elite and party levels. Differences between left and right parties were believed to be 
minimal as both competed for the centre ground of the political spectrum. Ironically, such 
a tendency often resulted in the squeezing out of centre parties at a time when centre- 
politics, consensus and conformity were seen as being in the political ascendant. The 
differences between the major parties were considered so minimal, that Bell declared the
l
‘End of Ideology’, whilst Lipset maintained that the ideological differences of the early 
20th Century had been replaced by ‘conservative socialism’.1 Others such as Schlesinger, 
Aron and Shils sought or described a ‘third way’ based upon pragmatism and moderation 
- a new radicalism of the centre. The left-right dichotomy was, according to these 
theories, a feature of the past.
However, this belief was challenged when the consensus was attacked by the 
intellectuals of the New Left in the early 1960s. In fact the rise of the New Left presaged 
a general leftward drift in the political spectrum throughout the following decade. 
Through to the mid-1970s most liberal democracies saw a gradual increase in the 
percentage vote of the left, with these electoral gains often resulting in left-wing 
governments. The electoral success of the left markedly improved on their performance 
in the 1950s.3
The rise of the New Left, and the improved electoral position of the left in general, 
was accompanied by a period of political unrest. The late 1960s and early 1970s were 
characterized by militant student and youth revolts, civil rights movements and 
opposition to the Vietnam War. This period also saw the rise of ‘post-materialist’ left 
politics; the appearance of radical political movements devoted to the equality of women, 
gays and ethnic minorities, and protection of the environment. It also saw increased 
support for left-wing nationalist movements in the developing world as part of a wider 
support for internationalism.4
Finally this period was accompanied by a concerted period of trade-union militancy 
and a proliferation of radical left movements advocating socialism and revolution. The 
late 1960s and early 1970s saw a wave of strike activity, almost entirely organized by 
rank-and-file movements and which included factory occupations. This movement also 
raised the notion of industrial democracy and an increased level of worker participation 
in the running of the workplace.
However, this challenge to the social democratic consensus from the left began to 
falter during the 1970s. The percentage of the vote gained by the left stopped increasing 
and either remained stable or began to decline.5 The level of industrial militancy also 
declined, albeit erratically, throughout the course of the decade. The movement for
2
industrial democracy reached its peak in the mid-1970s and thereafter went on the 
defensive.6
The stalling of the left challenge coincided with the rise of the New Right and its 
intellectual associates - monetarism, neo-liberalism and social conservatism. In addition 
the 1970s and 1980s saw the re-emergence of the far right and neo-Nazi groups, in 
addition to a rise in right-wing religious fundamentalism. The latter largely remained as 
fringe groups but the New Right proceeded to ideologically and electorally dominate the 
1980s through to much of the 1990s. This domination was largely associated with 
economic factors, the fight against inflation, the reduction of the public sector and the 
need for balanced budgets. More generally it replaced the previous dominance of 
Keynesian social democracy and the mixed economy with neo-liberalism and the 
importance of market economics.
At the same time the left experienced electoral and ideological crisis. Levels of 
electoral support fell away whilst the labour movement experienced a decline in both 
numbers and militancy. By the end of the century the radical and revolutionary left had 
all but disappeared whilst the centre left had often found it necessary to accommodate 
itself to the new realities introduced by the right. Out of this development emerged the 
‘third way’ an attempt by the parties of the centre left to establish a middle way between 
redistributive social democracy and neo-liberalism. The politics of the developed world 
appeared to have turned full circle. Once again political commentators were talking about
n
the ‘end of ideology’ and the end of the left and right as useful political terms.
In brief, the politics of Western liberal democracies appear to have turned full circle 
in the last fifty years, with a major- swing to the left and then to the right during the course 
of this cycle. Why should this be so? Most of the accepted theories of political change 
tend to regard developments as following a more linear course. One set of developments 
simply follows another, the causation may be party competition, changing views within 
electorates, class structure, or of an economic, structural or technical nature, but all share 
a generally linear pattern. Whilst cyclical theories, such as those of Toynbee or Spengler, 
are relatively common in the field of International Relations, there are very few within
o
Comparative Politics. The best known is probably that of Schlesinger. Schlesinger has
3
described American politics as going through a thirty-year cycle of alternating phases of 
‘public action’ and ‘private good’. These are driven by human desire and inter- 
generational conflict. However, the duration of Schlesinger’s cycle is not contingent with 
the cycle described above, and his phases only partially coincide with the changes 
described above.9 Although his work may be of theoretical use, it is not based upon the 
changes noted over the fifty-year period.
Given the international nature of these changes and developments and the singular 
nature of the pattern it is possible that these political changes have a common cause, and 
that they are the expression of a shared and cyclical phenomena that pervades modem 
society. Their occurrence over a fifty year period offers the possibility that they are 
linked to a phenomena identified with the field of economics, that of long-wave 
economics. Long-waves are also seen as occurring on an approximately fifty year basis, 
and are seen as essentially wave-like or cyclical in nature. Most long-wave researchers 
identify a fourth long-wave as starting in 1940/48. The initial phase of this wave, the 
upswing, came to an end in 1973, whilst the downswing was expected to end at some 
point in the mid-late 1990s.10
As such this wave is coincidental with the cyclical pattern described above and thus 
offers one possible explanation for the pattern of political development. Indeed, a small 
number of researchers, notably in the field of labour history, but also elsewhere, have 
claimed that both social and political changes can be linked to fluctuations within the 
long-wave. It is the intention of this thesis to investigate such a connection, but on a more 
systematic and comprehensive level, than has previously been the case.
1.2 Introduction to Long-Wave Economics
The study of long-wave economics dates back to the period prior to World War One, 
though it was only with the work of the Russian economist, N.D. Kondratieff in the 
1920s, that the study of long-waves became more widely known.11 Initially most studies 
were largely concerned with long-term changes in price movements. However, in an 
attempt to explain these movements, economists who contributed to long-wave theory 
also found it necessary to incorporate a variety of other economic phenomena. Product
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innovation, capital accumulation, economic growth rates and profit levels, amongst 
others, have all been incorporated into the various theories that attempt to describe and 
explain long-waves. As with other areas within the field of economics, attempts to 
explain the existence of long-waves in the world economy have given rise to a number of 
competing theories.
12Goldstein has identified three main schools of thought within long-wave research. 
These he identifies as the ‘capital investment’ school, taking its lead from the work of 
Kondratieff, the ‘innovation’ school, derived from the work of Schumpeter, and the 
‘capitalist crisis’ school based on the work of Trotsky. Despite differences of opinion in 
these three schools of thought, notably on the question of causation, there is, however, a 
certain level of agreement within these theories as to what constitutes a long-wave.
Long-waves are considered to last approximately fifty years and are a feature of the 
world economy. They consist of two main phases - an upswing of approximately 25 years 
duration, and a downswing also of a 25-year duration. Upswings are characterised by a 
generally favourable economic climate and prolonged periods of economic boom and 
prosperity. Downswings are usually characterised as periods of economic malaise, they 
witness a slowing of economic growth or economic contraction, and often experience 
protracted periods of depression. Goldstein’s definition is typical:
“Long waves are defined by alternating economic phases -  an expansion phase {upswing) 
and a stagnation phase {downswing). These economic phase periods are not uniform in 
length or quality. The transition point from an expansion phase to a stagnation phase is 
called a peak, and that from stagnation to expansion is a trough. The long wave, which 
repeats roughly every fifty years, is synchronous across national borders, indicating that 
the alternating phases are a systemic-level phenomenon.”13
Most researchers, following the lead of Kondratieff, maintain that long-waves are a 
feature of the industrial/post-industrial era, though some researchers have noted the 
existence of long-waves within agrarian societies.14 Given that long-waves are a feature 
of the international economy, it is also maintained that the dates for each long-wave are 
approximately the same across the various industrialised economies of the world. The 
dates provided by long-wave researchers for each long-wave are mostly similar though 
some differences are evident. After reviewing thirty-three long-wave researchers, and
5
using dates given by Kondratieff (1790-1917) and Mandel (1917 onwards) Goldstein 
arrived at the following average dates used by long-wave researchers for the 
industrial/post-industrial era:15
Figure 1. Averages of the dates used by long-wave researchers (Goldstein 1988).
Long-Wave Upswing Downswing
First 1790-1814 1814-1848
Second 1848-1872 1872-1893
Third 1893-1917 1917-1940
Fourth 1940-1968
Much of the original research carried out on long-waves concerned the long-term 
movement of world commodity prices. Rising prices were associated with upswings and 
falling prices with downswings in the long-wave. However, much of the modem research 
on long-waves has been carried out since the beginning of the world economic crisis in 
1973. Given that the post-1973 crisis was beset by periodically high levels of inflation, 
the association with prices has proved more complex than originally thought. As a result, 
recent researchers have formulated long-waves on the basis of empirical data other than 
price movements. Although price movements are still considered of importance within 
long-wave research, the original simplistic association between price movements and 
long-waves is now considered by some authorities to be only one amongst several aspects 
of long-waves.16
For instance, amongst recent developments are the neo-Schumpeterian explanations 
of Tylecote and Perez. Perez believes that certain types of economic change -  ‘techno- 
economic paradigms’ -  are accompanied by major structural crises of adjustment. As 
such, social and institutional changes are necessary to bring a better ‘match’ between the 
new technologies and systems of social management or ‘regime of regulation’. A good 
‘match’ results in a stable pattern of long term investment behaviour over 2 or 3 decades. 
According to Tylecote, this process is also subject to monetary, population and inequality
1 7feedback processes.
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1.3 Long-Wave Research and the Left and Right
In addition to economists, long-wave cycles have increasingly attracted attention from 
those studying in the field of industrial relations, labour history, political history and 
sociology. Over the years, a number of articles and books have attributed changes in 
political developments to changes in the long-wave as well as changing social attitudes, 
and also the level of support and influence enjoyed by the political movements of the left 
and right. Closely associated with this have been attempts to link changes in trade-union 
membership, industrial relations developments and levels of worker mobilisation to long­
wave fluctuations. The occurrence of left-wing uprisings and proletarian insurgencies 
have also been explained by changes in long-wave economics. In addition, the extension 
of long-waves into the field of industrial relations has also given rise to alternative causal 
explanations for long-waves; linking the activity of organized labour, and levels of 
worker mobilisation to changes in the long-wave in a similar manner to some theories of 
the short-term business cycle.18
The first debate concerning these matters came between Kondratieff and Trotsky over 
the occurrence of revolution. Whereas Kondratieff maintained that revolutions were more 
likely during long-wave upswings, Trotsky, following classic Marxist theory, insisted 
that revolutions came with economic crisis and the breakdown of capitalism and thus 
could only arise in downswings. However, the debate was cut short as both became 
victims of Stalin in the 1930s.19
In later years, the first author to note a specific link between long-waves and the 
changing fortunes of social and political movements was Hans Rosenberg (1943) who 
linked the profound changes of the 1870s and 1880s in Central Europe to the onset of the 
Great Depression of 1873-96, the second long-wave downswing.20 Rosenberg believed 
that the prosperous period of 1848-1873 (the second long-wave upswing) had given rise 
to a period dominated by Liberalism, a belief in freedom, the emancipation of the Jews, 
and to a well-ordered political process. By contrast, in the Great Depression “Instead of 
controversies about political freedom, the fight for economic security became the focus 
o f public discord. ( )  In an era loaded with tension, violent competition and nationalistic 
emotionalism....”21
7
According to Rosenberg the political losers in this new climate were the centre-left, the 
Liberals and associated Jewish groups. In a search for scapegoats amidst economic 
insecurity and political tension, it was the far-right anti-Semitic and Social Christian 
parties, together with the Conservatives and right-wing Centre Party who were the main 
beneficiaries of the economic depression. Political parties and ideologies were 
transformed to take account of the new economic reality as policies changed, notably 
those in favour of protectionism, to attract fearful voters.
A second beneficiary of the Great Depression, according to Rosenberg, were the 
Socialists, although both the party and its labour wing were to be proscribed and driven 
underground for much of the period, whilst Bismarck attempted unsuccessfully to split 
the labour wing from the political party through the introduction of social welfare. He 
maintains, there was an increased level of support for the Socialists during the 1870s and 
in the 1890s, whilst their ideological outlook hardened with the Gotha Programme of 
1875 and the Erfiit Programme of 1891. He believes it was higher levels of 
unemployment and sense of economic crisis that proved beneficial for the socialist left, 
and that also increased its militancy. By contrast, in the more prosperous period from 
1896 onwards, he believes the Social Democrats adopted a more levelheaded 
revisionism.
In terms of causation, he gave two main reasons for the change in the fortunes of 
political and social movements: firstly, the new psychological political climate caused by 
economic difficulties and antagonisms created a changed situation. Voters demanded 
economic security and were ready to find scapegoats amidst a period characterised by 
despondency, gloom, and pessimism. Secondly, he also believes that economic 
depression led to structural changes, labour became more concentrated and industrialised, 
benefiting the Socialists, whilst a shift from ‘small’ to ‘big’ capitalism to counter the 
depression, created insecurity amongst peasants, farmers and artisans who looked to the 
state to protect their interests. It was the Great Depression that gave rise to nationalism, 
state intervention in the economy and protectionism.
Rosenberg said little about the fortunes of the labour movement other than in relation 
to its political associate, the Socialists. However, an attempt by Dunlop (1948) to explain 
short-run variations in trade union membership in the USA linked its fortunes specifically
)")to long-waves. According to Dunlop, the American labour movement between 1827 
and 1945 had experienced seven major periods of rapid expansion in organization. He 
classified these into two types. Firstly, those occurring in ‘wartime’;
“the periods of Nationalism (1863-1872), Mass Advancement (1896-1904), the First 
World War (1917-1920) and the Second World War (1941-1945). The rapid expansion in 
membership is to be explained almost entirely by developments in the labor market: the 
rapid rise in the cost of living and the shortage of labor supply relative to demand”....” 
The tightness in the labor market and the general level of profits enabled the union to 
achieve results.”
The second type he regarded as those of ‘fundamental unrest’. These he linked to 
long-wave downswings, and arriving on the back of severe depressions. They were also 
specifically political in nature:
“It is suggested that after prolonged periods of high unemployment for a substantial 
number in the work force and after years of downward pressure on wages exerted by 
price declines, labor organizations emerge which are apt to be particularly critical of the 
fundamental tenets of the society and the economy.”24
These periods he identified as the Great Awakening (1827-1836) and associated with 
Jacksonian Democracy and free education, the Great Upheaval (1881-1886) associated 
with Populism and shorter hours, and finally the New Deal (1933-1937) associated with 
security.
However, when Hobsbawm (1964) looked at the long-run fortunes of labour 
movements and tentatively linked these to long-waves, he identified a different pattern to 
that of Dunlop.25 Generally speaking, he believed that during the course o f the Nineteenth 
Century there had been a fundamental alteration in the pattern of labour unrest. When the 
economy had been predominately agrarian, riots, strikes and rebellion had typically 
occurred during periods of economic crisis. As the economy had industrialized, however, 
a transition period gave way to one where labour unrest, strikes and socialist movements 
were more likely to occur at the top of the economic cycle, possibly linked to increasing 
prices. By contrast during periods of economic malaise, the picture was more mixed. 
Industrial action was often inadvisable, though some notable strike movements had
9
occurred, whilst it was during these periods, he maintained, that the struggle for the 
franchise was more likely to occur.
Following the downturn in the international economy after 1973, interest in long- 
waves revived. Although initially concerned with the economics of the long-wave, 
towards the end of the 1970s renewed interest in the links between long-waves and the 
fortunes of social and political movements occurred. The first to renew this link was 
Gordon (1978) who followed a fairly standard Marxist approach, believing that in the 
prosperous times of long-wave upswings labour movements tended to become co-opted 
into the capitalist process, whilst the economic crisis of downswings led to greater levels
7 f \of working-class action, and increased support for leftist ideas and movements. In 
general this was similar to the ideas of both Rosenberg and Dunlop.
However, this position was somewhat contradicted, in that, listing factors that led to 
the economic crisis from 1973 onwards, he believed that high levels of strike activity, 
protest and rebellion in the immediately preceding period were contributory factors. In 
fact a number of authors also looked at this period in conjunction with long-waves as 
well as previous episodes of rebellion and insurgency in the past. On the whole, in terms 
of a pattern of political change a consensus emerged that left wing and working class 
militancy increased, sometimes unevenly, through the course of long-wave upswings and 
reached a peak towards the end of the upswing. This was the position taken by Cronin 
(1979, 1980), Screpanti (1984, 1987) and Kelly (1998). For Screpanti, this was based on 
empirical research charting the number of strikes, strikers involved and days lost through 
strike action whilst Kelly looked at levels and density of union membership. In each case
this work covered a wide number of industrialised; countries over the last three long-
27waves.
However, each had differing explanations as to why this occurred. Cronin saw the 
increase in left wing and labour militancy as resulting from structural reasons. He 
believed that the working-class was re-made during the innovatory period of downswings 
and that it was during the beneficial labour market conditions of the following upswing 
that this ‘new working-class’ was able to organize and make its own demands heard and 
felt. Screpanti, by contrast, believed that revolutionary, anti-capitalist and socialist
movements exerted themselves more strongly during the latter part of upswings for 
largely psychological reasons -  in a tight labour market aspirations rose but could not be 
met and resulted in frustration leading to industrial and political unrest.29 Kelly, 
meanwhile, suggested a greater awareness of injustice, coupled with increased levels of 
trade-union mobilization and strike effectiveness in a tight labour market, led to increased 
levels of labour radicalism in long-wave upswings.30
By contrast, there was less agreement on the fortunes of the left and the labour 
movement during the course of long-wave downswings. Screpanti, maintained that both 
levels of frustration and aspiration declined as a result of slower economic growth, and
though there were some occurrences of increased left-wing militancy towards the end of
•  ^1the downswing, in general downswings were a time of working-class passivity. Kelly
believed that state repression and employer counter-mobilization led to declining levels
of radicalism, though following Cronin, he also saw structural transformation of the
working-class during downswings as leading to new ‘minor upsurges’ of left-wing and
labour militancy towards the end of downswings.32
In a further attempt to explain this pattern Salvati (1983) used the work of Kalecki and 
Phelps Brown. Kalecki (1943), using business cycle and labour market economics, had 
maintained that full employment would boost the political position of workers, whilst 
high levels of unemployment would advantage the position of the state and employers. 
Phelps Brown (1975) had maintained that the presence and absence of periods of social 
unrest could be explained by the different generational experiences of different historical 
eras. Defeat, job insecurity and high unemployment led to a generation of workers that 
was cautious and conservative, whilst full employment and strong growth led to rising 
aspirations and a generation marked by confidence and radicalism. Salvati suggested that 
both these explanations could also be used to explain what factors were causing long­
wave economics in the first place.33
As such these approaches contrasted with those of Dunlop, Rosenberg and to some 
extent Gordon. Long-wave upswings were regarded as periods of increasing labour 
militancy and left-wing radicalism rather than periods of quiescence and complacency. 
Mostly, this militancy was associated with the tight labour market and full employment 
that is seen as typical of upswings in general, and not just resulting from period’s of war
11
as Dunlop had thought. Downswings were seen as periods when the labour movement 
and the left were on the defensive with declining levels of mobilisation, except possibly 
at the end of the downswing. This contrasted with the almost opposite position taken by 
Dunlop and Rosenberg.
A slightly different approach was taken by Mandel (1980) who also recognized 
increased levels of working-class radicalism towards the end of the upswing, though this, 
he claimed, resulted from pressure from employers who were experiencing declining 
profitability.34 In the early downswing this militancy increased, though if the state and 
employers were able to break labour movements, as fascism did in the 1930s, this was 
one factor that was able to help pave the way for a following long-wave upswing. He 
believed that only be breaking labour militancy in the 1980s could a further upswing 
occur, though at the time of writing he believed this to be an unlikely outcome. In 
addition, Mandel saw upswings and downswings giving rise to different ideological 
hegemonies, for instance the Keynesian social democracy of the fourth upswing giving 
way to the neo-liberalism of the downswing as employers needs altered according to the 
economic circumstances.
However, the most comprehensive attempt by an author to link changes in the fortunes 
of political and social movements, indeed the whole of modem history, has been that of 
Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm, in his four-volume history of the last two centuries, has 
combined the concept of the long Nineteenth Century (1789-1914) and the short 
Twentieth Century (1914-1991), with distinct historical periods that fit closely with 
changes in the long-wave (See Figure 2)....
In Age o f Revolution (1789-1848), though the period is bounded by the French 
Revolution and the European revolutions of 1848, it also corresponds approximately to 
the dates usually used for the First Long-Wave -  1790s-1848.35 Similarly the Age o f  
Capital (1848-1875), corresponds closely with the Second Long-Wave Upswing of 1848- 
1873, whilst the Age o f Empire (1875-1914), corresponds closely to the dates often used 
for the Second Long-Wave Downswing (1873-1896) and Third Long-Wave Upswing 
(1896-1914), though 1914 also corresponds with the end of the Long Nineteenth 
Century.36 Equally, in Age o f Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1989,
12
Hobsbawm classes the First World War and the Third Long-Wave Downswing as the 
‘Age of Catastrophe’ (1914-45), whilst the Fourth Long-Wave Upswing of 1945-1973 is 
‘The Golden Age’ and the following Long-Wave Downswing of 1973-1997/8 has been 
coined ‘The Landslide’.37
Figure 2: Hobsbawm’s historical periods and the most commonly used long-wave 
periodicity’s.
Long-Wave Periodicity’s38
Long Nineteenth Century 
Age of Revolution 1789-1848 
Age of Capital 1848-1875 
Age of Empire 1875-1914
Short Twentieth Century 
Age of Catastrophe 1914-1945 
The Golden Age 1945-1973 
The Landslide 1973-1997/8
Upswing 
First 1790s -1814/25 
Second 1848 - 1873
Third 1896 - 1914/20 
Upswing
Fourth 1940/48 - 1973
Downswing 
1814/25 - 1848
1873 - 1896
Downswing
1914/20-1940/48
1973 -1997/8
Hobsbawm, of course, is not the only historian to have identified distinct eras within 
the modem age that correspond closely to the periods of the long-wave. The Great 
Depression of 1873-1896 followed the mid-Victorian Boom of 1848-73 and was
■IQ
described by contemporary observers in both Europe and North America. Both the 
Progressive Era in the USA and La Belle Epoque/Edwardian Boom in Europe correspond 
closely to the Third Long-Wave Upswing, whilst the Inter-War Depression performs the 
same function for the following downswing. The post-war boom, Golden Age of 
Capitalism, or Trentes Glorieuses are well-established concepts that describe the long- 
lasting prosperity of the Fourth Long-Wave Upswing.
Hobsbawm, however, has linked these historical eras closely to the rise and fall of the 
long-wave. He believes long-waves form distinct periods of historical change - economic 
periods within which a distinctive set of political, historical and social events and trends
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occurred. However, he is less certain as to why long-waves occur. In Age of Empire he 
maintains that:
“Kondratiev periodicities merely enable us to observe that the period with which this 
volume deals covers the fall and the rise of a ‘Kondratiev wave’; but that is in itself not 
surprising as the entire modem history of the global economy readily falls into this 
pattern.”40
Whilst in the Age of Extremes he claims:
“That good predictions have proved possible on the basis of Kondratiev Long Waves - 
this is not very common in economics - has convinced many historians and even some 
economists that there is something in them, even if we don’t know what.”41 
In The New Century he states:
“ There is only one clear indicator for the end of the Short Century: we know that since 
1973 the world economy has entered a new phase. And if you believe, as I still do, in 
Kondratev’s theory of long waves, that period was destined to end some time in the 
nineties, but exactly when is not clear:”. He then goes on to suggest that the relatively 
mild economic crisis of 1997-8 probably marks the end of The Landslide. As such, he 
believes, this period should mark the transition to a new historical era.42
Hobsbawm’s books chart the major changes of the last two centuries. They 
encompass economic, social, cultural and political change in addition to changes in the 
arts, sciences, religion and ideology. In the course of writing this history of the modem 
era Hobsbawm has chartered the fortunes of the social and political movements and ideas 
of the left and .right in conjunction with long-waves. However, the account of these 
changes is somewhat brief and is predominantly descriptive, though some level of 
analysis is also present. His description of these changes is somewhat similar to the 
authors discussed above though there are also temporal gaps and a degree of uncertainty 
about particular periods, notably during long-wave downswings.
In Age o f Revolution he appears not to identify the upswing and downswing with 
separate political and social developments. The whole period is one of intermittent 
rebellion and revolution. However, he describes the Restoration period (1815-30) as one 
of ‘blanket reaction’, repressing all forms of dissent, be they moderate or radical. The
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period from 1830 onwards, he believes, however, was one of increasing dissent as the 
labour movement mobilized and support for socialism and republicanism increased 
together with demands for greater democracy.43
For the following three upswings, as with other authors, he sees these as generally 
benefiting the political and social forces of the left. In the Age o f  Capital it was 
Liberalism that dominated the political scene with their parties ‘generally in power and/or 
office with only occasional interruptions’. By contrast, the right was largely on the 
defensive -  ‘All they aimed for was to hold up, or even merely to slow down, the 
menacing progress of the present’. After a ‘breathing space’ in the 1850s, popular 
pressure from below increased in the 1860s and the most pressing opposition to the 
dominance of Liberalism came from the radical left. This period saw an upsurge in 
support for democracy, republicanism, socialism and anarchism, the emergence of the 
First International, the uprising of the Paris Commune and a sustained period of strike
• • 44activity.
In the third long-wave upswing, described in The Age o f  Empire, the period saw a 
massive increase in support for socialist parties, with Socialist-Liberal alliances often 
dominating the political scene. This was accompanied by a notable expansion of union 
movements, often linked politically to revolutionary syndicalism. By contrast 
Conservatism saw an absolute decline in levels of political support.45 In the fourth long­
wave upswing, The Golden Age, after the left-wing reformist pulse of the middle-late 
1940s, ‘The great boom of the 1950s was presided over, almost everywhere, by 
governments of moderate conservatives’. However, ‘In the 1960s the centre of gravity of 
the consensus shifted towards the Left’ and the long-wave upswing ended with a period 
of social unrest, labour militancy and left-wing radicalism.46
With regards to downswings, he believes the picture is more mixed with neither the 
left nor the right necessarily being outright beneficiaries of a more depressed economy. In 
the Great Depression of 1873-1896 after an initial period of hysteria and repression 
following the defeat of the Paris Commune, ‘the mid-century political predominance of 
the liberal bourgeoisie broke down in the course of the 1870s, if  not for other reasons, 
then as a by-product of the Great Depression’. However, he believes that no ‘clear 
political pattern’ emerged to replace the dominance of Liberalism, but the end of the
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downswing did see a major advance for socialism and the labour movement at the top of 
the business cycle in the late 1880s/early 1890s.47
Hobsbawm places the period 1914-20 in The Age o f Catastrophe, though many long­
wave researchers place it within the previous upswing. It was, of course, dominated by 
the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The immediately following period then 
saw a wave of revolutionary activity, labour unrest, left-wing militancy and the 
emergence of Communism.48 However, this shift to the left was overshadowed in the 
1920s and 1930s, decades which experienced ‘the Fall of Liberalism’ as the forces of 
progress and democracy were routed by fascism and other movements of the far right. 
However, for Hobsbawm, although this period was dominated politically by the right, the 
left was not entirely vanquished and the 1930s saw improved prospects for The 
Communist International. After many setbacks, they were able to translate this into a 
degree of electoral success in the mid-1940s along with other left-wing parties.49
In the fourth long-wave downswing, The Landslide, ‘in most advanced capitalist 
countries social-democratic governments were in office in much of the 1970s’ but this 
situation was not to last long. ‘After 1974 the free marketeers were on the offensive, 
although they did not come to dominate government policies until the 1980s’. In the 
worsening economic climate of the 1970s and 1980s it was the social-democratic and 
labour parties that were eventually the major losers, ‘even administrations nominally 
headed by socialists abandoned their traditional policies, willingly or not.’50
For Hobsbawm, however, no political tendency came to dominate this period;
‘The new political forces which stepped into this void were a mixed assortment, ranging 
from the xenophobic and racist on the right, via secessionist parties (mainly, but not only 
ethnic/nationalist) to the various ‘Green’ parties and other ‘new social movements’ which 
claimed a place on the Left.’51
Overall, Hobsbawm gives no schematic analysis or model of how political fortunes 
alter for the left and right over the course of a long-wave, his work is largely a history of 
the modem era and an attempt to describe the historical trends that made each period 
distinct from those that came before and after. As such, for political and social 
movements, he gives a broad description of changing fortunes, often with the most 
typical example used to illustrate the trend. However, from this description a brief outline
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of events, as regards the fortunes of the left and right could be sketched. Upswings are 
usually dominated by the left with gradually increasing levels of support and 
mobilization. This results in a peak of left-wing radicalism either at the end of the 
upswing or in the early downswing. The dominance of the left is then broken in the 
downswing, though no clear pattern occurs to replace it. The end of the downswing 
usually sees a moderate advance for the forces of the left.
In addition, no single factor of causation is identified for this pattern, other than that it 
is linked to the economics of the long-wave. In explaining the political and social 
changes in each upswing and downswing he adopts a particularistic approach rather than 
a universal one. The dominance of Liberalism in the second upswing is explained by the 
structural rise of the industrial bourgeoisie and its’ increasing wealth and power. It had 
‘the only economic policy which was believed to make sense for development and the 
forces almost universally believed to represent science, reason, history and progress'.52 In 
a similar vein, the structural and numerical increase of the industrial working class 
explains the arrival of mass socialist parties and Communism, ideologies associated with 
reason, revolution and progress, from the late 1880s onwards into the third upswing.53 In 
the fourth upswing, conservative dominance in the 1950s is explained by satisfaction 
with a booming economy. However, a generational approach is used to explain the left- 
wing radicalism at the end of the upswing, the unrest resulting from a generation that 
‘had adjusted their expectations to the only experience of their age group, that of full 
employment and continuous inflation’.54
For the political changes in the Great Depression he simply refers to the economic 
problems of the period as breaking the legitimacy and thus dominance of the liberal 
bourgeoisie.55 In the third downswing, the fall of liberalism and rise of fascism and the 
far right are attributed to three causes; a decline in the belief of progress, an extreme 
response to the threat of socialism and revolution, and a belief that ‘representative 
democracy, was rarely a convincing way of running states, and the Age of Catastrophe 
rarely guaranteed the conditions that made it viable’.56 In the fourth downswing a more 
psychological approach is preferred with the traditional political pattern of social 
democratic dominance breaking down as a result of ‘a mood of insecurity and
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Iresentment’, the depression and restructuring of the economy creating disorientation and 
‘a sullen tension that penetrated the politics of the Crisis Decades’.57
Thus for Hobsbawm, long-waves are shaping the course of modem history and are 
accompanied by a repeating pattern with regards to the fortunes of the left and right. 
However, it appears that this repeating pattern could be accidental, since often different 
causative factors are involved in producing this regular pattern. Mostly, though not 
always, he uses structural factors to explain the rise of the left during upswings, 
sometimes associated with a growing belief in progress. However, for downswings it is 
usually psychological factors and a declining belief in progress that halt the advance of 
the left, though again this is not always the case. This then leaves the question open as to 
whether long-waves are the causative factor for the pattern of change, or merely 
incidental.
To some extent Beckman (1983) arrives at a similar pattern of development to that of 
Hobsbawm.58 As with Hobsbawm, his priorities lie elsewhere, namely with economics, 
finance and the stock markets. Unlike Hobsbawm, he does attempt to provide a typical 
pattern of development for the forces of the left and right and links this closely to changes 
in the long-wave. However, he only provides a brief outline of this pattern and with little 
evidence to substantiate it, usually referring to the more notable events in the political 
history of Britain and the USA during the last three long-waves in order to formulate the 
pattern.
He believes that the initial period of the upswing is marked ‘by a period of relative 
stability’ and government/continuity. As with most authors he believes there is ‘a 
tendency towards left-wing politics as the upwave matures’ but the increased aspirations 
of the electorate cannot be met by politicians and the left is soon ousted. In the 
downswing the initial period is marked by ‘political turbulence for about a decade’ and 
‘several changes in government, or political philosophy’. Many new parties emerge and 
those that exist are often riven by faction fighting. “Downwave politics move to the right’ 
but with the onset of the second and worst business cycle downturn (usually about a 
decade into the downswing), the party in office is removed and the ‘incoming party
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usually has left wing leanings but, sometimes, the result has been a dictator.’ After a long 
period of austerity the left comes to power at the beginning of the following upswing.59
Beckman’s explanation for these changes is almost entirely psychological - the result 
of mood swings within the electorate. The left increases support during the upswing 
because this is a time of optimism and risk-taking, with people more ‘outgoing and 
gregarious’, ‘people will favour a government whose policies allow maximum 
permissiveness, self-indulgence with minimum restrictions’. ‘There is greater interest in 
politics’ and people ‘once again feel they control their own destiny’. All this reaches a 
hedonistic peak towards the end of the upswing and in general it is the left that benefits. 
By contrast, downswings are characterized by economic hardship and pessimism, ‘people 
become cautious, introspective, and unwilling to accept risk’. They search for strong 
leaders and this tends to benefit the right or can lead to the breakdown of democracy.60
As with other authors he sees the left as benefiting most from the prosperity of the 
upswing. Like Hobsbawm he sees the early part of upswings as being uneventful. In 
addition he is also uncertain about the changes in the downswing, but allows for a greater 
shift to the right than most other authors concede. However, unlike other writers his 
explanation is purely psychological with no mention of structural changes or market 
forces.
As such, there is an established body of literature, albeit a small and eclectic one, that 
has linked the changing fortunes of the political and social movements of the left and 
right to changes within the long-wave. In addition there appears to have emerged 
something of a consensus over the years as to the nature of these changes. Almost 
invariably they are seen as being international in their range, whilst most accounts 
describe these changes as occurring in those countries that have industrialized and are 
either in the process of introducing democracy or have already done so. Little is said of 
agrarian and undeveloped economies or of authoritarian regimes. In addition, the pattern 
is considered to be cyclical in that it repeats across each long-wave.
There is some agreement on the pattern of change. This usually sees the left as 
emerging strongly in the upswing with a peak of radicalism towards its end. However, the 
left fares more poorly in the downswing, although there may be something of a revival
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towards the end. The fortunes of the left and right are more uncertain in the downswing 
with no clear pattern emerging.
However, these accounts also suffer a number of problems. In particular most authors 
have concentrated on the fortunes of the left, usually concentrating on its more successful 
periods and with little being said of periods of defeat. By contrast, either little or nothing 
is said of the right by most authors. In particular, the electoral and ideological success of 
the right during the 1980s is hardly even mentioned, even by Hobsbawm. Was the right 
equally successful in previous downswings? In addition, little is said of the periods at the 
beginning of both the upswing and the downswing, both areas suffer from neglect in the 
literature. The period at the end of the downswing is also contentious with some authors, 
such as Screpanti, denying any generalized left revival.
Further, there is no real agreement on the causes of these trends. All authors agree 
that long-wave economics are at the base of these changes, and that long-term changes in 
the state of the economy are the root cause. For the labour historians, the changing state 
of the labour market is nearly always mentioned. But the mechanism which transmits the 
changes in the state of the economy to changes in the fortunes of political and social 
movements differs from author to author. A wide variety of explanations are offered that 
range across the structural, generational, psychological and organizational.
A possible reason for this wide variety of explanations is that few of the accounts have 
been based on a systematic comparative analysis of the countries involved. Often, 
‘political highlights’ in certain countries are used and taken to be typical of the particular 
period, without examination of whether similar trends were occurring elsewhere. It is 
possible that these events could be simply national peculiarities rather than universal 
trends. In addition ‘quiet periods’ are either ignored or lack explanation.
In addition, these accounts rarely refer to existing theoretical explanations offered by 
political science in an attempt to explain this pattern of change. Accounts within political 
science to explain the dynamic nature of the modem political process have mostly 
focussed on voting behaviour, party competition and class stmggle. Of these only the 
latter has been extensively used within the literature linking the changes experienced by 
the left and right to long-waves. Theories of party competition and voting behaviour have
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been almost entirely neglected, but these ought, at the very least, to offer some insight to 
why these changes are occurring.
1.4 Research Design
The aim of the thesis is to test the hypothesis that there is a correlation between long­
wave economics and the fortunes of the political and social movements of the left and 
right. As such it will attempt to define more exactly any pattern of correlation that is 
found. In addition it will explore the possible causes for this correlation, and attempt to 
provide a more concise explanation for why this correlation occurs.
The use of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ are discussed in Appendix A and definitions 
provided that centre around the concept of distributive power. For the purposes of this 
thesis it is these definitions of left and right that are used throughout.
Chapter 2 will follow a comparative historical approach in an attempt to establish if 
any correlation exists between the fortunes of the left and right and long-wave 
economics, and if so what the pattern of that correlation is.
In investigating long-wave phenomena, researchers have had to face a number of 
problems. Firstly, the fact that there have only been four long-waves to date. This gives 
researchers only a small number of cases to investigate and the concomitant problems 
that are associated with this. A second problem is that over a period of fifty years there is 
a multitude of occurrences within that time span, making it difficult to identify the 
essential from the incidental. A third problem is that the quality and quantity of 
information available to social scientists covering the last two hundred years has varied 
dramatically. Whilst it is impossible to compensate entirely for these problems, 
researchers have attempted to overcome them in several ways.
One way of expanding the number of cases to be researched is to study long-wave 
developments in several countries. For this reason this thesis will be studying the political 
changes that have occurred in four countries. The countries chosen are Britain, France, 
Germany and the USA. These four countries were chosen, firstly, because they were 
amongst the first to industrialise. For most researchers, long-waves are usually seen as 
arising around the time of the Industrial Revolution and are closely linked to the post-
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agrarian era that followed. Any pattern of political change associated with long-waves is 
thus most likely to occur within industrial/post-industrial economies. By choosing early 
industrializes, this maximises the number of case studies that are likely to be 
encountered. Secondly, these are amongst the four most studied countries within the 
social sciences thus offering a higher quantity, and hopefully quality, of information, a
t V iparticular problem in the early decades of the 19 Century.
In addition I have chosen to study four countries to eliminate political changes that 
may be country-specific. By following a comparative approach it is possible to eliminate 
trends, events or occurrences that are not found in all four countries -  the incidental -  and 
to identify features that are common to all four countries -  the essential. Given that long- 
waves have always been identified as a feature of the international economy, occurring 
simultaneously across the developed world this leaves the possibility that such essential 
features may have their causation in long-wave economics. It removes the possibility that 
any particular feature of political change is a result of the particular development of that 
country rather than an expression of long-wave economics.
However, a further possible explanation of any such changes, may be that these four 
economies are experiencing a typical linear, or modemizational, pattern of development 
undergone by any economy that embarks on the process of industrialisation, for instance 
that associated with Rostow.61 A common set of experiences may simply result from the 
common experience of a specific form of economic development. In order to control for 
this it is necessary to study developments in political change over all four long-waves, in 
addition to the reason of maximising the number of case studies. If a similar pattern of 
political change is found to be repeating within each long-wave, i.e. on a cyclical basis, it 
is unlikely to be resulting from a linear form of development.
Chapter 2 will establish a largely descriptive account of the political changes 
experienced by the left and right within the four countries over the period of four long- 
waves. From this description, any pattern or correlation between the fortunes of the 
movements of the left and right and long-waves will be established. Long-wave 
researchers are divided on the exact dates that constitute long-waves. Appendix B will 
use a largely empirical approach in an attempt to establish a particular set of dates that
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periodises long-waves such that they can be used as the basis for Chapter 2’s 
investigation into their relationship with political change.
The existence of a correlation is not of course proof of causation. In addition, there 
may be any number of theories providing possible causation. As such, Chapters 3. 4 & 5 
will each deal with the possible causations for the pattern of correlation found in Chapter 
3. In turn, the chapters will deal with ideas and voting behaviour, class struggle and party 
competition approaches to political change. These have been the three main approaches 
within the field of political science to explain the dynamic nature of the political process 
in modem societies. As such, the three approaches should be able to help offer 
explanations as to why the movements of the left and right might enjoy varying levels of 
support over the course of a long-wave.
Chapter 6 will summarize the pattern of change that the left and right have experienced 
in connection with long-wave economics. It will attempt to account for differences 
observed within the existing literature (reviewed in Chapter 1). In a similar vein it will 
also analyze the question of causation. Chapter 7 will discuss historical anomalies, 
occurrences where particular movements of the left and right have managed to diverge 
from the typical pattern with the aim of understanding more closely the link between 
long-wave economics and the fortunes of the left and right. Finally, the chapter will 
discuss the implications of the research findings for long-wave and political science 
theory.
23
1 D. Bell, The End of Ideology, The Free Press, 1960; S. M. Lipset, Political Man, 
Heinemann, 1963.
2 A. Schlesinger, The Vital Center, Houghton Mifflin, 1949; R. Aron, The Opium of the 
Intellectuals, Greenwood Press, 1977; E.Shils, ‘The End of Ideology?’ Encounter 5, Nov. 
1955; ‘Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectuals’ Sewanee Review 66, 
Jul-Sept 1958, pp.450-80; see also S. M. Lipset, Political Man Updated, Chapter 15, 
John Hopkins University Press, 1981; F. Furedi, Mythical Past, Elusive Future, Pluto 
Press, 1992; K. Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time, Kegan Paul, 1943; Ideology and 
Utopia, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960.
3 See for instance, C. Lemke & G. Marks (eds), The Crisis of Socialism in Europe, 
Duke University Press, 1992.
4 See for instance, R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution,: Changing Values and Political 
Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton University Press, 1977.
5C. Lemke & G. Marks (eds), The Crisis of Socialism in Europe, Duke University 
Press, 1992.
6 O. Clarke, Conclusions: Towards a synthesis of international and comparative 
experience of nine countries. In G.J Bamber & R.D. Lansbury, International and 
Comparative Relations, Routledge, 1993.
7 See for instance, A. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right, Polity Press, 1994; The Third 
Way: the renewal of social democracy, Polity Press, 1998.
8 A. M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History, Andre Deutsch, 1987.
9 Schlesinger’s recent phases were:
1932-52 public action
1952-60 private interest 
1960-76 public action 
1976-80s private interest
A. M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History, Andre Deutsch, 1987, p.32
10 See for instance, E. Hobsbawm, The New Century, Little, Brown & Co. 2000.
11 For a detailed account of the history of long-wave research, see J. Goldstein, Long 
Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale University Press 1988, pp.21-174; 
N.H. Mager, The Kondratieff Waves, Praeger, 1987, pp.21-66; E. Mandel Long-waves
24
of Capitalist Development (The Marxist Interpretation), Cambridge University Press, 
1980, pp.122-146; J. Tinberg, ‘Kondratiev Cycles and So-Called Long-Waves: The 
Early Research’, in C. Freeman (Ed) Long-Waves in the World Economy, Butterworth, 
1983; J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
12 J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale University 
Press 1988, pp.21-60. See also, J. Delbeke, ‘Recent Long-Wave Theories: A critical 
survey’, in C. Freeman (Ed) Long-Waves in the World Economy, Butterworth, 1983.
13 J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale University 
Press 1988, p.7.
14 A variety of such theories exist. See for instance, T. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, (eds.) 
World Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology, Sage Publications, 1982; G. Imbert, 
Des Mouvements de longue duree Kondratieff, Office universitaire de polycopie, 1956; 
J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale University 
Press, 1988, pp.72-75 for the dating systems given by different authorities -Braudel, 
Imbert, Baehrel, Wagemann, and Mauro.. Long-waves in the pre-industrial era appear to 
be highly irregular in length, varying between 20 and 65 years in duration, suggesting 
that their causation is different from those of the industrial era.
15 J. Goldstein in Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale University 
Press, 1988, p.67.
16 See for instance: E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, NLB, 1975; Long-waves of Capitalist 
Development (The Marxist Interpretation), Cambridge University Press, 1980; ‘The 
International Debate on Long-Waves of Capitalist Development: An Intermediary 
Balance Sheet’, in A. Kleinknecht, E. Mandel, I. Wallerstein (Eds.) New Findings in 
Long-wave Research, St. Martins Press, 1992; J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and 
War in the Modem Age, Yale University Press 1988; E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, NLB, 
1975; S. Solomou, Economic Cycles; Long cycles and business cycles since 1870, 
Manchester University Press, 1998; J.A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, McGraw-Hill, 
1939; C. Freeman, Long Waves in the World Economy, Butterworths, 1983; J.W. 
Forrester, Business Structure, Economic Cycles, and National Policy, MIT Systems 
Dynamics Group D-2245-2, 1975; G. Mensch, Stalemate in Technology: Innovations
25
Overcome the Depression, Ballinger, 1979; J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic 
Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
17 C. Perez, ‘Structural Change and Assimilation of New Technology in the Economic 
and Social System’ in C. Freeman, Design, Innovation and Long Cycles, Francis Pinter, 
1984; C. Freeman & C. Perez, ‘Structural crises of adjustment: business cycle and 
investment behaviour’, in G. Dosi et al, Technical Change and Economic Theory, 
Francis Pinter, 1988; C. Perez, “Structural Change and Assimilation of New 
Technologies in the Economic and Social System’, Futures, vol. 15 no. 4 October 1983 
357-375; A. Tylecote, The Long-Wave in the World Economy: the present crisis in 
historical perspective, Routledge, 1992.
1 R See for instance, M. Salvati, Political Business Cycles and Long-waves in Industrial 
Relations: Notes on Kalecki and Phelps Brown, in C. Freeman, (ed) Long-waves in the 
World Economy, Butterworths, 1983; E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and 
Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 7, no.2, 1984, pp.509-548. Both authors 
suggest that the high level of industrial action at the end of each upswing is in some way 
responsible for the sluggish performance of economies during the following downswing, 
indeed is instrumental in bringing the downswing about. Possibly this results from a rise 
in real wages whilst productivity lags behind, resulting in falling profit levels.
19 For a more detailed account of the theoretical and political differences that existed 
between Kondratieff and Trotsky see J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in 
the Modem Age, Yale University Press 1988, pp.29-31; E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, 
NLB, 1975, pp. 122-137; R.Day, ‘The theory of the long cycle: Kondratieff, Trotsky, 
Mandel’, New Left Review, 99, 1976, 67-82.
20 H. Rosenberg, ‘Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873- 
1896 in Central Europe’ Economic History Review, 1943 Vol. 13 No.l&2 pp.58-73.
21 H. Rosenberg, ‘Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873- 
1896 in Central Europe’ Economic History Review, 1943 Vol. 13 No.l&2 p. 64.
22 J.T. Dunlop, ‘The Development of Labor Organization: A Theoretical Framework’ in 
R.A. Lester & J. Shister, ‘Insights into Labor Issues’, Macmillan, 1948.
23 J.T. Dunlop, ‘The Development of Labor Organization: A Theoretical Framework’ 
pp.190-191, in R.A. Lester & J. Shister, ‘Insights into Labor Issues’, Macmillan, 1948.
26
24 J.T. Dunlop, ‘The Development of Labor Organization: A Theoretical Framework’ 
p. 192, in R.A. Lester & J. Shister, ‘Insights into Labor Issues’, Macmillan, 1948.
25 E.J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968.
26 D.M. Gordon, ‘Up and Down the Long Roller Coaster’ in U.S. Capitalism in Crisis, 
Union for Radical Political Economics, 1978.
27 J. Cronin, ‘Stages, Cycles and Insurgencies: The Economics of Unrest’ in T.K. 
Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, (eds.) Processes of the World-System, pp.101-118, Sage 
Publications, 1980; J. Cronin, Industrial Conflict in Modem Britain, Croom Helm, 1979; 
E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 7, 
no.2, 1984, pp.509-548; Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 
British Journal o f Industrial Relations, 1987, 25, No.l, pp.99-124. J. Kelly, Rethinking 
Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long-Waves, Routledge/LSE, 1998, 
pp.83-108.
28 To some extent, Cronin’s theory thus follows the school of though associated with 
Schumpeter, in maintaining that capitalism goes through a period of major industrial 
innovation through the introduction of new technologies at some point in the late 
downswing. For Cronin, each new wave of industrial innovation also brings with it a re­
invented working class.
29 E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 
7, no.2, 1984, pp.509-548.
30 J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long-Waves, 
Routledge/LSE, 1998, pp.83-108.
31 E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 
7, no .2 ,1984, pp.509-548.
32 J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long-Waves, 
Routledge/LSE, 1998, pp.83-108. J.E. Cronin Industrial Conflict in Modem Britain, 
Croom Helm, 1979.
33 M. Salvati, Political Business Cycles and Long-waves in Industrial Relations: Notes 
on Kalecki and Phelps Brown, in C. Freeman, (ed) Long-waves in the World Economy, 
Butterworths, 1983. See also M. Kalecki, ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’
27
Political Quarterly Part 4, 1943, pp.322-331; H. Phelps Brown, ‘A Non-Monetarist 
View of the Pay Explosion’ Three Banks Review March 1975, No. 105 pp.3-24.
34 E. Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development (The Marxist Interpretation), 
Cambridge University Press, 1980.
35 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-1848, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1962.
36 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1975; The 
Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1994.
37 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes 1914-1991: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, 
London, Michael Joseph, 1994.
The dates for long-wave periodicities are taken partly from J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: 
Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988; but 
also from E. Mandel, Long Waves of Capitalist Development: The Marxist 
Interpretation, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980), and J. A. Schumpeter, 
Business Cycles, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939). For more modem dates I have 
followed J.J. van Duijn, The Long Wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 
1983, and E. Hobsbawm, The New Century, Little Brown & Co. 2000. The dates shown 
are those typically used by long-wave researchers, not the averages given by Goldstein.
39 The concepts of the mid-Victorian Boom and the Great Depression have both been 
challenged, see for instance, S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression, 1873-1896, 
Macmillan, 1969; R. A. Church, The Great Victorian Boom, 1850-73, Macmillan, 1975.
40 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1994, p.48.
41 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, p.87.
42 E. Hobsbawm, The New Century, Little Brown & Co. 2000.
43 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-1848, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1962, 
pp.138-163, 254-262.
44 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1975, 
pp.122-142.
45 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1994, pp.84-141.
46 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, pp.282-286.
28
47 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1994, pp.101-141.
48 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, pp.54-84.
49 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, pp.109-141, 166-170.
50 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, pp.408-413, 416-417.
51 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, pp.416-417.
52 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1975, 
pp.128-129.
53 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1994, pp.112-121.
54 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, p.285.
55 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1994, p.98, pp.101-104.
56 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, pp.109-141.
57 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., 1994, p.408, pp.416-418.
c o  #
R. Beckman, The Downwave: Surviving the Second Great Depression, Milestone 
Publications, 1983.
59 R. Beckman, The Downwave: Surviving the Second Great Depression, Milestone 
Publications, 1983, pp.34-39.
60;R. Beckman, The Downwave: Surviving the Second Great Depression, Milestone 
Publications, 1983, pp.39-42. The theoretical origins of Beckman’s explanation are not 
clear, but appear to be derived from Peter L. Cogan’s ‘The Rhythmic Cycles of Optimism 
and Pessimism’ , The William-Frederick Press, New York, 1969.
61 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto (3rd 
Edition), Cambridge University Press, 1990.
29
CHAPTER TWO 
POLITICAL HISTORY and LONG-WAVE ECONOMICS
Introduction
The presence of long-waves in the world economy since the beginning of the 19th 
century gives rise to the question of whether they can be linked to political and social 
developments during the last two centuries. This chapter will chronicle the major political 
changes and developments of Britain, USA, France and Germany, all early 
industrializers, throughout the period within which long-waves are considered to have 
occurred, with the intention of discerning any pattern of political change that might 
correlate with long-wave economics, thus confirming or disproving the patterns 
considered in the previous chapter.
The chapter will follow the changing fortunes of political, social and economic ideas 
and the ideologies, parties and movements of the left and right. In doing so it will also 
follow the changing nature of party competition in each period, the changing fortunes of 
the different social classes and the labour movement and level of worker mobilisation. 
The periods and dates given for the four long waves in Appendix B will be used to 
structure the political and social history of these four countries.
2.1 First Long-Wave 1803-1848
The First Long-Wave Upswing of 1803-1825 is closely associated with The Industrial 
Revolution, a period of rapid economic expansion in the British economy that marked the 
beginning of the modem industrial era. Elsewhere, the economies of France, USA and 
Germany remained overwhelmingly agrarian in nature, with only tentative beginnings of 
industrialisation.
At the beginning of the period all four countries were still dominated politically and 
economically by landed and/or financial oligarchies. In terms of the political climate, the 
period was marked by adjustment to the French and American revolutions and the 
political and military repercussions of these events. In general, this early period witnessed
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a period of political consolidation following the revolutions, and the establishment of 
new political orthodoxies, except in Britain where the old regime continued.
In Britain,1 the period began with the continuation of a Loyalist consensus supporting 
state, crown and church, established in response to a short-lived outbreak of Radicalism 
following the French Revolution of 1789. The Radical movement was quickly 
suppressed, in part by Loyalist mobs and in part by the state. The Loyalist consensus 
continued to hold, and was maintained by support for the Napoleonic Wars, until around 
1810/12. At this point the first signs of the re-emergence of Radical thought occurred, 
though the movement did not gain significant influence until after 1815.
In the USA,2 following the revolution and the institution of a republic, political 
tendencies divided between a more elitist and centralising Federalism, and a more 
democratic-leaning and decentralising Republican movement that was considered closer 
to the ideals of the French Revolution. Initially, the political scene was dominated by the 
Federalist agenda of centralisation, restricted democracy and support for financial elites. 
In general the status quo was preserved, though a more reactionary period at the 
beginning of the 19th century saw the implementation of restrictive laws on the freedom 
of speech by the Federalists.
In France,3 the conservative Directorate had became established in government and 
attempted to steer a middle course between the monarchist right and Jacobin left. 
However, it continued to face political opposition from both sides including both Jacobin 
and Royalist offensives until, facing economic crisis, it finally collapsed in 1799. It was 
replaced by the Consulate of Napoleon until 1804, which was then replaced by the 
Napoleonic Empire until 1815.
To some extent Napoleon continued the middle course, shifting power towards the 
executive, restoring power to the Church and nobility, but also introducing the 
Napoleonic Code that guaranteed certain legal equalities to the wider population and 
continued the right of ordinary people to hunt -  one of the most important gains of the 
French Revolution. During the course of Napoleon’s rule both taxation and conscription 
were extended whilst the regime became increasingly bureaucratic and despotic. 
Opposition to the regime was limited in scope and it was military defeat that finally 
brought an end to the dictatorship.
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In Germany,4 the years from 1792 onwards were dominated by the occupation of 
Napoleon’s troops. At the beginning of the period, the territory was made up of several 
hundred states of vastly differing sizes. Napoleon’s occupation had the effect of reducing 
this number to 38, notably during the years 1792-1806. Reform was instituted from 
above, political, social, economic, legal and administrative changes were made as the old 
feudal order was dismantled and change instituted which reflected the influence of the 
French state and Napoleonic Code. After the unrest of the late 1790s, the 1800s were 
more politically stable. The new states set about consolidating their position through 
constitutionalism and representation, though the latter was based on highly restrictive 
franchises. However, despite reform, the nobility were able to continue their political, 
military and economic dominance, and, notably in Prussia, reorganise so that the years 
1813-15 were spent at war with France, with Prussian troops eventually defeating 
Napoleon in 1815.
At some point during the first twenty years of the century these established regimes 
and their political consensus all faced a political challenge from the left. In general, this 
was often centred upon demands for greater democracy and a wider electoral franchise 
and political participation.
In the USA, the Jeffersonian Republicans scored a famous electoral victory in 1800. 
They sought a more democratic and egalitarian society and numerous extensions of the 
franchise at state level were carried out between 1800 and 1810, and later during 1818- 
21, in the face of opposition from the Federalists. In addition, they repealed the previous 
repressive legislation of the Federalists. However, although successful in the political 
sphere, the Republicans faced a more concerted attempt by the Federalists to preserve a 
system based on economic inequality. Federalist supporters within the judiciary and 
legislature were able, by 1816, to adopt the ‘American system’ of tariffs, internal 
improvements and support for the ‘financial oligarchy’ with the result of stemming the 
tide of Republican reform in the economic sphere. Although the Federalist Party 
collapsed in the process, and Republican presidents were elected largely unopposed 
through to 1824, it was the Federalist economic agenda that prevailed.
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The 1820s saw the tentative beginnings of a trade-union movement and of industry in 
New England and the years 1824-5 also saw a period of union building and a spate of 
strikes, though predominantly amongst artisans.
In Britain, in the late-1810s, the Loyalist consensus gradually gave way to more 
progressive political movements that challenged, not only the status quo, but also the 
aristocratic hegemony. From 1816 onwards, middle and working class Reformist 
movements spread rapidly across the country, especially through the network of 
Stockport and Hampden Clubs. Closely associated with the Reform movement of the 
1810s was the emergence of Liberal Radicalism. First and foremost Radicals were 
opposed to the Com Laws instituted after the end of the Napoleonic Wars to support 
agricultural prices, but as attempts to repeal them failed, Radicals sought to extend the 
popular suffrage in order to extend the political influence of the industrial bourgeoisie 
and repeal the restrictive trade legislation. The movement for reform led to a series of 
mass demonstrations that culminated in the massacre of demonstrators at Peterloo in 
1819. Although the movements continued into the early 1820s they failed to attract their 
previous level of support or militancy.
From 1820 onwards, the political mood generated by Radical Liberalism appears to 
have been strong enough to have influenced the ruling Tories. The period of Tory rule 
between 1822 and 1827 is marked by the emergence of Liberal Toryism, and saw a less 
autocratic approach to both domestic and foreign policy, and a number of reforms to the 
economy and to the running of government. The period between 1820 and 1825 also saw 
the spread of Owenite socialism and co-operativism as well as trade unionism amongst 
the working class. Pressure for trade-union legalisation built up during this period and 
eventually proved successful with the repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824, resulting 
in a further upsurge of union building and industrial action.
In France, the Restoration established a constitutional monarchy in 1815. Initially the 
government was conservative in nature, but between 1817-19, liberal reformers became 
increasingly important and influential and the franchise extended slightly. However, in 
1820 following the assassination of a royalist, the electoral law was altered to allow the 
vote to only the extremely wealthy and a reactionary government ruled from 1821
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onwards. Its rule was marked by efforts to increase the influence of the church and 
nobility. In Germany, following the Restoration of 1815, constitution building continued 
until 1819. In that year the monarch Frederick William III was persuaded that reform had 
lasted long enough and had gone too far, and a period of reaction and repression followed 
throughout the 1820s, any opposition political movements were driven underground.
The First Long-Wave Downswing of 1825-1848 initially saw a more politically 
tumultuous period with a more determined attempt by left reformers to challenge the 
status quo.
In Britain,5 the political climate initially continued as the upswing had finished. 
However, by the end of the 1820s Liberal Toryism was beginning to unravel. The passing 
of Catholic Emancipation by Liberal Tories provoked a right-wing backlash within the 
Tories, from which the Whigs benefited, coming to power in 1830. Their arrival in 
government was accompanied by the re-emergence of the Reformist movement of the 
previous decade, with both the middle and working-classes demanding extensive political 
reform.
The granting of the Great Reform Bill of 1832 and the Abolition of Slavery (1833), 
amid the resurgence of both middle and working class Reform movements, widespread 
demonstrations and political unrest, marked an early highpoint for Liberal Radicalism. 
For the working class, however, the period was one of major setbacks. Following a 
largely successful employer’s offensive of 1825/6, many unions collapsed. Organised 
labour responded with a movement of general unionism from 1829-34. Closely 
associated with Owenism, but also early syndicalist thinking, the unions of the Grand 
National and Consolidated Trade Union (GNCTU), initially sought to promote the 
common ownership of industry. However, a renewed employer’s offensive and high 
unemployment had destroyed the movement by 1833/4. The working class thus suffered 
the double blow of failing to gain the vote and of seeing its union and co-operative 
movement shattered. To make matters worse the Poor Law of 1834 and the hated 
workhouse were introduced.
In the USA,6 following the downturn of 1825, the union and strike movement 
collapsed, though by 1827 the Workingman’s Party had been established and a more
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general unionism created, both of which lasted through to the early 1830s. 1828 saw the 
election of the Jacksonian Democrats, a movement that sought to revive the spirit of 
Jefferson’s Republicanism after the more conservative period of 1816-1828, though the 
challenge to the status quo was an economic rather than political one. Jackson was 
supported by elements from the South, West, organised labour and Eastern banks and 
entrepreneurs, all of whom had a common enemy in the national Bank and many of 
whom opposed the American System and the ‘financial aristocracy’. Jackson’s attempts 
at a more egalitarian order were largely concentrated on abolishing the Bank. It was 
effectively defeated by 1834 and separated from the state in 1836, but its replacement 
with a hard money programme alienated sections of his support.
In France,7 the liberals were able to respond to the reactionary rule of the ultras and 
from 1825 onwards opposition to the regime increased. Ultra rule came to an end in 1827 
and the king sought to establish a compromise government. However, the forces of left 
and right began to mobilise against the government and the king called elections in 1830. 
The liberal opposition scored an overwhelming electoral victory and the king sought to 
dissolve the assembly, restrict the electorate and increase censorship. The response was 
the 1830 revolutionary uprising, which saw the establishment of the July monarchy, the 
extension of the franchise, and represented a political triumph over those who wanted to 
restore the pre-1789 order. Political unrest, however, continued notably amongst workers 
as they sought better working conditions, riots and strikes broke out intermittently and the 
protests were only finally dissipated in 1834 through military and legal repression.
Following the poor harvest of 1830 and the outbreak of revolution in France, similar
o
events occurred in Germany in the years 1830-2. Although a number of states 
established new constitutions, the uprisings were crushed militarily and the previous 
period of repression and reaction was re-established throughout the rest of the decade.
From around the mid-1830s onwards, the challenge from the left subsided and the 
political events of the period were somewhat more subdued. In Britain, the extension of 
the vote to sections of the middle-class was followed by a decline in both the level and 
militancy of Radicalism throughout the rest of the 1830s and early 1840s. In contrast, this 
period saw a gradual shift towards the right. Initially the Tories sought to reverse the
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reform bill with the support of the king, but this ended in failure. The rest of the decade 
was then spent by both Tories and Whigs attempting to define the terms of voter 
registration in their own favour. This was pursued with vigour by the Tories whilst 
support for the Whigs declined, but by the time the Tories came to power in 1841 the 
Whigs had survived the worst Tory offensive and established a level of registration 
acceptable to both parties. The battle over registration tended to dissipate the forces of 
Radicalism and this period represented an early nadir for the progressive movement.
In the USA, in the economic boom of 1830-37, the trade-union movement expanded 
steadily, however, support for Jackson amongst organised labour began to fall away as he 
failed to oppose the power of the local banks. Towards the end of the boom more strikes 
occurred, but after the economic collapse of 1837, both the union and strike movement 
collapsed. The radical Democrats and organised labour shifted leftwards but became 
increasingly isolated. By now the main opposition to the Democrats were the 
conservative Whigs, following in the Federalist tradition, but now no longer anti­
democratic nor in favour of reviving the Bank. In the economic depression of the late 
1830s the Whigs gained increasing support and were elected in 1840. Following their 
resounding defeat, conservatives captured control of the Democrats. Conservative 
Democrat administrations followed that of the Whigs, marking a more conservative shift 
in government after Jackson’s economic reforms.
In France, after the unrest of 1830-4, the years until 1840 were politically quiet. The 
government was conservative in nature and their was little in the way of open opposition. 
This was also the case in Germany, though here the government was more reactionary in 
nature, continuing a higher level of repression and censorship.
However, from the beginning of the 1840s the challenge to the status quo and 
conservatism was once again renewed both on the political and the economic front.
In Britain, amongst the middle-classes, agricultural protectionism took the blame for 
the severe economic crisis of the early 1840s, and the mid-1840s saw the re-emergence of 
Radicalism as it sought to revive the campaign for the repeal of the Com Laws. The Anti- 
Corn Law League, through a voter registration drive and the threat of political unrest 
eventually proved successful in influencing the Whig and Tory leaders to repeal the Com
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Laws. The Tories, however, split over the issue, allowing a new Whig government in 
1846, thus marking a major revival and success for Liberal Radicalism. There followed a 
period of social reform and factory reform legislation, though the legislation tended to be 
the minimal acceptable to employers and often ineffective. In their weakened and divided 
state, the Tories had little choice but to accept the Liberal reforms leading to the 
establishment of the mid-Victorian consensus.
The depression of the early 1840s, saw the re-emergence of working-class political 
activity - the desperate but unsuccessful attempts of the Chartists to secure suffrage for 
the working class. Industrial activity remained limited, with the exception of an attempted 
general strike known as the ‘Plug Riots’ by Chartist supporters in August 1842. Initially 
the strike gained widespread support in the industrial heart-lands of Yorkshire and 
Lancashire, notably amongst mill workers, and was accompanied by demonstrations in 
London. However, the strike attracted only intermittent support elsewhere and a 
combination of troop deployment, government resistance and limited solidarity ensured 
the strike petered out despite support continuing into mid-September.
In the better economic climate of the mid-1840s, this period witnessed a revival in the 
fortunes of trade-unionism and saw the beginnings of New Model Unionism amongst 
organised labour, whilst movements agitating for factory reform and the improvement of 
working conditions met some success. A revival in Chartism in 1848 proved short-lived 
and unsuccessful.
In France, the 1840s witnessed a far greater level of opposition to the ruling 
government than was the case in the later 1830s. 1840 saw the short-lived centre-left 
government of the liberal Thiers. Most of its reforms were economic, but nationalist 
demonstrations and a strike wave led to conservative fears of revolution and the king 
brought the government to an abrupt end. A conservative government under Guizot 
followed for the next seven years, but opposition from the left remained a feature of the 
decade. In 1848, opposition spilled over into revolution. The revolution followed a period 
of social unrest caused by the poor harvests of 1846-7.9
Initially the forces of liberalism moved against the monarchy and successfully 
established a republic and universal male suffrage. However, working-class radicals 
pressed for more radical social and political reform and for socialism. Fearing renewed
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revolution, most of the middle-classes, having achieved their aims, shifted to a more 
conservative position. Positions became polarised between the radicals and the 
conservatives as the centre became vacated. The conservatives proved to be far stronger 
and consolidated their hold on power, and a period of repression and reaction followed, 
resulting in the end of the Republic in 1851 and the implementation of a dictatorship by 
Louis Napoleon.
Events in Germany paralleled those in France. The 1840s saw a growing level of 
opposition to the monarchist regime, with both radical and liberal ideas and movements 
gaining in influence. A number of revolts broke out notably during the poor harvest years 
of 1845-7. However, conservatism remained in the ascendancy until revolution spread 
from France in 1848. The revolution was less profound than in France, both liberals and 
radicals were politically weaker. Most of the initial gains made by liberalism were 
eventually counteracted by a coalition of middle-class and aristocratic conservatives that, 
as in France, feared further revolution. The outcome was a more representative polity 
than pre-1848, but one biased towards the monarchy.
In the USA, from around 1840 onwards, slavery became the most significant political 
issue. The abolitionist movement had grown gradually during the 1830s despite the initial 
opposition of the Democrats and the Whigs, both of whom saw its potential to divide 
their fragile coalitions. For most of the period the Whigs were usually the opposition 
party and, as such, proved to be more ready to take up the abolitionist cause as they 
searched for a popular issue to propel them into power. The official position of the 
majority party, the Democrats, remained opposed to abolishing slavery.
During the 1840s, however, the two major parties faced third party challenges from 
the Liberty Party and the Free Soil Party, both of which favoured abolition. Neither was 
able to sustain a continual challenge, but the parties were successful enough to hold the 
balance of power in a number of states, and thus became a force that the major parties 
had to deal with. The abolitionist cause was most popular in the North, and it was here 
that the Whigs and Democrats began to support an abolitionist position. This led to 
tensions over the issue of slavery within the two major parties. In general Whigs and 
Democrats in the North were more likely to support abolition, whilst those in the South
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continued to support slavery. The issue thus became cross cutting for both parties, 
especially for the Whigs.
Tensions between the North and the South, and expressed within the Whigs and 
Democrats were so great, that the leaders of the two parties sought a compromise position 
in order to preserve national unity as well as that of their parties. In 1850, they achieved a 
historic compromise that allowed slavery to continue in the South, but made it illegal to 
adopt slavery in states where it was not already in existence, and initially the compromise 
proved electorally popular.
2.2 Second Long-Wave 1848-1896
The Second Long-Wave Upswing10 (1848-1873), corresponds with Hobsbawm’s Age 
o f Capital, a period that saw the spread of industrial capitalism across much of Western 
Europe in the 1850s, and its acceleration across parts of North America from the 1860s 
onwards. In political terms, it witnessed the rise of middle-class Liberalism vying for 
power with the landed oligarchies, and the political and social movements of the working 
class seeking to establish themselves amid rapid industrialisation.
In Britain,11 in political terms, the period began with the prosperous years of the mid- 
Victorian Consensus, also known as the Age o f Equipoise. The consensus was largely 
defined by a Liberal agenda of free trade and free enterprise, but saw little significant 
political change during the course of the 1850s. This was also the case on the Continent, 
where, following the political compromise of 1848-51 between the aristocracy and 
emergent bourgeoisie, a period of conservative consensus dominated the 1850s. Amongst 
organised labour there was little industrial action nor any militant trade union or political 
movement, but in the better economic climate, trade unions enjoyed improved 
organisation and increasing membership.
In the USA,12 the 1850 Compromise remained intact despite much antagonism 
between North and South. At the national level, the consensus over the issue of slavery 
held throughout the decade, and did not break down until the election of Abraham 
Lincoln in 1860. At the state level, however, it did not placate the militants of either side. 
The Democrats won the 1852 election on a ‘Compromise platform’; whilst the Whigs
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divided over abolition. In the same year, the Northern Whigs adopted a resolution stating 
that the Compromise of 1850 was only a temporary measure. The Southern Whigs left 
the conference, and in 1854 the split within the party became final due to divisions over 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill which proposed to extend slavery to these two newly formed 
states. The Northern Whigs opposed the bill, whilst the Southerners supported it, and the 
party thus ceased to be a national force.
The demise of the Whigs allowed the rise of the Republican Party and its replacement 
as the major opposition party to the majority Democrat Party. Republicanism stood for 
liberal capitalism, free labour, opposition to slavery, and supported the economic interests 
of independent farmers and small business. The conservative-controlled Democrats were 
now the party in favour of slavery. The Republicans quickly made electoral gains in the 
mid-1850s on a position of opposing the Kansas-Nebraska bill, notably in the North and 
amongst abolitionists, and were, within a few years, the majority party in the North. The 
Democrats, however, remained the majority party across the whole country, and won the 
1856 election, but took the blame for the downturn in the business cycle the next year. 
The Republicans blamed the economic problems on the Democrats low tariff policy, and 
made further electoral gains in the North. By 1858, the party realignment of the 1850s 
was complete and the Democrat-Republican party system was firmly established. The 
political position before the industrialisation and Civil War of the 1860s was thus one of 
an abolitionist, pro-liberal capitalist Republican Party dominant in the North, whilst the 
Democrats were strongest among the slavery-supporting agricultural landowners of the 
South.
The 1860s saw the consensual period of the 1850s replaced with a more concerted 
attempt by left reformers to break with the status quo. In particular this revolved around 
breaking the power of landowners and attempts to extend capitalism, republicanism, 
parliamentary rule and representative democracy. This period saw the re-emergence of 
Republican and Liberal movements in France in opposition to the dictatorship of Louis 
Napoleon.13 Both movements gained in importance and influence sufficiently to 
influence Louis Napoleon to embark on a period of limited liberal reform throughout the
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1860s, which included a switch to free trade, greater freedom for the press, educational 
reform, and the legalisation of trade unions and the right to strike.
In Germany,14 the political tide turned towards Liberalism after 1858. In the following 
decade, despite the presence of Bismarck, the Liberals made significant electoral gains 
and displaced conservatives as the dominant political force within the Prussian Reichstag 
and made some progress towards a more parliamentary form of government, though the 
monarchy continued to control the executive. However, on the left the Liberals witnessed 
sections of the working class moving away from liberalism and two Socialist parties 
emerged after 1863. In addition, the right to combine became established and increased 
trade union activity and organisation emerged during the 1860s, though strike activity 
was often met with state repression.
In the USA, by 1860, the political tensions over slavery had reached breaking point, 
and the Compromise of 1850 was on the verge of collapse. The coming Civil War was a 
result of these tensions, and represented a battle between two very different economic and 
social systems, systems that were increasingly incompatible as they sought different 
political solutions to their economic problems. During the war the Radical Republicans, 
supported by the industrial bourgeoisie and supporting the abolition of slavery, became 
the dominant political tendency in the North. In the South, the land-owning oligarchy was 
eventually defeated and with this military defeat came the end of slavery.
In Britain the 1860s saw the continued dominance of the Liberals, but also the 
renewed influence of Radicalism and more assertive trade unionism. Domestic politics 
was dominated by Gladstone’s aims of achieving free trade, reduced government 
expenditure and low taxation through successive budgets, in line with the Radical 
thinking of the day. Support for suffrage extension began to be popular amongst both the 
middle and working-classes and also amongst trade unionists. From 1864 onwards an 
increasingly militant suffrage movement began to gain support, whilst support for an 
improved legal position for the trade unions also gained support amongst trade unionists 
and Radicals.
Across the industrialised world, this leftward shift was to result in more radical 
positions being adopted. The late 1860s also saw a period of rising working-class
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militancy that culminated with a rapid increase in the level of trade-union organisation 
and the strike wave of 1866-73, numerous strikes occurring both in the industrial core 
and periphery. These were largely successful in nature, particularly in Britain where the 
9-hour day was widely introduced. Associated with this increasing worker militancy was 
the First International, and the revolutionary socialist and anarchist movements within it. 
All enjoyed a period of considerable influence and were marked by an optimism and 
confidence that believed that social revolution was imminent. The stronghold of the 
International was France, and the Paris Commune of 1871 marked a high point for the 
movement, though the revolutionary aims of the Commune were suppressed through 
military force and the International suffered a period of concerted repression following 
the collapse of the Commune.
The final years of the upswing also saw the extension of the suffrage in Britain in 
1867 and the radical administration of Gladstone (1868-74) and a period of concerted 
reform - a second highpoint for Liberal Radicalism. This included a protracted period of 
progressive trade-union legislation, and reform of the civil service and military in order to 
diminish the influence of the aristocracy. France, Germany and the USA all saw the 
introduction of universal male suffrage in this period.
In the USA, with the North militarily victorious, Radical Republicans whose support 
had grown during the war, were able to abolish slavery and extend the vote to blacks and 
thus implement universal male suffrage through a series of amendments to the 
constitution. As such they attempted to break the economic power of Southern 
landowners and to extend the system of liberal capitalism to the South through the 
process of Reconstruction
In Germany, Bismarck was finally able to create a unified Germany in 1871. 
Universal male suffrage was introduced to the German Reichstag, though the monarchy 
continued to control the executive through Bismarck. In the elections that followed the 
National and Progressive Liberals made significant gains and remained the dominant 
political force, spending the next two years instituting widespread constitutional reforms 
in the newly unified Germany.
In France the dictatorship of Louis Napoleon collapsed in 1871 following military 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. Republicans quickly seized their opportunity in the
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power vacuum that followed and instituted a new Republic. The Paris Commune was 
suppressed by Thiers and the less radical sections of the Republican movement with the 
aim of securing the Republic, preventing the return of the monarchy and of paving the 
way for parliamentary rule and democratic elections.
The Second Long-Wave Downswing15 is The Great Depression of 1873-96, widely 
recognised by historians as a time of economic difficulties and characterised by a long 
agricultural depression, falling prices and profits. It brought the Golden Age of 
Liberalism and free trade to an end, and gave rise to protectionism and to imperialism. 
Politically, Liberalism faced numerous setbacks, whilst the Socialist movement was 
placed squarely on the defensive. The major beneficiary of the period was Conservatism.
The early period of the Great Depression was characterised by a growing reaction by 
rightist forces towards the radical reforms and militant industrial action that characterised 
the end of the upswing. Sections of the socialist left, however, continued to pursue radical 
or revolutionary aims and a period of political turmoil followed as each sought to gain the 
upper hand in the political arena, and in which government often changed hands as left 
and right successively gained the upper hand.
In Britain, the radicalism of Gladstones’ government and trade-union militancy 
resulted in important sections of the aristocracy and middle-classes moving towards the 
Conservatives, resulting in the victory of Disraeli in 1874. Disraeli pursued a brief period 
of social reform until 1876 and a more openly imperialist policy, but, as the economy 
continued to suffer was voted out and replaced by an indecisive and divided Liberal 
administration in 1880. The Liberals aimed to implement a range of social reforms but 
internal divisions and opposition from the now Conservative-controlled House of Lords 
dogged the administration. The Liberals briefly rallied around a further extension of the 
suffrage, but once again divided over Home Rule for Ireland, protectionism and 
numerous other issues. The electorate more concerned by economic depression, than 
social or political reform voted in the Conservatives under the reactionary Lord Salisbury 
in 1886 and were to remain in power for most of the Great Depression.16
In France the battle between Republicans and Monarchists to define the nature of the 
French State initially swung in favour of the Monarchists, but with their movement
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divided, they were forced to come to a compromise with the Republicans in 1875. From 
then on, the Republicans were able to gain the upper hand and by 1879 they had secured 
a parliamentary regime. The Republic was secured and a period of institutional reform 
that included freedom of the press, the legalisation of trade unions, and educational and 
local government reform was concluded by 1884. The Republican forces meanwhile 
promptly divided between right-wing Opportunists favouring a limited state and free 
market and left-wing Radicals favouring greater state intervention in social and economic 
matters.17
In Germany, the political dominance of the National Liberals was gradually eroded 
during the 1870s. Liberalism took the blame for the economic and financial crash of 1873 
and the electorate shifted to the right, supporting protectionism and anti-Semitism, whilst 
the Conservative and Centre parties saw their electoral fortunes rise, and the left-wing 
Progressive Liberals pushed for greater public spending. In the late 1870s the National 
Liberals suffered declining support and split over an anti-Socialist law introduced by 
Bismarck in 1878, many moving to the right, and allowing a right-wing coalition to take 
power in 1878, after years of Liberal dominance. However, after purging the civil service 
and army of leftist elements and outlawing the socialist and trade union movements and 
introducing protectionism, the government was still confronted by continued economic 
difficulties. Taxes were increased and prices rose and the government lost the elections of 
1881, to be replaced by a weakened left Liberal regime that also confronted economic 
difficulties and proved short-lived, ending in 1884.18
In USA, the Republicans attempted to reconstruct the South after its military defeat 
and impose a liberal capitalist economy. However, the Democrats were able to improve 
their electoral standing by denying blacks the vote through the use of mob rule and the 
Republicans were forced to withdraw their troops in the late 1870s. Faced with economic 
depression and continuing industrial unrest both major parties had to cope with the 
challenge of third parties advocating radical monetary policies in their respective 
electoral heartlands. Increasingly both the Democrats and Republicans were forced away 
from ideological battles and Radical Reconstruction towards economic matters, notably 
tariff and monetary policies.
44
The Democrats further eroded the voting rights of blacks in the South, whilst both 
major parties adopted increasingly conservative economic policies rather than the more 
radical ones favoured by the third parties. The earlier Republican drive to dominate the 
South gradually came to a halt and they were forced to consolidate their position in the 
North whilst the Democrats maintained their control of the South. Something of a 
stalemate ensued in American politics from the late 1870s onwards. 19
In all four countries the workers movement was hit badly by rising unemployment and 
an employers offensive. Everywhere union movements were placed on the defensive and 
numerous union movements collapsed in the mid-late 1870s. Though the peak in strike 
activity passed after 1873, industrial action still remained relatively high. In Britain, 
working class Radicalism declined, as did the trade union movement, notably in the 
recession of 1878-9. The revolutionary anarchist and socialist movements on the 
Continent gradually lost impetus and faded away whilst the First International collapsed 
in 1874. Several short-lived attempts to revive the International ended in failure. Across 
much of Europe, notably in France and Germany repressive legislation diminished the 
effectiveness of organised labour. In Germany, in 1880, Socialist parties, clubs and 
newspapers together with trade-unions were outlawed and driven underground, whilst in 
France the repression of the labour movement following the defeat of the Paris Commune 
continued until an amnesty was secured in 1884.
The period of political unrest began to subside during the course of the 1880s. 
Government in this decade in all the major powers was characterised by conservative 
right-wing regimes. The period of radical social and political change largely came to an 
end as all regimes attempted to deal with the problems of the economy. Liberal free trade 
tended to take the blame for the economic difficulties and moves towards protectionism 
and imperialism gained support in an attempt to create a political and economic climate 
more conducive to economic recovery. Only in Britain did protectionism ultimately fail 
to become established, though the British Empire was greatly expanded. Imperialism 
offered the dual benefit of opening up new markets whilst providing government with a 
means of showing it was effectively dealing with the economic malaise. A more virulent
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right-wing nationalism appeared to be successfully dealing with both political and 
economic crises.
In Britain, Salisbury and the Conservatives came to power in 1886 and were to remain 
there, with the exception of a short-lived and unimpressive Liberal administration in the 
mid-1890s, until the end of the Great Depression. The period was marked by a deepening 
commitment to imperialism and strong government, including the military suppression of 
Irish supporters of Home Rule. Little in the way of social reform was attempted, that 
which did occur was clearly designed to forestall more radical attempts at reform.
Similar regimes were presided over by the right-wing Opportunists in France, where 
the only significant issue was that of clericalism, as the monarchist right sought to use the 
issue to overthrow the Republic. In the event the battle centred over education and the 
Opportunists were able to secure a largely secular education system. In Germany the 
1880s were dominated by Bismarck and the conservative Cartell alliance and both 
protectionism and imperialism were enthusiastically pursued in an attempt to revive the 
economic situation. In the USA, conservatives within the Democrats and Republicans 
came to political dominance in a lacklustre era that has become known as The Gilded 
Age. The only major political battle was that over tariff reform with the Republicans 
being the more protectionist of the two parties.
The only noteworthy political change was the emergence of a more virulent right-wing 
nationalism and imperialism associated with these conservative movements, whilst in 
France a rise in religious sentiment saw a protracted battle between secular and religious 
France dominate the political scene. In France in the mid-1880s, and in Germany in the 
early 1880s and early 1890s, extreme right-wing anti-Semitic movements challenged the 
status quo. However, despite achieving brief upsurges in support and appearing to be on 
the verge of making major political breakthroughs, they failed to eventually make any 
major long-term electoral impact.
For the working-class movements, the early-mid 1880s represented a period of 
protracted political and economic difficulties. Faced with periods of high unemployment, 
employers’ offensives and political repression the movements dramatically scaled down 
their aspirations. Slowly, amongst socialists, revolutionary ideas died away, and more 
reformist currents developed within the movement. In addition, in Europe, antagonism
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towards Liberal/Republican employers and the fact that Liberal movements were now 
rarely in power, encouraged the development of independent working-class political 
movements. A number of Socialist parties emerged, and under the aegis of Engels, 
developed a distinctly reformist version of Marxism, associated with economic 
determinism and ‘vulgar materialism’. It was based on the fact that despite the profound 
difficulties of the time, socialism would ultimately prove inevitable, thus providing a 
moral-boosting reason for continued adherence to the socialist cause.
The emphasis for all these movements was moderation, support for democracy, 
gradual reform and universal suffrage, all of which it was hoped would eventually lead to 
socialism and workers control in the long run. The labour movement in USA remained an 
exception, where organised labour tended to support the Republicans. It also saw an 
upsurge in militant labour activity in the early 1880s and associated closely with the 
Knights of Labor. The movement rebounded from the long depression of the 1870s with 
an upsurge in union building, and a strike wave in 1886, closely associated with militant 
socialism and anarchism. However, the strike wave and union movement collapsed in 
failure and defeat following the trial of the Haymarket martyrs in Chicago in 1886.
The early 1890s saw something of a moderate left challenge to the prevalence of 
conservatism. A brief but largely unsuccessful Liberal revival in Germany and Britain 
occurred after the difficulties of the previous decade. In Britain, the Liberals had 
dispensed with much of their radicalism and had accepted imperialism. In power between 
1893-5, Gladstone once again failed to achieve Home Rule for Ireland and the short-lived 
administration of Roseberry achieved very little. In Germany the Liberals were 
temporarily able to reduce protective tariffs between 1890-3 but collapsed under pressure 
from the conservative executive, and replaced with a more right-wing government.
In France the Radicals improved their position without securing power, except for a 
brief period in 1895-6. Under the government of Leon Bourgeois, an attempt at a third 
way between socialism and laissez-faire radicalism, known as solidarisme, was attempted 
and centred round the introduction of a progressive income tax. The movement failed and 
was replaced by the centrist Meline government that pursued a cautious reform 
programme that attracted increasing support from both left and right.
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In USA, the Democrat Party was briefly captured by the left-wing Populist farmers 
movement, but electoral disaster followed in 1896 and allowed the Republicans to finally 
impose liberal capitalism, free enterprise and protectionism as the dominant economic 
hegemony across the entire country. Democrats, however, quickly rebounded, regained 
control of the Democratic Party and re-established their political dominance in the South.
With the economic revival of 1888-93, all four countries saw the emergence of a 
reinvigorated labour movement. However, initial gains made during the business cycle 
upturn were often reversed as the economy returned to depression after 1893. In Britain 
New Unionism was associated with the emergence of a working-class socialist 
movement, whilst Germany saw the emergence of the Social Democrats as a growing 
political force alongside a strengthened union movement. In France the revival saw the 
emergence of a revolutionary syndicalist union movement and a proliferation of small 
Socialist parties. In USA, the moderate and sectional American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) replaced the Knights of Labor and gained in strength, though remained 
considerably less radical than its European counterparts. With the exception of the French 
syndicalists and the AFL, all these movements were committed to reformist socialism, 
but as yet their parties only achieved minor electoral success.
2.3 Third Long-Wave 1896-1948
The Third Long-Wave Upswing (1896-1920)20 corresponds with La Belle Epoque or 
the American Progressive Era, though the outbreak of World War One during 1914-18 
has tended to fracture the idea of this upswing as a coherent historical period.
In political terms the first period of the upswing was relatively quiet. In Europe, 
Conservatives, previously supporters of the agrarian order, had by now accepted 
industrial capitalism, the nation-state, limited democracy and some form of parliamentary 
constitution. On the left, Liberals and Radicals had, for the moment, ended their radical 
ambitions, accepted a strong state, imperialism and protectionism, and had also 
experienced a hemorrhaging of middle-class support to Conservative movements. In the 
USA, following the defeat in 1896, the Democrats had little choice but to accept the 
Republican agenda of liberal capitalism, protectionism and industrialisation.
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The period did however, see the tentative beginnings of a Socialist revival and some 
increase in industrial action, notably in France, and initially, both Liberal and 
Conservative movements were united in their opposition to Socialism as part of the 
consensus that continued until the mid-1900s. In France, the consensus was interrupted 
by the Dreyfus affair during 1898-9 as both the left and the right attempted to use the 
affair to break up the centrist coalition of Meline. In the event this proved successful 
though the Bloc Republicain rallied in support of the Republic and the centre-left 
Waldeck-Rousseau government that followed was little different to that of Meline except 
more overtly anticlerical.
In the mid-1900s, however, all four countries experienced a revival of middle-class 
liberalism and radicalism. In Britain, the Liberals came to power in 1906, after twenty 
years of Conservative dominance, and in 1911 significantly reduced the power of the 
aristocratic House of Lords. They also presided over a period of progressive legislation 
between 1906 and 1914 that included land reform, progressive taxation measures, a 
wealth tax, and the beginnings of a welfare state that included national insurance, 
pensions, improved state education, health care, house-building, minimum wages and a 
number of other social provisions. This period also saw the consolidation of a successful 
electoral pact between the Liberals and Labour to prevent electoral defeat through a 
divided left-wing vote.21
In France the Radicals came to power in 1899 after two decades of conservative rule, 
though initially their policies differed little from the Opportunists. In 1905, however, 
following long-standing antagonism with the religious authorities they effected the 
divorce between the state and church. They also ‘republicanised’ the military and civil 
service by purging reactionaries from the two institutions. The Radicals remained in 
power until the outbreak of war whilst the parties of the right continued to lose electoral 
ground. However, Radical rule was marked less by social reform than by repression of 
the workers movement, as a significant strike wave under the anarchist-led CGT followed
from 1904 intermittently through the following years. The Radicals major policy aim of
22introducing a progressive income tax never realised its objective.
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In the USA, the Republicans under T. Roosevelt and his New Nationalism programme, 
shifted to a more progressive platform in the mid-1900s, a move that was shortly to be 
followed by the Democrats with their New Freedom platform. From this period onwards, 
known by historians as the ‘Progressive Era’, a progressive middle-class reform 
movement gained momentum, gave rise to the emergence of the Progressive Party, and 
most notably the implementation of aspects of direct democracy, municipal reform, 
reduced child labour and other progressive labour legislation. When the Democrats were 
elected under Wilson in 1912, the reform trend continued, though with a more economic 
emphasis as tariff reform, progressive taxation, banking and monetary reform and 
antitrust legislation were all implemented. This period also saw the emergence of the 
women’s suffrage movement, the movement for prohibition and the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its attempt to establish greater 
civil and democratic rights for the black population.23
However, in all the developed countries, Liberals, Progressives and Radicals faced a 
challenge from the Left - that of Socialism - a rising ‘third force*. The mid-1900s saw the 
beginnings of an impressive upsurge in support for reformist Socialist parties, notably in 
Germany where the Social Democrats became the majority party by 1912, though they 
were unable to form a government whilst the executive was still controlled by the 
monarchist oligarchy.24 Their success was reflected to a lesser degree in France, where 
the Socialists became the second largest party by 1914. In Britain, Labour steadily 
advanced, gaining both in the percentage of the vote and the number of seats they could 
obtain. Even in the USA, Eugene Debs and the Socialists experienced a period of 
electoral and organisational success in comparison with previous and later historical 
periods.
Further to the Left, this period saw the building of a large revolutionary and 
anarcho-syndicalist union movement in France, and this era is sometimes known as the 
‘Syndicalist Revolt’. The syndicalist union confederation in France, the CGT, was typical 
of many union movements at this time, committed to direct action and social revolution, 
and opposed to the state and ‘political’ action. It gained in size, militancy and influence 
and embarked upon a period of concerted industrial action, in the hope that this would
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ultimately lead to social revolution and workers control of industry. In the USA, 
syndicalism arrived with the establishment of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
in 1905. Industrial militancy increased from 1905 onwards both in the AFL and IWW, 
especially in the years 1910-12, years which saw a notable expansion in union 
membership for both organisations.
Britain also experienced a period of concerted industrial unrest between 1910 and 
1914, as trade unionists became increasingly militant, with numerous outbreaks of 
industrial action, notably for improved wages at a time of rising prices. This movement 
lost momentum, as elsewhere, as the business cycle dipped in 1914 but also with the 
outbreak of World War One, with all four governments using the war as an excuse to 
disrupt the activities of the far left. In France this allowed the Socialists to capture control 
of the CGT from the anarcho-syndicalists, whilst in the USA, Socialists and syndicalists 
were widely persecuted for their opposition to the war from 1917 onwards.
World War One had the effect of disrupting the forces of the Left in other ways. In 
Britain the Liberals split in two over the conduct of the war, leaving Lloyd George’s 
dominant faction reliant on Conservative support. In France the Radicals lost control of 
both the political and military situation leading to a Clemenceau-led government in 1917 
that relied on support from the centre-right. In the USA, Wilson moved further to the left 
after 1914, and implemented an unprecedented series of economic and social reforms 
including progressive labour legislation, as he attempted to take the progressive vote 
away from the Republicans. However, entry into the war in 1917 proved controversial, 
the war slowed the pace of reform, and repression was directed at the socialist left, 
though women’s suffrage was successfully implemented during the course of 1918-20. 
Congress came under the control of the more conservative Republicans in 1918.
In Britain, the Liberals instituted universal suffrage for both men and women in 1918, 
and the election that followed saw a continuation of Liberal government, though 
dependent on the majority Conservative Party. The coalition government under Lloyd 
George set about continuation of the pre-1914 reforms and extended the welfare state 
through pension increases, extended unemployment insurance, improved education,
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health care and housing, and oversaw the establishment of collective national bargaining 
as a means of dealing with worker militancy.
In France, the left parties gained a majority of the vote in the 1919 elections but the 
Moderates (formerly the Opportunists) took advantage of a changed electoral system and 
a divided left, to form the government. Despite presiding over the implementation of the 
8-hour day they failed to deal with the pressing economic and political problems that 
confronted France after the war.
Opposition to WW1 also accelerated divisions within the Socialist movement, as the 
more militant sections opposed the war and anticipated the imminence of social 
revolution. Many of those on the radical Left joined the Communist movements that 
emerged from 1919 onwards, following the apparent Bolshevik success in Russia. In 
Germany, opponents of the war on the left of the party split from the SPD to form the far- 
left Independent Social Democrats (USPD). In France, the Communist party (PCF) 
emerged in 1920 and was initially far larger than the Socialists, whilst the American 
Communist Party (ACP) was formed in 1919. In Britain guild socialism and syndicalism 
became popular on the left whilst the British Communist Party emerged in 1920.
Notwithstanding the divisions within the socialist movement, the final stages of the 
upswing saw a renewed upsurge of support for the socialist left, especially once WW1 
was no longer a major distraction. Industrial militancy reappeared from 1916-17 
onwards, and spread from skilled to unskilled workers as a massive strike wave spread 
across the industrialised world, much of it successful. In France, union membership 
soared after the war and industrial militancy culminated in an attempted general strike in 
1920 but was poorly organised and proved unsuccessful. The strike wave did result, 
however, in the 8-hour day and 48-hour week being achieved in 1919.
In Britain, a rapidly increasing union membership launched a series of strikes between 
1917 and 1921 that involved most sections of industry, notably the triple alliance of 
miners, transport and railway workers. Rapid gains were made with increased wages, 
reduced hours and improved working conditions. Support for socialism increased rapidly, 
and the Labour party officially adopted a socialist programme in 1918. In the same year 
their vote increased considerably to 22.2% and 63 MPs.
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In the USA the 8-hour day was the major aim of the unions, and strikes over this issue 
were largely successful. The strike wave peaked in 1919 with the Seattle general strike 
and numerous strikes in the steel, lumber and mining industries, whilst union membership 
peaked at over five million the following year. Both the IWW and AFL enjoyed 
increased momentum in the years of low unemployment after the war despite a severe 
wave of repression from government, employers and conservative organisations directed 
at socialists and syndicalists alike in the ‘Red Scare’ of 1919. In the 1920 presidential 
elections the Socialist vote peaked at around a million votes.
In Germany the shift to the Left was the most significant. In the wake of the collapse of 
the aristocratic empire, the socialist and liberal forces gained in support, whilst the 
smaller revolutionary forces of the left pushed for social revolution. In 1918-19, 
revolution spread across Germany in the shape of Workers and Soldiers councils. 
Universal suffrage for both men and women and parliamentary democracy were 
instituted for the first time. In the following elections the Social Democrats came to 
power with 45% of the vote, whilst all the major parties offered somewhat more 
progressive programmes than before the war. The SPD government set about 
consolidating democracy and the new constitution, whilst instituting a series of reforms 
that included the 8-hour day, higher wages, better working conditions and a greater 
degree of worker participation in the workplace, all of which was approved by the 
workers councils.
The Third Long-Wave Downswing (1920-1948)25 falls within the period known by 
Hobsbawm as the Age of Catastrophe or The Fall of Liberalism. In political terms it saw 
the rise of fascism and the far right, the rise and demise of Communism and the 
emergence of social democracy.
Politically, the 1920s were a period of turmoil, characterised by a polarisation of the 
forces of the left and right. The wave of democracy and revolutions that characterised the 
final years of the upswing produced a right-wing backlash of equal intensity. In much of 
continental Europe the reactionary right began to mobilise against the forces of the left. 
Even in those countries where democracy was more established, they were not, however, 
immune from a period of political turmoil. In general the political situation remained
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highly polarised with socialists committed to the introduction of socialism and 
conservatives committed to laissez-faire capitalism.
In Britain the Liberal-led coalition collapsed in 1922 and there followed three 
elections in three years. Initially the Conservatives came to power, but in 1923, Baldwin, 
their new leader sought to introduce protectionism in order to improve the economy, but 
failed to gain electoral support for ending free trade. The Labour Party came to power in 
1924 in the first of two minority administrations during the decade, but despite a number 
of social reforms were unable to make any lasting impact. The Liberals meanwhile united 
to preserve free trade, but, despite a short-lived revival in the late 1920s, were unable to 
preserve their previous position as the leading party of the left -  much of their middle- 
class support shifted to the Conservatives during this period. In 1924 the Conservatives 
were returned to power, though by now had postponed any moves towards protectionism 
and ruled until 1929. Baldwin attempted to steer a middle course between Labour’s 
demands for socialism, and the right of the Conservative Party calling for a more 
aggressive approach towards the unions, more assertive rule in India and for economic 
protectionism. As such he refused to concede to the demands of organised labour, notably 
during the General Strike of 1926, whilst waiting for the capitulation of union leaders.
The beginning of the decade saw the massive strike wave of the previous upswing 
decline from 1921 onwards. In particular this followed the defeat of miners’ strike that 
had initially been promised solidarity action by the Triple Alliance of transport and 
railway unions. This left the miners strike isolated and thus defeated. The level of 
militancy died away, as did union membership as a result of high unemployment. 
However, following Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925, the miners faced a 
reduction in their wages and went on strike. In 1926 a general strike was called by the, 
TUC in support of the miners strike and the General Strike paralysed the country for nine 
days. However, its failure severely dented the socialist belief in workers control and saw 
the arrival of a distinctly more moderate trade-union leadership in the years that followed 
and a notable decline in the level of strike activity.
Throughout the 1920s unemployment remained a protracted political problem, but 
neither the Conservatives nor the short-lived Labour government of 1929-31 were able to 
deal with the ‘intractable million’. Neither was Labour able to deal with the economic
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crisis that followed the Wall Street Crash of 1929. A political deadlock resulted as the 
Labour leadership sought cuts in unemployment benefit and the government collapsed. 
Macdonald, the Labour leader, formed a National government to deal with the crisis and 
in the following election Labour were reduced to a rump party of 56 MP’s and without 
their previous leadership. The Conservatives won a resounding victory, paving the way 
for a decade of Conservative rule.26
In France,27 a similar situation saw two short-lived left-wing periods of government 
in 1924-26 and 1932-4 but both were divided and neither were able to resolve the 
economic difficulties they faced, and both collapsed following their inability to introduce 
viable economic reforms. In general, governance passed increasingly from the Radicals 
to the Moderates, but they too were divided as to how to resolve the economic problems 
of the day. Divisions over economic remedies, over clericalism and social reform 
dominated political life on both the left and right.
On the left, the Socialists successfully diminished the importance of the Communists 
during the 1920s, and rapidly became the larger of the two parties. The Communist Party, 
starting the decade as a much larger political force, was soon consumed by faction fights 
and purges and it declined throughout the decade in both membership and electoral 
appeal until the party was left with only ten deputies in 1932. In the meanwhile, the 
Radicals sought a more right-wing approach and continually opposed the social reforms 
favoured by the Socialists. Within the labour movement, union membership dropped 
dramatically in the recession of the early 1920s whilst the CGT split into three factions, 
the largest supporting the Socialists, the smaller factions supporting Communist and 
revolutionary syndicalist positions.
On the right, the Moderates were divided into several loose party groups and sought to 
counter the rising tide of the far right and its opposition to the Republic. A proliferation 
of fascist, ultranationalist and other far right parties and movements emerged after 1924, 
and notably in the early 1930s, opposed to the far left, the industrial action being carried 
out by the unions, liberalism and democracy, and favouring authoritarian government, 
with some supporting the return of the monarchy.
Neither Moderate nor Radical governments could resolve the economic crisis of 1932- 
6, and in 1936 a Popular Front government led by Socialists came to power, followed by
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a wave of sit-down strikes and a rapid increase in support for the trade-union movement. 
A series of social reforms were implemented, but were opposed by the Right, employers 
and financiers, and the economic situation deteriorated once more. The government 
collapsed after only 10 months to be eventually followed by a Radical administration that 
in 1938 shifted dramatically to the right, collaborated with employers to reverse certain 
Socialists’ reforms considered damaging to economic reform, and adopted a more 
laissez-faire economic approach.
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In Germany, the first three years were characterised by a series of attempted 
insurrections by the far Left and attempted putsch’s by the far right, notably in Bavaria. 
The German Communist Party (KPD) was formed in 1920, as a majority split from the 
USPD, and refused to recognise the new constitution, as was the case with the far right. It 
also saw the union movement split into a proliferation of movements variously 
supporting Socialist, Communist, anarcho-syndicalist and council communist positions. 
In the elections of early 1924, in the midst of hyperinflation, there was a shift towards the 
right, whilst the KPD and the far right made substantial electoral gains. The government 
that followed proved to be unstable, though the financial situation was rectified, and 
further elections that year saw support for the far right and far left fall significantly whilst 
the SPD remained the largest party in a centre-left coalition government.
The years 1924-30 saw a further decline in the fortunes of the left. The KPD 
dwindled in numbers and influence beset by splits and inter-faction purges, though the far 
right declined into almost complete insignificance. In 1928, the SPD vote declined to 
30% and the coalition government made up of the SPD, Centre Party, and Progressive 
Liberals (DDP), was joined by the right-wing former National Liberals of the DVP. The 
coalition government throughout these years was dominated by in fighting over a number 
of issues, notably the issue of defence spending. In 1928, the Conservative DNVP shifted 
markedly to the right, adopting an anti-democratic, monarchist position that split the 
party in two. The DVP adopted a similar position the following year. These years saw the 
middle-class vote shift from liberalism to a number of right-wing single issue parties 
hostile to democracy, whilst far right paramilitary organisations maintained a high level 
of activity.
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In 1930, parliamentary rule effectively came to an end, as the mainstream parties of the 
left and right failed to agree on benefit cuts as a means of dealing with the economic 
crisis that followed the Wall Street Crash. Political deadlock ensued between 1930 and 
1933. The electoral beneficiaries of this were primarily the Nazi NSDAP, rising from 
2.6% of the vote in 1928 to a peak of 37.4% in July 1932, and to a lesser extent the 
Communists, from 10.6% in 1928 to 16.9% in November 1932. In the meanwhile the 
SPD vote dropped to 20.4%, whilst reactionary elements of the Conservative DNVP 
sought to introduce a fully authoritarian, monarchist regime. Their failure to do so led 
them into collaboration with the NSDAP.
The Nazis, after the early dramatic rise in their electoral fortunes, saw a falling away 
of support in November 1932 to 33% of the vote, but following the failures of the 
reactionary monarchists to implement their own agenda, Hitler was able to take power 
with the help of the Conservatives. There then followed the implementation of a fascist 
regime, democracy was suppressed, and the Communists and then the Socialists 
outlawed. Political opposition was banned, independent trade unions were broken up and 
incorporated into Nazi-controlled State structures. Liberalism and democracy were 
effectively ended and a fascist dictatorship implemented.
In the USA,29 the early 1920s saw the election of two conservative Republican 
presidents, Harding and Coolidge, committed to laissez-faire capitalism, but they 
oversaw a period of protracted political turmoil. Battles broke out between pro and anti 
prohibitionists, but also between supporters of the NAACP and the rapidly emerging Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK). The KKK spread rapidly in the 1920s, campaigning against 
immigration, Catholicism, Jews and organised labour, and attracting support mostly from 
lower middle-class whites hit by the early 1920s depression. There were also ideological 
battles between creationists and evolutionists.
The class struggle continued though the upper hand was now with the employers. 
Unemployment soared to over 15% in 1921 and union membership fell to a low of 3.6 
million in 1926. The IWW split in 1924, never to recover, whilst the AFL was taken over 
by racketeers. Employers often imposed the ‘open shop’ and company unions. Strikes 
gradually became fewer, notably after 1922, whilst the courts became notably harsher 
after 1921 and anti-syndicalist laws were widely used. Both the ASP and ACP lost
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support during the 1920s, whilst disputes within the labour movement often formed the 
backdrop to struggles between conservative and progressive factions within the 
Democrats, and to a lesser extent within the Republicans. In general the Democrats were 
too divided, and increasingly demoralised, to mount a serious electoral challenge to the 
Republicans, as they became the political home of disaffected sections of society.
The renewed prosperity of the mid-late 1920s saw a decline in political disputes, and 
the election of a more moderate Republican, Hoover, whilst the Democrats remained 
remote from the mainstream of the electorate. However, Hoover failed to address the 
economic crisis that followed the Wall Street Crash of 1929, whilst the Democrats rallied 
behind a progressive, FD Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s New Deal platform triumphed over the 
laissez-faire conservatism of the Republicans in the election of 1932. The New Deal 
programme addressed many long-standing grievances of those who supported the 
Democrats - in many respects it appeared as a more moderate version of Wilson’s New 
Freedom programme.
The initial wave of New Deal legislation of 1933 concentrated on extending 
government intervention in the economy, greater centralisation and restructuring the 
banking and corporate systems. It also sought to increase employment through farm 
relief, public works programmes, regional development and increased public spending. 
The legislation was bitterly opposed by conservatives, and the Supreme Court soon 
declared much of it unconstitutional. However, the economy improved from 1933 
onwards, and a second wave of legislation followed in 1935 which concentrated on 
introducing social security measures and progressive taxation, and which proved more 
longstanding, establishing the beginning of a welfare state.
The depression hit organised labour particularly hard, union membership and strike 
activity declined amidst soaring unemployment and wages were cut as labour was put on 
the defensive. The worst of the depression was over by 1933, and in 1934 strikes began to 
break out across the country. In 1935 the Wagner Act was passed in an attempt to 
regularise labour-management relations, a bill that followed on from the efforts of the 
National Recovery Administrations attempts to improve the position of labour. Fearing 
the legislation would soon be declared unconstitutional, unionists within the AFL formed
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the Committee for Industrial Organisation (CIO) and set about unionising industrial 
workers.
Following the success of the Flint sit-down strike at the end of 1936, a wave of 
unionisation followed across the country in 1937 notably amongst steel, mine, and car 
workers. However, the CIO was expelled from the AFL and the union drive slowed 
notably during the depression that followed in late 1937 through to 1938. Strikes fell to a 
very low level during the depression as unemployment soared once again, though by now 
the AFL and CIO claimed to be organising around 19% of the workforce, and numbers 
rose slowly through to the 1940s.
The onset of the Depression of 1929-32 also had a profound political impact 
elsewhere. As unemployment rose, as businesses went bankrupt and economies faced 
chronic structural and short-term problems, the government response almost everywhere 
was protectionism and, after failed attempts to pursue laissez-faire solutions, piecemeal 
attempts to revive national economies through the introduction of managed economies. 
Most of these economic reforms were carried out in the early 1930s and gave way to a 
more conservative political climate in which economic revival was the overriding 
concern throughout the rest of the decade.
In Britain the Conservatives dominated the 1930s with massive majorities achieved 
through the creation of the National Government. Under the leadership of Baldwin, 
Britain experienced the beginnings of a managed economy, protectionism and state 
intervention in the economy. Little in the way of social reform was instituted, and for 
Labour this was a period of protracted existence in the political wilderness.
In France, after the collapse of the Popular Front, together with the failure of an 
attempted general strike that was followed by repression, worker apathy became the norm 
and union membership declined dramatically after the brief upsurge in 1936. The far right 
also declined in size and importance, and the following years were markedly conservative 
in nature. The Radicals whilst keeping many of the Socialists reforms, sought to follow a 
largely conservative economic policy and concentrated their efforts on creating a climate 
in which the economy could recover from the depression.
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In the USA, the New Deal was only partially implemented, and faced the hostility of a 
conservative press, a conservative Republican Party, the Supreme Court and conservative 
sections of the Democrats. Much of the legislation was declared unconstitutional and 
reversed by the Supreme Court. Despite a landslide victory for Roosevelt in 1936, the 
depression of 1937-8 dampened enthusiasm for New Deal economics and the programme 
of reform petered out later that year. Little in the way of further reform was either 
contemplated or achieved, and American politics remained largely conservative in nature 
until the mid-1940s.
In Germany, once the Nazi dictatorship was established, attention was turned to 
reviving the economy through a mixture of public works, increased defence spending, 
deficit financing and imposing price, wage and currency controls. Initially the economy 
improved whilst a number of factors indicated that political support for the Nazis was 
falling from 1934 onwards. In 1936 economic problems also returned in the shape of a 
currency crisis, increasing inflation and a shortage of raw materials for industry. The 
response of Hitler was to turn to economic planning, which proved to be largely 
unsuccessful, but also an extension of Nazi control within the state, notably within the 
army and civil service, and a more aggressive foreign policy. In the following years, 
territorial expansion became the answer to Germany’s problems.
The established democracies were not entirely immune to the extreme-right, but in 
general fascism and other forms of authoritarianism made a lesser impact. In France 
numerous extreme-right parties and movements emerged in the 1920s. In the 1930s their 
attempts to gain power and implement a reactionary agenda became more concerted 
especially during the worst of the economic depression -  between 1932 and 1936 -  when 
popular support for the far right was at its highest. However, they failed to displace the 
established parties, and their support began to fall away from 1938 onwards. Britain also 
experienced the rise of fascism in the early 1930s, but Moseley’s Fascist Party, despite 
appearing to make rapid ground at the beginning of the decade, failed to sustain its 
challenge and its appearance proved short-lived as support fell away after 1936. In USA, 
the KKK and Black Legion organised against the strike movement of the mid-193Os but 
in general the far right was politically limited in scope.
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The advance made by the radical left in the previous upswing and that had faltered 
during the early downswing, finally came to an end in the mid-1930s. It was during this 
period that ‘the middle way’ began to develop. In general, the Slump and the end of the 
gold standard in 1931 had forced the right to tacitly abandon laissez-faire capitalism and 
shift to a position where it was believed that capitalism could be managed. A similar 
movement on the left mirrored this shift. Socialism and any hope of social revolution 
were informally abandoned and an increasingly social democratic programme elaborated 
that combined a mixed economy with support for the welfare state and a belief that 
capitalism could be managed for the benefit of the working class. In Britain, Labour 
distanced itself from the far left and Communism, adopted much of the Liberal agenda of 
1929 and sought to portray itself as party of moderation and responsibility. In France, the 
Socialists witnessed the collapse of the Popular Front government and saw some of their 
most important legislation reversed or effectively neutralised, leading to a reappraisal of 
their position. In the USA the Socialists saw a slight increase in support during the worst 
of the depression, but the ASP dwindled to almost nothing during the course of the 1930s 
as Socialists shifted their support to the New Deal Democrats. In Germany the SPD 
remained illegal.
Similar tendencies occurred within the Communist International. The 1930s were a 
particularly bad decade for the far left. In the USSR, the power struggle between Stalin, 
on the right, and Trotsky and others on the left, had ended in victory for the more 
nationalistic and reactionary path chosen by Stalin. Increasingly the Communist 
International became a means with which to advance Soviet foreign policy interests. In 
addition, faced with persistent economic crisis, high unemployment, falling union 
membership, declining or failed worker militancy, and a concerted and often extreme 
right-wing backlash, the Communists formally abandoned any hope of revolution in 1936 
and opted to form Popular Fronts with other sections of the left, be they middle or 
working-class.
Their strategy became an essentially conservative one of defending the existing gains 
made by the left and by opposing the rise of fascism. As a result they were able to make 
slow but steady membership gains in Britain, largely amongst the middle-classes opposed 
to fascism, but remained very much a minority section of the left. In the USA, after a
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small and brief increase in support for the ACP in 1932, the movement dwindled during 
the 1930s as former Communists switched support to the Democrats with the hope of 
preventing the right from reversing the New Deal legislation. In France, the PCF 
increased its vote in 1936 and supported the Popular Front government, though refused to 
actually form part of the government. Whilst supporting the Socialists reforms they 
continued to criticise the government, attempting to take credit for successes whilst being 
able to criticise its failures. Otherwise it made little progress. In Germany the 
Communists remained outlawed.
The mid-1940s saw something of a revival for the forces of the left, in those countries 
where this was still possible. In Britain a leftward-shift in the electorate from 1942 
onwards resulted in the election of a majority Labour government in 1945, and the 
establishment of a welfare state, a mixed economy, and increased co-operation between 
government and unions. However, attempts to preserve planning as a means of running 
the economy after the war ran into opposition from unions and employers and Keynesian 
demand management was increasingly adopted as a means of intervening in the 
economy.
In USA, a left revival saw rapidly increasing support for the NAACP from 1943 
onwards, followed in 1946 by a short-lived strike wave notably amongst miners and 
railway workers. The Republicans came to accept the New Deal and the emergent 
welfare state, but Truman, the Democrat leader, failed in his attempt to extend the 
achievements of the New Deal, through his own Fair Deal reform plan. The response of 
the Republican-dominated Congress to trade-union militancy was to suppress the unions:, 
through the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, and the period ended with something of a stalemate 
between mildly reforming Democrats and conservative Republicans.
The defeat of fascist and authoritarian regimes by the Allies in 1945 allowed the re- 
emergence of the forces of the left in those areas it occupied. In the countries of Western 
Europe previously occupied by the Nazis, democracy re-emerged with a large upsurge in 
support for both Socialist and Communist parties and others on the left. In France, 
Communists came to power in a left-wing coalition, but the main beneficiaries were the 
Socialists and the Christian Democratic MRP. The period saw both the centre-left and
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centre-right vying to establish their own vision of a new future, though in general neither 
gained outright control, whilst in order to attract voters both set about instituting 
democratic constitutions, and the construction of rudimentary welfare states and mixed 
economies.
In Germany, no revival was possible until the fall of the Nazi dictatorship in 1945, and 
for four years political life was dominated by the occupying powers. The country 
effectively became divided in two, the politics of the East being dominated by the needs 
of the occupying Soviet forces. Under Soviet pressure the SPD was forced into unifying 
with the KPD and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) that was created became the dominant 
party in the East. The other political parties were effectively sidelined and the 
Communists, with help from the Soviets took control, and established a Soviet-style 
authoritarian regime, with most of the economy and the trade unions brought under state 
control.
2.4 Fourth Long-Wave 1948-1998
The Fourth Long-Wave Upswing (1948-1973)30 is commonly known as the post-war 
boom but also known as The Golden Age o f Capitalism, Trente Glorieuses or the Golden 
Years. Economically it was marked by a long and protracted economic boom and 
commonly associated with Keynesian demand management. In political terms it was 
associated with social democracy, the welfare state and the consolidation of liberal 
democracy in the West.
In political terms, the early period was marked by the post-war consensus or ‘social 
democratic compromise’, a period that led many to posit the end of ideology. The left had 
abandoned socialism and the right had abandoned laissez-faire capitalism as the two sides 
settled for a mixed economy, welfare state, full employment programmes and Keynesian 
demand management. The immediate post-war period thus saw a growth in progressive 
economic reforms, that saw the growth of the welfare state, corporatist arrangements in 
industrial relations and a rapid increase in the scope with which the state intervened in the 
economy, usually under the aegis of governments of the left.
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In Germany,31 these reforms came in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the West, a 
new democratic and federal constitution was established in 1949, and the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) (formerly the Centre Party) and the SPD emerged as the two 
main parties in the 1949 elections with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) a distant 
third. The CDU/FDP coalition government that followed had instituted a welfare state 
and elements of corporatism by 1952. In the East, a welfare state and full employment 
were also established, but economic growth remained slow. From 1951 onwards a 
production quota system was imposed by the state on the workforce and resulted in the 
workers uprising of 1953. Although the uprising was crushed by Soviet tanks, the New 
Course economic strategy that followed made some concessions to worker grievances, 
until a new five year plan was instituted and accompanied by further repression.
After the reforms of the late-1940s, the 1950s tended to be dominated by governments 
committed to consolidating the arrangements of the ‘social democratic compromise’, 
predominantly by parties of the right, be it Conservatives, Christian Democrats, or 
Republicans. The decade was predominantly conservative in nature., and in general the 
post-war consensus in each country held until the end of the decade. Those challenges to 
the status quo that did occur, such as McCarthyism in the USA and Poujadism in France, 
were more likely to be from the right but ultimately made little impact on the consensus. 
The parties of the right remained dominant in electoral terms, whilst the centre parties 
were squeezed and the left fared poorly. In 1958, the German SPD formally abandoned 
Marxism and adopted a more social democratic programme as the parties of the left 
elsewhere had already done. There was little in the way of militaiit trade unionism or 
strike activity, though full employment facilitated trade Union growth throughout the 
decade and a gradual increase in strike activity occurred towards the end of the decade.
Towards the end of the 1950s, however, challenges to the established hegemony 
began to appear. In USA, the beginnings of the civil rights movement amongst black 
Americans emerged, though attempts to translate this into positive legislation proved 
limited in nature. In France,33 following protracted military conflicts within its colonies, 
the Fourth Republic collapsed, and a new constitutional arrangement giving more power
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to the president was instituted by De Gaulle who then created the Fifth Republic. The 
elections that followed were won by the Gaullist UNR , and the powers of the president 
were further extended in 1962 when the president became elected by direct suffrage, 
following a second constitutional crisis.
Gradually, the parties of the left began to make electoral advances, a trend that 
accelerated during the later 1960s. In general they sought to deepen and extend the 
features of social democracy. In West Germany, the FDP shifted to the left, whilst the 
Social Democrats continued their gradual electoral advance of the 1950s and finally came 
to power in West Germany in a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats in 1966. 
Their government was marked by a somewhat more progressive stance and a series of 
constitutional amendments. In East Germany, by now enjoying rapid economic growth, 
1963 saw the institution of the New Economic System that encouraged decentralisation 
within industry and also a more relaxed cultural and intellectual climate.
In Britain,34 Labour came to power in 1964 with the aim of modernising the economy 
through corporatism and planning. In the event the project largely failed. However, a 
programme of progressive social reform, that included, equal pay, legalising abortion and 
homosexuality, making divorce easier and ending capital punishment proved more 
successful. In addition the welfare state was extended whilst major reforms were 
achieved in transport, health, housing and education, though an attempt to abolish the 
House of Lords ultimately collapsed.
In the USA, the Democrats took control of both the Presidency and Congress in the 
early 1960s. Although Kennedy initiated a number of reforms, progress was very limited 
and the administration spent much time combating rising inflation. It was only under 
Johnson’s presidency from 1963 that an exhaustive reform programme was launched and 
successfully implemented. The 1960s witnessed a deepened and strengthened social 
democracy and welfare state, as well as extending civil rights and the vote to blacks in 
1965, as Johnson sought to establish the Great Society.
In France, the beginning of the 1960s saw a marked increase in social unrest notably 
amongst public sector workers and farmers, the response of the Gaullists being to make it 
more difficult to strike. The vote for the left parties increased in the national elections of 
1962 and 1967 and in the presidential election of 1965, though not sufficiently to take
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power. The governmental policies of de Gaulle concentrated on improving the economy 
and were notably conservative in social matters.
In parallel with this development rose a new set of demands raised by the New Left. In 
general these revolved around ‘post-materialist’ concerns, equal rights for women and 
ethnic and social minorities, greater attention to environmental concerns, civil and human 
rights and a search for qualitative improvements in the democratic process. Towards the 
late 1960s/early 1970s the New Left, post-materialist politics, and the youth/student 
revolt were at the height of their influence. This saw the emergence of political 
movements committed to the liberation of women, blacks, gays and the Third World. 
Fuelled by opposition to the Vietnam War and ‘imperialism in the Third World’, the 
movements enjoyed mass support and a period of concerted militancy. The period also 
saw the emergence of radical green and environmental movements.
This period saw the re-emergence of the extra-parliamentary left as numerous 
Trotskyist, Maoist and anarchist parties and groups developed during a period of 
widespread optimism about the possibility of progressive and revolutionary change. The 
period was also one of industrial militancy. Union membership rose steadily during the 
long post-war boom, aided by full employment, and resulted in an increasing level of 
strikes that culminated in the strike wave of 1968-74. In general, strikes were 
predominantly unofficial in nature and largely successful in improving wages and 
working conditions.
In part, the far left gained as a result of the problems encountered by the social 
democratic parties. In Britain, Labour experienced a devaluation crisis in 1967 that 
effectively derailed both their economic and social reforms and lost them support on the 
left. In 1970, the Conservatives under Heath came to power, and attempted to introduce a 
modernisation package for both the state and industry. However, faced with concerted 
trade union militancy much of the package was abandoned or significantly altered.
In the USA, the Democrats became increasingly involved in the traumas of the 
Vietnam War and military conscription, whilst increased military spending slowed 
spending on social welfare projects. By 1968, radical and moderate Democrats were 
divided deeply over Vietnam, whilst conservative Southern Democrats defected over
66
civil rights creating partisan dealignment and leaving an opening for the Republican 
Nixon to become president. Nixon, despite much conservative rhetoric, continued with 
social policies similar to those of Johnson, extending the welfare state, enacting 
environmental legislation and improving health and safety legislation. On economic 
matters he initially attempted to control the money supply to combat inflation and 
allowed the unions to pursue generous wage claims, but inflation continued and 
unemployment began to rise and a wage and price freeze were accompanied by tax cuts 
and a devaluation of the dollar in 1971. In the 1972 presidential elections, Nixon faced a 
radical Democrat, McGovern and was re-elected whilst the Democrats retained control of 
Congress.
West Germany experienced far left student unrest, notably in the years 1967-8 and the 
establishment of the ‘extra-parliamentary left’ (APO), as dissatisfaction with the 
CDU/SPD grand coalition emerged. It also saw the re-establishment of the KPD, and the 
far Right NPD, though neither could make an electoral impact. In the 1969 elections, 
support for the left parties increased, notably for the SPD, and a left-wing SDP/FDP 
coalition government was established. In the following years it established a series of 
social reforms, extended the role of the welfare state and increased the level of worker 
participation in industrial decision-making. In the 1972 elections the coalition was 
returned with an increased majority. By contrast, in East Germany, after antagonising 
elements of the SED and the Soviet authorities, the party leader Ulbricht was removed 
from office and replaced with Erich Honecker in 1971. Honecker set about imposing a 
more orthodox position and during the next two years reversed the trend towards 
economic decentralisation.
It was in France, though, that the student and union militancy of these years came 
together most spectacularly in the events of May 1968, a two month period of riots, near 
insurrection and a widely supported general strike. The government under de Gaulle had 
remained largely conservative in terms of domestic policy, and had failed to respond to 
the calls for social reform. For two months the Fifth Republic appeared on the verge of 
collapse, but the Gaullists were able to counter mobilise and won a resounding victory in 
the crisis elections that followed.
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However, de Gaulle’s position was weakened and with a background of continuing 
left unrest, called a further referendum on constitutional reform the following year. The 
referendum failed and de Gaulle resigned to be succeeded by the Gaullist Pompidou. 
Pompidou followed a more socially progressive agenda instituting a series of reforms, 
notably concerning the position of workers. In the national elections of 1972, the left 
parties further continued the electoral rise evident in the early 1960s but failed to gain a 
majority.
The Fourth Long-Wave Downswing (1973-1998).35
The crisis decades that followed the extended post-war economic boom have been 
labeled by Hobsbawm as The Landslide. The period was characterised by a gradually 
emerging crisis for social democracy, and the ascendancy of a New Right political 
agenda associated with monetarism, neo-liberal economics and a determined effort to 
reduce the role of the state in the economy.
In political terms, The Landslide began with a period of political turmoil as 
governments sought to deal with militant trade unionism, the damage caused by 
stagflation and its implications for the welfare state and in many cases left terrorist 
groups. Under the weight of these problems the steady electoral and governmental 
advance of the left that had marked the 1960s and early 1970s gradually lost momentum. 
With the onset of economic crisis, social democracy also went into crisis. Support for 
social democracy either declined, albeit unevenly, or remained static. Poor economic 
performance demanded cuts in public expenditure and resulted in declining support for 
the welfare state. Keynesian demand management appeared unable to cope with the twin 
problems of rising unemployment and high inflation, neither could it deal with the 
militancy of the union movement. Social democratic ideology, established during 
economic prosperity, failed to cope during the deterioration in the world economy.
In the meantime, as the social democratic left sought more specifically socialist 
answers to the problems of the 1970s, the forces of the right began to gather momentum. 
Motivated by the neo-liberalism of the New Right, parties on the right became 
increasingly antagonistic towards social democracy, Keynesian economics and state 
intervention in the economy and the militancy of the trade unions. The result was that the
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political climate of the 1970s was marked by increasing polarisation - the left moving 
towards socialism, and the right to neo-liberalism and a more authoritarian state. Those 
guided by social democracy sought to steer a middle course, but the political and 
economic difficulties meant that electorates often found the results disappointing leading 
to frequent changes of government and a belief in ungovernability and governmental 
overload.
In Britain,'6 the Heath government was brought down by a combination of trade union 
militancy and economic crisis in 1974, and following two elections Labour managed to 
secure a small majority. Their attempts to advance the cause of social democracy soon 
ran up against a deteriorating economy, and after 1976 the governments strategy was 
guided by monetarism and reducing public spending. Although the intense strike wave of 
1968-74 came to an end, the unions remained militant, though increasingly strikes 
became defensive in nature in the face of an employer’s offensive.
Within the Conservatives, following Heath’s defeat, a shift to the right resulted in the 
election of Thatcher as party leader. Increasingly the party adopted a hostile attitude 
towards the trade unions, welfare state, nationalised industries and Keynesian demand 
management - most of the social democratic package. On the Labour left, activists 
pushed for a more explicitly socialist direction and gained in influence within the party. 
The Labour leadership sought to steer a middle course, dealing with the unions through 
bargained corporatism and attempting to preserve social democracy in the face of a poor 
economic performance that reduced government revenues.
By 1979, however, the unions were once again on the offensive leading to the ‘winter 
of discontent.’ The Labour government collapsed as it failed to achieve Scottish 
devolution and the Conservatives came to power. Within a year the economy had entered 
a depression, unemployment and inflation soared and rioting broke out across much of 
Britain. For the government, the economy remained the main problem, and the 
Conservatives after first using monetarism, increasingly sought to improve the economy 
through a neo-liberal approach. Spending was reduced, the unions were legislated 
against, local government and the welfare state were attacked and the nationalised 
industries readied for privatisation. Within the Labour Party, the left came to power after 
election defeat, and adopted a more explicitly left platform, resulting in the party dividing
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and the creation of the Social Democrat Party (SDP). The election of 1983 was won 
relatively easily by the Conservatives, paving the way for another 14 years of 
Conservative rule.
In the USA, Nixon was forced to resign in 1974 to be replaced Ford. Ford attempted 
to reduce public spending and balance the budget and as a result vetoed a huge social- 
welfare reform programme initiated by Congress. Taxes were cut to stimulate the 
economy but inflation, unemployment and declining industrial productivity remained a 
problem. The Democrat Carter was elected president in 1976 and sought to expand public 
spending to stimulate the economy. However rising inflation imposed a more 
conservative deflationary approach whilst his plans for tax reform, extended health care 
and governmental reorganisation were all rejected or drastically revised by Congress. 
Both unemployment and inflation doubled during his administration and the budget 
deficit soared.
Both Ford and Carter attempted to steer a centrist course, between the Democrats left 
wing and the growing influence of the Republican right in the shape of Reagan and the 
New Right. Although the level of strikes remained relatively high, the union movement 
was in decline. Increasingly the AFL-CIO turned to political lobbying to preserve the 
agenda pursued by organised labour, but legislative attempts to guarantee employment 
and to extend picketing rights in the mid-1970s were unsuccessful. The right, however, 
were gaining in influence, and in 1980, the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan scored a 
crushing victory in the presidential elections.
- ID
In Germany, following the 1973 economic crisis and faced with rising unemployment 
and inflation and declining tax revenues, attempts by the SPD to further expand the 
welfare state ran into; problems. Their programme was increasingly compromised whilst 
the SPD left clamoured for a more socialist approach which led to long running disputes 
within the party. Further to the left, student unrest boiled over into a concerted terrorist 
campaign, notably in the shape of the Red Army Faction (RAF) that sought to provoke 
revolution. Corporatism was, however, extended in 1976 as increased worker 
participation was implemented on corporate supervisory boards, though the measures 
were considered insufficient by the unions, which by now were also calling for a 35-hour 
week to replace the 40-hour week established earlier in the decade.
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In the 1976 elections the long advance of the SPD was reversed as both they and the 
FDP registered electoral losses, though the coalition remained in power. With regards to 
the far left the government managed to effectively combat the terrorism of the RAF in the 
following years. But it also faced a rapid growth in the anti-nuclear protest movement 
and the wider environmental movement; both growing in support in opposition to 
government policies on nuclear power and as a result of heightened awareness of 
environmental problems. Meanwhile the CDU/CSU moved to a more overtly right-wing 
position under Franz Josef Strauss, and lost seats in the 1980 elections, the SPD vote 
remained the same as in 1976, whilst the FDP made significant gains.
Immediately, however, the SDP/FDP coalition government faced severe economic 
recession. Unemployment soared and so did the financial deficit. The FDP -  moving to 
the right - sought reduced public spending and lower taxes, policies that were 
unacceptable to the SDP and its trade union allies and in 1982 the government collapsed 
to be replaced by a CDU/FDP coalition under Helmut Kohl. New elections were called in 
1983. The divided SPD fared badly and lost much support to the newly emerging Green 
Party. The FDP, which had also divided between its left and right factions also fared 
badly whilst the CDU/CSU scored a conclusive victory. A CDU/FDP coalition was 
formed and economic policy veered to the right under a more neo-liberal approach of 
reducing public spending and lowering taxes.
In East Germany, Honecker introduced delimitation -  reduced contacts with the West - 
and the repression of intellectual dissidents from 1973 onwards. From the mid-1970s, an 
attempt was made by the regime to improve working conditions and housing, reduce 
working hours and to extend holidays and pensions. The economy continued to 
deteriorate in the late 1970s, production fell, debts rose and plans went unfulfilled. Unlike 
in the West though, no readjustment was made, instead austerity was pursued leading to a 
decline in imports and consumer goods.
I Q
In France, Pompidou died in 1974. In the following presidential elections the 
Socialist and Communist parties formed a common front whilst a proliferation of 
candidates from the far left and far right stood for election. However, the centre-right 
candidate Giscard d’Estaing was narrowly elected president. Initially he sought to 
continue the more reformist policy direction of Pompidou through a series of
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constitutional, social and industrial reforms. Much of this was successfully implemented 
but was increasingly disrupted by the deteriorating economic situation.
Throughout the 1970s the government was faced with rising unemployment, and high 
inflation. Union membership gradually declined though the level of strike activity 
remained relatively high and demands for industrial democracy continued. Initially the 
left parties were the beneficiaries of the discontent with the economic situation. A crisis 
developed within the Right and the prime minister Jaques Chirac was replaced in 1976 by 
a centre-right non-Gaullist, Raymond Barre. Barre’s priority became improving the 
economy and he launched an austerity drive, reducing spending, raising taxes and 
freezing wages and prices.
In 1976, Chirac launched the Gaullist RPR, whilst the following year the left alliance 
between the Socialists and Communist collapsed as the Socialists appeared to be 
emerging as the dominant force in left politics. In 1978, the president launched the 
centre-right UDF. In the national elections of that year the two parties of the right 
secured an overall majority, whilst the Socialists emerged with a larger vote than the 
Communists for the first time since WW2.
Amidst a rapidly deteriorating economic situation the presidential elections were held 
in 1981. The Socialist Mitterrand narrowly emerged as the victor and in the following 
national elections the Socialists enjoyed a sweeping victory. Mitterrand and the Socialists 
set about instituting a distinctly social democratic package of reforms. Numerous 
companies and banks were nationalised, the political system was decentralised, social 
reforms were instituted and an attempt was made to stimulate the economy through 
improved working practices and social benefits. Within a year though, this approach was 
abandoned in the face of a deteriorating economic situation, and a period of fiscal 
austerity was imposed, which marked the beginning of a far more conservative period in 
French politics.
The 1970s and early 1980s also saw the re-emergence of the extreme right, after three 
decades of political isolation and only sporadic and short-lived upsurges in support. 
Across both Europe and North America, neo-Nazi and other fascist movements appeared, 
basing their rise on increasing discontent with immigration at a time of economic crisis. 
In Britain the National Front had gained significantly in size during the 1970s particularly
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over the issue of immigration. In the late 1970s the party appeared to be on the verge of 
an electoral breakthrough, and was also engaged in a number of clashes with the far left. 
However, the breakthrough failed to occur and the fascist movement dwindled during the 
course of the 1980s. In France the Front National benefited from a switch to proportional 
representation in 1986 and was able to take between 10 and 15% of the vote for more 
than a decade. In Germany and the USA a proliferation of far right and neo-Nazi parties 
emerged though none were able to make a significant electoral impact, though the 
presence of these parties ensured that immigration and crime remained important policy 
issues throughout the 1980s.
By the early 1980s the New Right were making the intellectual running and the 
election of Thatcher and Reagan and their close association with neo-liberal political 
economics marked a watershed in post-war politics. The 1980s were dominated by these 
movements as they sought to roll back the gains of social democracy - the welfare state, 
the increased power of the trade-unions, state intervention in the economy and 
progressive social reforms established during the previous decades. The 1980s were a 
decade characterised by anti-labour, anti-regulatory, low tax, reduced government and 
pro-market policies.
In Britain, the 1980s were marked by the dismantling of the post-war social 
democratic settlement. The trade unions were weakened through legislation, a process 
made easier by the defeat of the miners’ strike of 1984-5 and persistent high 
unemployment that led to a dramatic fall in trade union membership after 1979. A 
concerted attempt was made to further weaken the unions, reduce inflation, drive down 
public spending, reduce the welfare state and privatise the nationalised industries. By the 
end of the decade much of this was accomplished though the economy once again went 
in to recession. Though Thatcher resigned in 1990, the Conservatives remained in power 
until 1997, and continued with a largely neo-liberal agenda.
In the USA, Republican presidents were in power between 1980 and 1992. Reagan 
came to power in 1980 on a monetarist and neo-liberal agenda of reducing federal 
spending and cutting taxes. In the event monetarism was quickly abandoned, but a more 
assertive neo-liberalism was pursued. A policy of cutting taxes, rationalising government
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and increased defence spending was pursued to revive the economy, whilst the defeat of 
the air controllers strike in 1981 paved the way for a generalised anti-union drive and a 
period of falling wages and union decline. Although inflation fell, unemployment and the 
public deficit rose. This heralded a period of disputes between a Congress still controlled 
by the Democrats, albeit increasingly conservative in nature, and Republican presidents 
over balancing the budget, notably after 1984.
Reagan’s second period in office was characterised by the introduction of regressive 
taxation measures, high interest rates, immigration reform and the Gramm-Rudmann bill 
to balance the budget. Although Bush campaigned on a hard right platform, his period in 
office after 1988 was largely conservative in nature, with very little domestic reform and 
nothing done to upset the status quo. Taxes were raised to balance the budget, rather than 
impose further cuts in public spending. However, in the recession of 1990-2, growth 
slowed and unemployment rose once again.
In Germany, the CDU/FDP coalition remained in power until 1998. Its time in power 
was eventually beset by high unemployment and periodic economic recessions. Unlike in 
Britain and the USA, the strength of the social market model meant that it was unable to 
dismantle the social democratic settlement of earlier decades, despite the fact that the left 
opposition was divided by deep-seated antagonisms. Once economic reforms had been 
instituted in the early 1980s, the government was largely conservative in nature. In the 
1987 elections both the CDU and SDP suffered losses as the FDP and Greens scored 
successes, but the CDU/FDP coalition continued as before.
In East Germany, the regime became increasingly dependent on loans, economic co­
operation and increased trade with West Germany, and in return delimitation was ended 
and concessions made on human rights. Dissent, particularly from pacifists, 
environmentalists and socialists continued through the 1980s though it was usually met 
with repression, whilst foreign debts rose dramatically. Following glasnost and 
perestroika in Moscow, and a visit by Gorbachev in October 1989, protests against the 
regime began and within a month the Berlin Wall had come down. The ruling regime 
soon collapsed and in March 1990, the CDU won the first open elections.
Following the reunification of Germany in 1990, the CDU/FDP coalition remained in 
power. The euphoria that followed reunification soon dissipated, however. The cost of
74
rebuilding the East proved far more expensive than originally thought, and inflationary 
pressures were met with increased interests rates creating a depressed economy that soon 
spread to much of Europe. In the 1994 elections the CDU/FDP were returned to power 
but with only a slight majority.
In France, the Socialists spent most of the mid-1980s battling with inflation and fiscal 
deficits and unsuccessfully attempting to lower unemployment - the few social reforms 
contemplated were abandoned. Unemployment, crime and immigration dominated the 
electoral campaign of 1986 in which the right-wing parties scored a resounding victory. 
The Chirac government followed a more openly neo-liberal approach, and rapidly set 
about privatising the nationalised industries, abolishing the wealth tax and deregulating 
prices, but was unable to improve the employment situation, whilst attempts to reduce 
public spending provoked a short-lived, but successful wave of defensive strikes and 
demonstrations.
In the presidential elections of 1988, Mitterrand was returned to power on a platform 
that emphasised consolidation -  ‘no more privatisations or nationalisations’. In the 
national elections that followed a minority Socialist government came to power. The 
government sought to rule from the centre, with few new directions taken. After a brief 
period of economic improvement, fiscal austerity was once more pursued as recession 
returned, and unemployment rose from 1990 onwards. The government introduced new 
social security measures and a plan for urban regeneration to alleviate the worst aspects 
of persistently high unemployment, but repeated attempts to reduce the unemployment 
rate proved unsuccessful and in 1993 the right wing parties enjoyed a crushing victory in 
the national elections.
The government of Balladur that followed pursued an extensive privatisation 
programme and sought to reduce the budget deficit through increased borrowing whilst 
cutting taxes and raising social benefits. Unemployment remained high and this and 
financial stability were the main themes of the 1995 presidential elections. In 1995 Chirac 
was elected president, but attempts to reduce unemployment through increased spending 
proved unsuccessful, and economic growth slowed. Attempts to rectify the situation 
through increased taxes and reduced spending were met with concerted resistance from 
public sector workers, and Chirac was forced to abandon much of his reform programme.
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An increasing social conservatism and opposition to the permissiveness of the 1960s 
and 1970s also marked this period. The 1970s and 1980s saw a conservative backlash 
based around support for the family and marriage and opposition to abortion and 
homosexuality. Racial quotas, immigrant workers and affirmative action were also 
opposed. In the face of this trend and also facing the rise of religious fundamentalism, the 
‘post-materialist’ groups of the New Left - feminists, anti-racists, environmentalists and 
gay rights campaigners - became increasingly defensive. Long gone were the flirtations 
with Marxist and socialist ideology and the talk of revolution that had characterised the 
early 1970s. Faced with the need to consolidate the gains recently made, positions were 
moderated to gain wider acceptance in a conservative social climate, and policies 
adjusted to take account of the new neo-liberal reality.
In general the more reactionary social movements including the right-wing religious 
fundamentalist movements, although gaining much support, proved largely unsuccessful 
and much of the progressive social legislation of the 1960s and 1970s remained, although 
the far right’s attacks on race quotas, affirmative action plans, immigrant workers 
produced some reversals. The Thatcher government also passed legislation that 
discriminated against homosexuals. In general, the anti-abortionists had little legislative 
success.
In general, the 1980s saw the left demoralised as a result of electoral and ideological 
defeat, and increasingly on the defensive. In the early years it was beset by divisions. In 
Germany, the Greens were divided between fundamentalists and realists, the latter 
eventually proving victorious, whilst the SPD was divided over its stance towards NATO 
and nuclear weapons. In Britain, Labour split in two over Europe and the differences 
between its socialist and social democratic wings. The 1980s also saw a decline in union 
membership, notably in France, Britain and the USA, to a lesser extent in West Germany. 
There was also a marked decline in industrial action notably after 1982-4. Much of the 
1980s were marked by attempts to counter anti-union legislation in Britain, an anti-union 
drive in the USA and to prevent deregulation of workplace activities. The drive towards 
industrial democracy that marked the 1960s and 1970s disappeared during the 1980s as 
unions became increasingly defensive, and eventually many unions found they had little 
choice but to co-operate with employers in the new more deregulatory environment.
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In the face of the neo-liberal onslaught, a conservative social climate and long years in 
opposition, the left faced little choice but to moderate its aims whilst adopting elements 
of the New Right agenda. Socialism and Keynesian social democracy were abandoned, as 
were state intervention in the economy and support for militant trade-unionism. In place 
came an accommodation with market forces, private industry and working with business 
leaders. By the 1990s, the left began to recover from the electoral and ideological nadir of 
the 1980s, and the decade saw a series of electoral victories for the moderate left across 
Europe and North America. In general this re-emergence was accompanied by the 
emergence of the ‘third way’ - an attempt to steer a centre-left course between right-wing 
neo-liberalism and redistributive social democracy. In general, this meant accepting the 
right’s neo-liberal economic agenda, whilst pursuing a more progressive social agenda, 
often attempting to use the welfare state to increase working opportunities to reduce 
unemployment.
The first to recover were the Democrats in the USA, where Clinton, helped by a split in 
the right-wing vote came to power in 1992, on a platform of stimulating the economy 
through tax cuts and increased public investment and spending on education. Greater 
attention was paid to social issues, more emphasis was made on using welfare as a means 
to finding work, whilst a hardened right-wing stance on crime was accepted. However, 
ambitious plans for health reform failed. Although the economy was recovering, it 
became known as the ‘jobless recovery’, wages were still falling and unemployment was 
still high, many jobs being lost through downsizing and globalisation. Widespread 
insecurity about the economy helped the Republicans to take control of Congress in 1994.
Gingrich, the ideological leader of the Republican right, sought to establish his neo­
liberal Contract for America agenda, notably the downsizing of the federal government 
and, deregulation, reduced welfare and a balanced budget. Clinton and the Democrats 
were forced to adopt a more defensive approach, much of the Clinton agenda being 
abandoned, but in the standoff much of the Contract also failed. Eventually the two sides 
accepted a compromise position, accepting the need for a balanced budget, but with little 
in the way of reduced welfare. In 1995, interest rates came down improving the economic 
outlook and in an improving economy Clinton was re-elected in 1996. His second term
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saw a mildly progressive, but limited, domestic reform agenda, mostly blocked by the 
Republican Congress, but attempting to preserve free trade and reform welfare in order to 
expand employment.
In Britain, after 18 years in opposition Labour came to power in 1997. For the most 
part neo-liberal economic policies were continued, though the party sought to improve 
the situation of the poorest sections of society through mildly redistributive budgets and a 
series of social measures that facilitated workplace opportunities. A minimum wage was 
introduced and union recognition made enforceable through law. A series of 
constitutional reforms were enacted that gave devolution to Scotland and Wales, ended 
the hereditary domination of the House of Lords, and introduced elements of a 
constitution via the European Charter on Human Rights.
In Germany, after 16 years in opposition, the left finally came to power in the shape of 
a SPD/Green coalition in 1998, on a platform of accepting the right-wing pro-market 
economic agenda together with a more progressive social agenda. In France, where its 
years in opposition were less in number, the Socialist programme was less modified than 
elsewhere. In 1997, the Socialists were returned to power and formed a left coalition 
government with the Greens, independent socialists and Communists. Although attempts 
were made to follow a more pro-labour policy with the reduction in the working week to 
35 hours, the extensive privatisation policy of the right was continued.
2.5 The Correlation between Long-Wave Economics and the Left and Right.
Having described the political histories of the four countries, it is now possible to 
address the question of whether the fortunes of the left and right fluctuate in accordance 
with long-wave economics and whether any pattern found corresponds with those posited 
by the authors discussed in the previous chapter.
The historical chronology of the political and social changes within Britain, France, 
Germany and the USA does indeed show a distinct correlation between political changes 
experienced by the left and right and long-wave economics, notably during the second, 
third and fourth long-waves. The first economic long-wave is somewhat more doubtful - 
the pattern existent in the latter three long-waves being only partially present during the
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first. As anticipated in Chapter 1 and as might be expected within a wave-like structure, 
the pattern appears to be distinctly cyclical -  the political climate at the beginning and 
end of each long-wave being of a similar nature.
The pattern within each long-wave, particularly the last three, appears to follow the 
following trajectory:
Each long-wave upswing begins with a period of political consensus amongst the 
major political forces, often based on a compromise between the forces of left and right 
and which lasts approximately a decade. It is the centre that dominates rather than the left 
or the right. However, since the period is also characterised by a lack of any strong 
change in either direction, it tends to be conservative in nature, a fact that probably 
explains the predominance of right-wing parties in power during this period.
Eventually, the consensus gives way to the emergence or increased support for left- 
wing movements and ideologies, whilst the right tends to decline and become defensive. 
The rapid increase in economic growth appears to give an impetus to radical reforming 
political tendencies that not only end the consensus, but also attempt to challenge the 
prevailing political hegemony. In structural terms these movements often appear to be 
linked to the increasing influence of a particular social class that finds itself growing in 
economic importance as the expansion of the upswing proceeds.
Initially, the shift to the left appears to be gradual and moderate in nature, and largely 
concerned with social and political matters. However, as each upswing proceeds the last 
6-10 years ends with a period of radical left militancy, and intense class struggle activity, 
which is often accompanied by a period of radical reforming government. Even the 
parties of the right can find themselves pursuing this trend. For the most part, however, it 
benefits the forces of the left. This accords with the findings of most of the literature 
covered in Chapter 1.
The pattern within the downswing is distinctly different. The first decade of each 
downswing is characterised by a period of political turmoil, often with several changes of 
government. The political forces of the left, attempting to extend the gains of the 
upswing, are challenged by the right as it attempts to limit the amount and intensity of 
political and social change. Neither the left nor the right necessarily dominate this period 
but the level of ideological competition is intense.
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However, as the downswing continues and experiences its worst depression, the right 
appears to usually gain the upper hand in this struggle, and a political climate 
characterised by either conservative or reactionary movements begins to prevail, although 
the exact timing of this can vary from country to country. In this period the left appears to 
lose momentum, whilst economic issues become those dominating the political discourse. 
Thus, the ‘crisis period’ of downswings are associated with a period of political turmoil 
that gives way to the ascendancy of right-wing movements and ideologies. The central 
period of the downswing is one of a distinctly conservative political climate and an 
overriding concern with economic considerations.
Each downswing then appears to end with something of a recovery for the forces of the 
left, though the strength of this recovery appears to vary considerably, and is on a 
distinctly more moderate basis than the upsurge witnessed during the upswing. The end 
result, though, is always the same - a second period of political consensus, though the 
form the consensus takes may be initially defined by either the left or the right. Thus, the 
‘recovery period’ of the downswing appears to be associated with partial left-wing 
recoveries, and the emergence of a new left-right consensus.
The most notable exception to this pattern appears to be the first economic long-wave, 
although elements of the pattern are evident, especially within Britain. The upswing saw 
an increase in support for Radical, Reformist and trade union movements at the expense 
of Loyalism, but the peak in militancy arrives early in the downswing. The forces of the 
Left retreat during the 1830’s but re-emerge in the shape of Chartism, New Model 
Unionism and the Anti-Corn Law League in the 1840’s.
In France, the political trajectory at this time appears to be more one of reform and 
counter-reform occurring over shorter periods than the long-wave. Initially the country 
moves towards authoritarianism under Napoleon, followed by a moderate shift to the left 
after 1815. This is followed by a more reactionary period of the Restoration. The forces 
of the left do increase in influence but a first peak in militancy comes in the early 
downswing in 1830. A period of conservatism follows in the 1830s and is increasingly 
challenged in the 1840s until revolution breaks out in 1848. The end of this long-wave 
does witness a left upsurge, but of a revolutionary, rather than moderate, nature. Thus
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aspects of the pattern are present, but the dominant trend appears to be the continuing 
fall-out from the 1789 revolution -  the battle between revolution and counter-revolution. 
In many respects this pattern also occurs in Germany, though in a more moderated form.
In the USA, the initial period sees Jeffersonian Republicanism and a wave of 
democratisation replace conservative Federalism. However, by 1816 the movement loses 
momentum, and does not arise again until the election of Jackson in 1828. This time the 
dominant issues are economic, rather than political, but after some successes the radical 
Democrats lose momentum to be replaced by more conservative Whig and Democrat 
administrations after 1840. Anti-slavery Republicanism does, however, gain political 
momentum in the 1840’s leading to the Compromise of 1850. Thus elements of the long­
wave political trajectory appear to be mixed within other trajectories.
The reason for the poor correlation between political change and the first long-wave 
probably results from the fact that France, USA and Germany still have predominantly 
agrarian economies, and even in Britain agriculture is still of considerable importance. As 
noted in Appendix B, long-waves appear to be closely connected to an economic 
conjecture that has gone beyond the agrarian and that is dominated by the business cycle, 
class struggle and relatively rapid economic growth. Further, evidence for the first 
economic long-wave is limited outside Britain and thus it is unlikely that the political 
trajectory would have solely followed an economic pattern that is only barely in 
existence.
Notwithstanding the problems of the first long-wave, in all four countries the following 
three long-waves all show a distinct pattern of political change that appears to correlate 
with long-wave economics. (See Figure 3) However, correlation; is not proof of linkage 
between the two phenomena, conceivably other forces could be creating this pattern of 
political change. In addition, the authors discussed in Chapter 1 offered a variety of 
explanations as to why social and political developments might be resulting from long­
wave economics. The following three chapters will turn to the question of causation. 
Why should long-wave economics impact upon the political and social movements of the 
left and right and have differing impacts at different stages of the long-wave?
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Figure 3: The Political Long-Wave
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CHAPTER THREE
IDEAS and VOTING BEHAVIOUR
Introduction
The previous chapter established what appears to be a distinct pattern of correlation 
with regards to long-wave economics and the fluctuation in the fortunes of the political 
and social movements of the left and right. However, there still remains the question of 
causation, or why this correlation should occur, and as indicated in Chapter 1 a number of 
possible causative factors have been suggested. This chapter and the following two 
chapters will explore the possible causations for the changing fortunes of the political and 
social movements of the left and right. How do long-term changes in the economy impact 
on the forces of the left and right? What are the mechanisms that transmit changes in the 
economic to changes in the political and social?
Traditionally political scientists have most commonly used three mechanisms by 
which to explain the dynamic nature of the political process in modem times; to explain 
the relatively fast pace of change that has characterised modem polities. Firstly, changes 
in the ideas, beliefs and thinking of a country’s population. Increasingly, as democracy 
has become the dominant political process, this has meant the changing behaviour of 
voters. Secondly, and most closely associated with Marxism, the struggle between the 
different social classes is seen as creating and shaping a dynamic political process. 
Thirdly, as political parties have also become the characteristic form of political 
organization within democracies, so party competition is seen as an important dynamic 
process in modem polities. Together these three chapters will attempt to offer an 
explanation as to why the changing fortunes of the left and right should correlate with the 
presence of long-waves in the international economy.
With regards to voting behaviour, researchers have identified three main tendencies 
during the course of the fourth long-wave.1 Firstly, a period based on partisan alignment 
which lasted from the 1940s through to the 1960s. During the course of the 1960s and 
1970s, however, this gave way to issue voting. This in turn gave way to voting based on
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economic performance from the latel970s/early 1980s onwards, and was considered to 
be important at least until the mid-1990s. This chapter will attempt to offer an 
explanation as to why these trends should have occurred within the time period of a long­
wave, and thus how they impact upon the political parties and movements of the left and 
right. It will also propose, using the chronology of Chapter 2, that this pattern has 
occurred at least twice before, during the second and third long-waves. Although 
democratic institutions were scarce during the first long-wave, there is some evidence to 
suggest that elements of this pattern were also in existence.
Figure 4: Trends in voting behaviour across the fourth long-wave.
UPSWING DOWNSWING
<  ►
Partisan Issue Voting Economic Performance
Alignment
3.1 Partisan Alignment
Studies of voting behaviour from the 1940s through to the 1960s over a wide number 
of liberal democracies indicated that the dominant form of voting in this period was
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* 2partisan identification. This was a form of voting based on loyalty to a particular 
political party. Voters at the beginning of the period identified with a political party and 
consistently voted for that party through the following elections. It was also found that 
the choice of party rested around a particular cleavage within each society. The most 
common of these national cleavages was that of social class, or class alignment, where 
the middle-class predominantly voted for the parties of the right, whilst working-class 
voters predominantly voted for parties of the left. Other national cleavages were those 
that centred upon an urban-rural divide, a centre-periphery divide or a divide based upon 
religious differences. Whatever the cleavage, the result was partisan alignment.
These findings were somewhat different from what had been expected. Earlier writers 
such as John Stuart Mill and Joseph Schumpeter had stressed the rational nature of the 
voter, maintaining that voting was based on a clear and thorough evaluation of policies.3 
Voters voted according to their conscience and intelligence. The voters in the early post­
war period appeared otherwise, voting was based on loyalty and appeared unthinking. In 
the period of these findings, researchers concentrated largely on the mechanism by which 
this form of voting behaviour occurred, on the largely ahistorical assumption that voting 
behaviour had probably always followed this pattern. However, as the pattern began to 
break down in the 1960s and give way to issue voting it was realized this was a period- 
specific phenomenon and attempts were made to explain its existence at this particular 
period in history.
In general, most of the explanations for partisan alignment tended towards a structural 
causation.4 As the tertiary, or post-industrial, sector expanded in the post-war boom, it 
was maintained that so did the education system and mass media. It was believed that 
voters were increasingly well educated and better informed and thus increasingly able to 
make informed decisions based on a greater level of knowledge with regards to the 
political process. In a society based on the service sector, it was believed that voters 
would vote according to issues, ideas, beliefs and attitudes, in place of the rather 
unthinking voters of the industrial era who were presumed to be only sufficiently 
educated to place their faith in the political party that most closely represented their social 
position.
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However, there are a number of problems with a structural causation for this change in 
voting behaviour. Such an explanation tends to clash with much of the literature within 
political history. The nineteenth century is often portrayed as being marked by the 
ideological clash of Liberalism and Conservatism, whilst in the early twentieth century, 
there were the ideological clashes between Conservatism and Socialism and between 
Fascism and Communism to name but only two. The passion and commitment with 
which these battles were fought between competing ideologies appears unlikely to be the 
result of a rather unthinking and resigned form of popular support.
Neither is partisan alignment able to explain the changing pattern of voting within 
the industrial era. If industrial era voting had been entirely characterized by partisan 
alignment then it could be expected that the party alignments that crystallized during the 
onset of the industrial era in the early-mid 19th century would still have been in place in 
the period after WW2. This would have mirrored the alliances established in the early 
period, and would have seen a huge urban working and middle-class vote for the 
Liberal/Radical/Republican parties and a small aristocratic and agrarian vote for the 
Conservative parties. In reality of course, the middle-class Liberal parties were a much 
diminished force, whilst the middle-classes voted for their former ideological enemy, the 
Conservatives or Christian Democrats. Working-class votes went primarily to social- 
democratic parties.
Partisan alignment would also be unable to explain the two great movements of the 
middle-classes from Liberalism to the parties of the right during the 1870s and 1880s, 
and later during the 1920s and 1930s. Nor could it explain why the working class broke 
with the liberal middle-class parties in the 1860s through to the 1880s, and established 
socialist parties of their own. Nor could it explain the fact that a significant section of the 
working class broke with Socialist parties to establish the Communist parties in the early 
1920s and that the Russian revolution clearly had an ideological impact amongst left- 
wing radicals.
There are additional problems with the structural thesis. In Britain dealignment was 
found to be most marked amongst Labour voters5, whereas amongst the presumably 
better educated and wealthier middle-class Conservative voters partisan alignment proved 
more persistent. In addition, it was common in the industrial era for party loyalty to exist,
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not only for individuals, but across several generations of the same family even amongst 
very wealthy, educated and well-informed elites -  somewhat in contradiction to the idea 
that such voters are more likely to demonstrate a more rational nature in their voting 
behaviour.
It seems highly unlikely that partisan alignment was always the characteristic form of 
voting behaviour in the industrial era. Significant dealignments and realignments 
occurred within electorates before the 1960s. Neither can these have simply been some 
automatic response to changing social background since party loyalties shifted amongst 
voters remaining within the same social class. In addition party loyalty can be present or 
absent amongst well-educated and informed individuals. As such these objections all cast 
doubt upon the rise of issue voting as a product of a structural shift from an industrial to 
post-industrial society.
An alternative explanation of partisan alignment was offered by Himmmelweit et al.6 
They concluded that the strong and often enduring partisan commitments of the early 
post-war period resulted from an absence of distinctive policies in a time of political 
consensus. With little to choose between the main parties in the 1950s, voters tended to 
identify with that party that appeared to come closest to their own social background, 
using this as a ready-made voting identikit, that helped guide them through a period that 
offered little political choice.
“ Thus, in the United States in the 1950s, where few issues divided the voters, the 
decision may well have been more influenced by vote habit and party identification 
compared with the late 1960s and 1970s where the country was divided on such issues as 
the Vietnam war, minority rights, law and order and the extension of state and federal 
aid.”7
However, this explanation still leaves the question of why voters remained loyal to 
their preferred party. If the policies of the mainstream parties were very similar it would 
presumably be easy for voters to switch between parties, yet this was not seen to be the 
case. A possible alternative causation for partisan alignment could be that voters were 
loyal to a party that had delivered certain benefits to them in the past, when there were 
still major differences between the mainstream parties, and before the period of
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consensus developed. Voters would associate a particular party with their own particular 
aspirations and became loyal to this party in the face of opposition from the other major 
party or parties. However, if developing party loyalty was more likely to occur during a 
period of political polarization, the reason as to why this would continue during a period 
of consensus still needs to be explained. With the rise of political polarization being dealt 
with below, possible reasons for the development of partisan alignment will be dealt with 
later in the chapter.
3.2 Issue Voting
A. Social Psychology
In the late-1960s and early-1970s psephologists noticed that both partisan and class 
alignment were diminishing in importance in terms of voting behaviour, whilst voting
o t #
based on a considered choice was increasingly important. This was described m a 
number of ways; as the rise of the rational voter, value judgement voting, ideological 
voting or voting according to beliefs and attitudes, but most commonly as ‘issue voting’. 
No longer were most voters faithfully voting for a chosen party, they were now 
evaluating party policies and performance and then making a considered judgement on 
which party to vote for.
As mentioned above, explanations sought for the rise of issue voting largely centred 
round structural changes in the economies of the developed world, notably the changing 
position of the working class.9 Butler & Rose had earlier suggested that increased levels 
of prosperity had encouraged working-class voters to aspire to middle-class values and 
with it, vote for right-wing middle-class parties.10 This ‘embourgeoisement’ of the 
working-class became a favoured explanation for the decline of partisan alignment, with 
others such as Franklin, suggesting that left social democrat parties had become a victim 
of their own success.11 With the rise of the welfare state, full employment and improved 
economic growth, poverty was thus declining and working-class voters no longer needed 
parties dedicated to socialism. They were no longer attached to class-based parties and 
were free to vote elsewhere.
However, as outlined above there are good reasons to doubt social structure as a major 
source of causation for partisan alignment, and thus also its breakdown. For a start it
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failed to explain the increasing level of support for the left in the 1960s/early 1970s. In 
addition a number of researchers found that skilled working-class voters, with generally 
higher rates of pay, were more likely to vote for left parties than those lower down the
1 9pay scale, thus damaging the theory of embourgeoisement. Other researchers looked 
elsewhere for an explanation to the rise of issue voting, notably at the changing beliefs of 
voters, rather than their changing social position, and claimed that voters were not 
captives of their social background.13 Prominent amongst this line of thinking was the 
work of Inglehart, who looked at the effect of economic change on political direction.14
Inglehart established a longitudinal study into the causative factors for a perceived 
increase in post-materialist values during the 1960s and early 1970s, and considered two 
major causative factors. One was the shift from an industrially based economy to that of a 
service-sector economy - in other words a structural causation. The other possibility 
considered was that the rapid economic growth of the post-war boom had altered the 
political values held by people living within Western Europe, Japan and North America.
Inglehart considered that both structural and economic factors had caused a shift in 
political values. Traditionally the major concerns of any population were those of 
economic well being and security - materialist values. However, during the prolonged 
period of economic expansion in the post-war period, there had been a general increase in 
levels of economic wealth, such that traditional materialist values were being replaced by 
post-materialist values. These included a greater concern for non-economic issues, such 
as human rights, free speech, the quality of democracy, concern for the environment, 
women’s issues, along with a more supra-national, rather than parochial outlook as 
concerns international matters, and a greater level of participation at the political level.
Much of Inglehart’s work was based on Maslow’s Need Hierarchy - the idea that 
people first and foremost seek to meet basic subsistence needs. Once these have been 
attained they then pursue needs further up the need hierarchy. As each set of needs are 
attained, the individual then re-orientates towards a further set of needs - each level being 
fulfilled due to a saturation effect. Thus, those who have acquired a satisfactory level of 
wealth, then pursue non-material needs. These were the post-materialists of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. A satisfaction gap emerged between the political aspirations of these
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individuals and the perceived level of progress that the societies they inhabited had 
achieved.
He maintained that political changes were most notable in the social classes that had 
experienced the most rapid improvement in their level of wealth. Thus it was amongst the 
rising or aspirant middle-classes that a shift towards post-materialist values was most 
pronounced during this period. It was also the case that those countries that had 
experienced the most rapid economic growth during the post-war boom, namely Italy, 
France and Germany, were those that recorded the greatest increase in post-materialist 
values amongst their populations. Those countries’ whose economies grew more slowly, 
such as Britain, experienced the smallest increase in post-materialist values, and a greater 
remaining attachment to materialist concerns.
Inglehart also concluded that the shift of significant sections of the middle-classes 
towards post-materialist values was responsible for the increased level of support 
amongst this class that left-wing parties enjoyed in the 1960s and early 1970s. Their 
newfound values were at odds with the materialist values traditionally promoted by 
governments and political parties of the right. The post-materialist middle-classes sought 
political change and a more egalitarian society, and since left-wing parties were most 
closely associated with a desire for reform and major changes to society in a more 
egalitarian direction, it was to these parties that the post-materialists increasingly gave 
their support.
In addition, Inglehart offered a further factor as to why increased economic growth 
would favour the parties of the left. An improving economic position provides a sense of 
greater security for individuals, and ‘an increasing sense of security brings a diminished 
need for absolute rules’, since individuals can tolerate greater ambiguity.15 An improving 
economic position also increases opportunities and allows individuals greater autonomy 
and independence. As such they are less deferential to authority. Given that the parties of 
the left favour greater egalitarianism whereas the parties of the right tend to support the 
more hierarchical structures that already exist in society, a less deferential electorate is 
more likely to favour the left. Thus, increasing levels of economic wealth translate into 
increased support for the left for two major reasons: a desire for progressive change and 
less deference to authority.
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With the post-materialist middle-classes voting for left parties, Inglehart’s study 
offered an alternative explanation as to why party loyalties were breaking down, and why 
voters were increasingly voting on the basis of issues, rather than party loyalty. It was not 
simply structural changes within society but also the presence of a long economic boom. 
It is also noticeable that the issues that most concern voters in this period are social and 
political issues. In Chapter 2 it was evident that social and political issues had often been 
the dominant issues within the latter half of long-wave upswings, and that this trend in 
the 1960s and early 1970s was a repetition of earlier periods.
The 1810s had seen a wave of democratization within the USA by populations inspired 
by Jeffersonian Republicanism. In Britain the same period saw the rise of middle-class 
Radicals and working class Reformists agitating for democratic government.16 The 1860s 
and early 1870s saw an upsurge in support for more democratic government and 
constitutional change, but also for social reform that improved the position of trade 
unionists and the working class in general. In Britain a whole proliferation of interest 
groups seeking social reform lobbied the Liberal party to support their causes.
The period between 1905 and 1920 saw a similar set of circumstances. In the USA, 
both Republicans and Democrats sought the votes of the progressive reform movements 
agitating for improved working conditions, extended democracy, prohibition, and the 
early feminist movements supporting votes for women. A similar picture emerged 
elsewhere as developed countries experienced a wave of democratic reform for both men 
and women. The Progressive Era/Belle Epoque also saw the early beginnings of feminist, 
anti-racist, animal rights, pacifist, and internationalist movements, often thought of as a 
product of the 1960s onwards. As in the 1960s and early 1970s it was political and social 
issues that dominated the political agenda at this time. A closer look at past political 
trends and movements by Inglehart would have revealed the fact that post-materialist 
issues had emerged in periods previous to the 1960s, most notably during long-wave 
upswings, and thus could not simply be a product of the structural shift to a post­
industrial era.
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Thus Inglehart provides an essentially socio-psychological explanation for the rise of 
issue voting and a shift to the left at the same time. In the same vein, Beckman also used 
a socio-psychological explanation as to why an era of prolonged prosperity would benefit 
the parties and movements of the left.17 Based on a theory of alternating rhythmic cycles 
of optimism and pessimism, he provided a purely psychological explanation for the 
political trends accompanying the long-wave pattern of economic behaviour. 
Expectations begin to rise as the economy becomes more prosperous and as the upswing 
progresses expectations become increasingly heightened. As increasing signs of 
prosperity appear, people become more outgoing and sociable.
Increasingly, electorates favour governments “whose policies allow maximum 
permissiveness”, self-indulgence and the minimum of restrictions. Censorship is opposed. 
Prosperity makes people carefree; they begin to see the world as risk-free and are 
increasingly willing to assume risk-taking. The parties of the left are associated with 
political change but a risk factor is always associated with change. But during the 
upswing individuals are more likely to engage in risk-taking. The left is thus likely to 
benefit from an electorate willing to engage in risk-taking changes.
For Beckman, towards the end of the upswing there is a more marked tendency towards 
left-wing politics, to such an extent that politicians are no longer able to meet the 
heightened expectations of the electorate. Trade-union membership and power increase, 
whilst interest in politics reaches a peak “as people feel that not only do they have the 
power to solve their own problems, but also the problems of society at large.” The 
increasing prosperity brings a wave of social and political legislation. Politicians promise 
the earth whilst people believe they are witnessing the dawn of a new era - success and 
prosperity it is believed are guaranteed. At the end of the upswing people believe they 
will soon be able to liberate themselves “from the discipline and authority of repressive
1 9social and political institutions”. In many ways this described trend is similar to the 
position of Inglehart. Heightened levels of optimism and greater risk-taking encourage 
populations to be less deferential, challenge authority and contemplate radical change, a 
trend that tends to benefit the parties of the left electorally.
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However, one problem with attributing the rise of issue voting, and specifically 
voting on political and social issues, in the 1960s to the economic growth of the post-war 
boom is the fact that the 1950s were just as prosperous as the 1960s, yet partisan 
alignment dominated the 1950s. This would appear to be contradictory. Attempts to 
reconcile this problem have concentrated on the existence of generational cohorts. A 
number of writers have maintained that each generation holds a distinct set of beliefs and 
values which differ from those before and after them. These result either from the shared 
experience of a common set of political developments and/or as a reaction to the values 
and beliefs of the preceding generation. As such they differ from a belief in life-cycle 
effects, the most common of which is that youth is radical and the aged are more 
moderate or conservative.
Inglehart believed that each generation was affected by the political and social 
developments that occurred during its youth, ‘that early socialization seems to carry 
greater weight than later socialization.’19 Thus each generation is ‘imprinted’ by the 
political, economic and social developments it experiences as it becomes politically 
aware, and carries this collective experience with it throughout the rest of its life. Later 
developments will have some impact, but to a lesser extent than early experiences. Thus 
he believed that the majority of voters in the 1950s had their formative experience in the 
more economically insecure period that predated the post-war boom.
In contrast, the generations that came of political age in the 1960s and early 1970s had 
only known expanding economic prosperity, and increasingly numerous within the 
electorate, they began to pursue different political ends to previous generations, and 
impact upon the political process. These generations were more interested in post­
materialist values, and for the reasons given above were not necessarily loyal to any 
particular party but were more inclined to vote on issues and for the parties of the radical 
left.
This trend is also reminiscent of observations made in earlier upswings. In the 1860s, 
the younger generation of radical workers within the First International were attracted to 
the revolutionary anarchism of Bakunin, quickly replacing the more measured and 
moderate mutualist anarchism of Proudhon, preferred by the older generation. In the 
1910’s it was the younger generation of workers that was attracted to the Left Socialist
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and Communist parties believing that the established Social Democrat/Socialist parties, 
preferred by their elders, were too staid, bureaucratic and compromised by capitalism and 
liberal democracy.
Thus a psychological and generational theory could be offered for the demise of 
partisan alignment and the rise of issue voting, and one based upon the increasing 
prosperity of the long-wave upswing and that explains the shift to the left during this 
period.
B. Voter Volatility and Political Polarization
Issue voting and a shift to the left were not the only features noted within voting 
behaviour studies at this time. One other notable feature that accompanied the rise of 
issue voting was that of voting volatility. With voters loyalties no longer fixed to one 
particular party it became evident that one consequence of dealignment was that party 
systems became less stable and more unpredictable. At a time of increased interest in 
ideas, attitudes, beliefs and ideologies this opens up the possibility of new parties and 
ideologies emerging to challenge the ones previously associated with the period of 
partisan alignment. Given that the economic prosperity of the upswing has usually 
produces a leftward shift within the electorate, the first challenge to the party system is 
likely to come from parties associated with the left. Indeed, at a time of heightened 
expectations, especially amongst the young, all long-wave upswings have seen the 
dominant left parties challenged from further to the left.
In the 1860s and 1870s radical, socialist and anarchist movements emerged to 
challenge the mainstream movements and parties associated with Liberalism and 
Republicanism. In the 1900s and 1910s, many Socialist parties emerged to challenge the 
middle-class Liberal parties of the left. The Socialists in turn were challenged by Left 
Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists and later Communist parties. In the 1960s the 
mainstream social democratic parties of the left were challenged by the New Left, and a 
variety of Socialist, Trotskyist, Maoist and anarchist groups in addition to the political 
movements concerned with post-materialist issues.
Almost invariably these developments appear to provoke a reaction within the 
movements of the right and an opposite response. In the 1880s, a more hard-line
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imperialist Conservatism developed alongside the anti-Semitic parties of the far right, a 
movement that presaged the development of fascism in the 1920s and 30s. In the 1970s 
and 80s, the New Right developed an ideological position hostile to social democracy 
whilst neo-Nazism and right-wing religious fundamentalism reappeared on the political 
scene. All these appear to be, at least in part, a response to the rise of the radical left and 
had as a major aim the neutralization of radical left policies.
Many on the political right are alarmed by the development of an influential radical left, 
as well as the general leftward shift in the political climate. Radical political change 
brings the possibility of instability, revolution and a threat to vested interests. Again, with 
electoral volatility and issue voting in evidence, openings may appear for new parties on 
the right. The traditional parties on the right may be considered to be too passive or too 
accommodating in the face of the leftward shift, and thus offer an opening for parties on 
the far right to exploit voter dissatisfaction on the right. Thus, the shift to the left may 
also see a shift by a section of the electorate in the opposite direction, as a reaction to 
counter the leftward shift.
In response to these developments activists within the parties may also adopt hardened 
left and right positions to stem the flow of electoral support to the emerging parties. In 
addition, with issue voting predominant, all parties will find it necessary to engage with 
new ideas and issues. The result appears to be a polarization of the electorate and usually, 
the period of the very late upswing and early downswing is marked by the existence of 
the full array of political movements across the left-right spectrum. Political instability is 
common in this period -  the 1870s, 1920s and 1970s - with governments often being 
short-lived, and switching between antagonistic positions on the left and right. 
Ideological battles are commonplace, whilst new parties and ideologies challenge the 
mainstream.
This tendency appears to be exacerbated once the economic difficulties of the 
downswing emerge; voter volatility and economic deterioration are likely to increase 
political instability. Initially the heightened expectations of the electorate carry over into 
the downswing, but governments and political parties are decreasingly able to deliver on 
these expectations.21 Government performance comes under increasing scrutiny and often 
unable to deliver, government may change hands on several occasions in the early
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downswing. Weak parliamentary systems may succumb to authoritarian solutions, as in 
the 1920s.
In a period of scarcer resources but with still high expectations, the positions of left 
and right may become increasingly hardened and intransigent adding to the already 
existing polarization within the electorate. With relatively fewer resources available for 
distribution, the battle to secure those resources becomes more intense. Where the 
mainstream parties are unable to deliver the expected goods, voters may transfer their 
support to the parties of the far left and far right adding further to the polarization of this 
period.
Thus the political instability and polarization of these periods, identified in Chapter 2, 
can be attributed to increasing voter volatility at a time when heightened expectations 
within the electorate are rapidly followed by a deterioration in the economic position -  
the onset of the downswing. The rise of issue voting and voting volatility, whilst partisan 
loyalty declines, would appear to be a major factor in the period of political turmoil that 
has characterised the early part of long-wave downswings.
3.3 Economic Performance Voting
From the early 1980s onwards voting studies in a number of Western democracies
22increasingly found that the issues that most concerned voters were economic ones. 
Voters were found to be concerned about high levels of unemployment, inflation, 
taxation and interest rates in particular, and the performance of the economy in general. 
Increasingly psephologists considered that voters party preference was determined by 
which party was believed to offer the better performance on the economy. Often this 
choice was based on retrospective voting -  based on the performance of the incumbent 
party -  but voting patterns also indicated that this could be based on prospective 
performance and thus also applied to the opposition parties as well. This trend was seen 
to continue at least until the mid-1990s.
The debates concerning this trend tended to centre upon methodology and the exact 
nature of any economic model of voting, with attempts to identify how voters evaluated 
their position. Explanations for this changing trend were less evident, possibly because
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with so many economies facing profound problems, the reason seemed self-evident. 
Some suggested, somewhat ahistorically, that voters had probably always had economic 
performance uppermost in their minds when voting -  contradicting the findings of
9Tpartisan alignment in previous decades. Those that did offer an explanation were largely 
based on the belief that this was simply one manifestation of issue voting, voting on the 
issue of the economy.24
That economic performance should become the dominant voting behaviour in this 
period is indeed hardly surprising. The post-war boom of 1948-73 lasted for twenty-five 
years and towards the end of the period rapid economic growth was taken for granted. 
The economic downturn after 1973 was unexpected and came as something of a shock 
and once it was realized that this was not simply a short-term phenomenon, voters 
became increasingly concerned by the state of the economy.25 A return to better years 
was desirable or at the very least stabilization and prevention of further deterioration 
became a priority to voters previously used to relatively high levels of economic growth.
This is the inverse of Inglehart’s causation for the rise of post-materialist values. Once 
economic prosperity is not guaranteed, a shift down Maslow’s Need Hierarchy once more 
results in priority for materialist concerns. The shift to voting according to economic 
performance does however undermine Inglehart’s causation of a shift to a post-industrial 
society as being a major factor in the shift to voting on social and political policies in the 
1960s and early 1970s. Although Inglehart foresaw the possibilities of either a right-wing 
backlash or economic deterioration as being capable of slowing down or even reversing 
the shift to post-materialism, he optimistically believed this was not likely to be 
significant in a post-industrial society. In the recession-hit 1980s, however, the 
industrial sector fared very poorly, huge swathes of industry being destroyed by 
depression, whilst the service sector continued to expand and society became more post­
industrial.
Yet, in this increasingly post-industrial society, materialist issues dominated the 
political agendas of the 1980s and early 1990s. Unemployment levels, taxation, inflation, 
balanced budgets, interest rates, the ERM and EMU, were all identified as the major
97voting issues of this period. At the same time the dominant shift in political ideology 
was towards the New Right and neo-liberalism, an ideology specifically grounded in
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economic, or material, issues. Thus, even within a post-industrial society economic-based 
issues proved important. It therefore seems that Inglehart overestimated the importance of 
post-industrialism as an explanation for the rise of post-material issues, thus leaving the 
post-war boom, or long-wave upswing, as the main causative factor.
The chronology in Chapter 2 also indicated that voting on economic performance was 
not an occurrence unique to the 1980s and early 1990s. Clearly previous long-wave 
downswings had also given rise to voting based on economic issues and on economic 
performance.
In the 1820s, the Jacksonian Democrats built a coalition around groups that believed 
abolishing the National Bank would bring the economic stagnation of the decade to an 
end. In Britain, the economic depression of the late 1830s and early 1840s saw the re­
launch of the Anti-Corn Law League. Agricultural protectionism and the high price of 
com were believed to be preventing manufacturers from lowering wages and thus 
squeezing profits. At a time of economic depression and falling prices this was 
considered particularly damaging and led to renewed and ultimately successful efforts by 
middle-class Radicals to end protectionism. Elements within the aristocracy, notably 
Peel, believed that by ameliorating the economic position they could reduce support for 
further constitutional and democratic reform.28
In the second long-wave downswing it was Liberal free trade that took the blame for 
the economic depression that followed the financial crisis of 1873. Increasingly voters 
lost interest in the social, political and democratic reform that had dominated the late 
1860s and early 1870s and concentrated on economic matters. Free trade became 
increasingly unpopular and political parties began to support protectionist moves and the 
raising of tariffs. A further economic issue came to prominence in this period, that of 
imperialism. Imperialism offered politicians a way of convincing electorates that they 
were actively dealing with the economic problems of the Great Depression, whilst 
opening up new markets to industry.
In the third long-wave downswing, unemployment and deflation became pressing 
problems for political parties in the 1920s. More specifically almost every party in power 
at the beginning of the Slump was ousted, voters blaming the incumbent party or parties 
for the economic crisis of the early 1930s, the Republicans in the USA, Labour in Britain
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and the mainstream parties in Germany. Opposition parties that appeared to have 
programmes that addressed the economic difficulties of this period were elected and once 
in government were either re-elected or ousted on the basis of economic policy 
competence. The previous incumbents were usually associated with poor economic 
performance and remained out of office whilst the economic problems of the 1930s 
persisted. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, prolonged periods of economic malaise have 
repeatedly resulted in economic performance becoming a priority for voters.
Thus, each long-wave downswing witnesses the importance of voting by economic 
performance, a factor arising from the crisis occurring within the international economy. 
Increasingly, parties need to be seen to be competent on the economy, indeed this issue 
becomes prevalent over all others. In addition, such is the level of economic crisis, that a 
new economic strategy needs to become established both to improve the economy and to 
reassure voters. Invariably the old ‘economic orthodoxy’ takes the blame for the crisis 
and a new ideology is offered to stimulate recovery.
A. The Shift to the Right.
A noticeable phenomenon of each long-wave downswing is that the political climate 
nearly always shifts to the right in the middle part of the downswing. There are one or 
two notable exceptions to this such as the Democrat victories in the 1930s and those of 
the Socialists in France in the 1930s and 1980s, but in general the left fare badly in the 
middle downswing period, particularly the far left. Using the observed changes in voting 
behaviour there appear to be several possible reasons as to why a deteriorating economic 
climate might benefit the right at the expense of the left.
Firstly, the parties of the left are likely to be more electorally successful during the 
long-wave upswing and thus in power when the economy first enters the crisis period of 
the long-wave downswing. The ruling party is likely to be associated with and blamed for 
the economic downturn and thus identified by voters as poor on economic performance. 
Given the increased importance of this factor as a form of voting behaviour this is likely 
to be damaging to the parties of the left, especially where electorates tend to see the 
parties of the right as being ‘better on the economy’.
116
Secondly, the parties of the left have been electorally popular on the basis of their 
political and social programmes during the long-wave upswing. It is these that have 
propelled them forward and that have inspired activists on the left to become involved in 
political parties and movements. Further it is unlikely, given the high aspirations of the 
late upswing period, that these aims have all been successfully implemented, or that they 
will be quickly abandoned. The process of government is often a slow one and not all 
social and political demands can be addressed rapidly. An example of this would be the 
adoption of the 1989 Berlin Programme by the German SPD, a response to poor electoral 
results in the 1980s. For the most part the new programme addressed social and 
environmental issues, was aimed at gaining support from Greens and post-materialists, 
but failed to substantially improve the SPD’s electoral success in the early 1990’s.
Thus whilst the economy deteriorates and increasingly concerns the electorate, there 
may be a tendency for a large section of the left to insist on the continued importance of 
political and social problems. In particular these may be the more affluent post­
materialist sections of the left who are hit less by the economic crisis, and thus lead to the 
possible alienation of working class voters. Working class voters who are least 
committed to the causes of the left may then be attracted to the parties of the right if they 
appear to be addressing the economic crisis. This, of course, makes the parties of the left 
less electable.30
The shift towards more economic matters is less of a problem for the parties of the 
right who were more reluctant to engage in political and social reform in the first place. 
Many on the right believe that the social and political experimentation of the upswing 
period has gone too far. Leftward change brings with it the possibility of instability and 
an uncertain future, a threat to vested interests and egalitarianism is believed to be based 
on a false notion of human nature. Reformers are never satisfied and always desire more 
reform. It is never entirely apparent as to where and in which direction any form of social 
experimentation will eventually end. Attending to economic problems offers a safer 
course of direction. For the right it comes more easily, for improved economic 
performance may be achieved without progressive redistributions of power, or even by 
reversing those that have been implemented, as was the case in the 1970s with the New
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Right’s attempt to return to a position existing before the establishment of the social- 
democratic compromise.
A third explanation is the inverse of the argument offered by Inglehart for explaining 
voting behaviour during a period of increased prosperity.31 Just as voters become less 
deferential in a period of growing prosperity, in a period such as a long-wave downswing, 
economic stagnation or decline leads to greater insecurity and what Inglehart calls the 
‘authoritarian reflex’. Faced with economic crisis, and often associated political crises, 
insecure voters start to search for a ‘strong leader’, a powerful figure who is able to 
rectify a deteriorating situation. Given that the parties of the right stress a greater role and 
importance for leadership and respect for authority than the egalitarian-leaning left, it is 
the parties of the right who are more likely to provide or offer such a figure and thus 
more able to attract economically insecure voters.
It appears that for these reasons the political polarization and voter volatility of the 
early downswing give way to a period of right-wing domination once it is clear that the 
economy has deep-seated problems. In general it is the parties of the right that have 
dominated the second two-thirds of each downswing. Rosenberg, in his study of the 
political and social consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-96 in Central Europe32 
offered a particular example of this trend as he attempted to link political change with 
long-wave economics. Although he saw the crisis as causing structural changes within 
the economy, his explanation for the changing political situation was largely 
psychological in nature.
Following the boom years of the ‘Age of Capital’, the sudden, but prolonged, 
economic crisis after 1873 had a major psychological impact upon the population. For 
Rosenberg, the prolonged economic crisis and the failure of the business cycle to boom 
for more than brief periods “account for the gloom and the feeling of tension, insecurity, 
and anxiety prevalent throughout the period. Economic pessimism appeared to be deep- 
rooted and firmly entrenched”. Further, such a climate of pessimism “was a golden 
opportunity for prophets of disaster” and followed a search for scapegoats upon which
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the economic crisis could be blamed.
First and foremost, the architects of the economic order were blamed - Liberals and 
their close association with Jewish financiers. Public opinion moved against Liberalism at
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the same time as anti-Semitism became widespread. With the parties of the right 
exploiting the changing political climate, they were able to attack the prevailing Liberal 
political order and place the Liberals on the defensive. By 1878, the increasingly 
conservative political climate gave an electoral victory to a coalition of right-wing 
parties, reversing nearly two decades of Liberal dominance.
According to Rosenberg, the continued economic insecurity brought on by the Great 
Depression caused the shift of public opinion to the right to persist and ensured the 
adoption of a more conservative political climate. It was this that allowed Bismarck to 
break his alliance with the National Liberals, create a Conservative coalition government 
and pursue a more distinctly conservative political programme. “Instead of controversies 
about political freedom, the fight for economic security became the focus of public 
discord”. Continued economic insecurity preserved a climate of political conservatism 
that saw Bismarck entrench the power of the prevailing monarchical system of 
government and end any thought of further constitutional change.34
Bismarck and the German Conservative parties were not the only political 
beneficiaries of the Great Depression or second long-wave downswing. In Britain, 
following three decades of Liberal dominance, the Conservatives came to power in 1886 
and were to remain there for most of the following twenty years. In France the right-wing 
Opportunists were politically prevalent between 1884 and 1900, whilst in the USA it was 
the conservative elements within the Democrat and Republican parties who dominated 
the course of events at this time.
The third long-wave downswing also saw a political shift, not only to the right, but 
also to the far right, most notably in the shape of fascism, which was successful in seizing 
power not only in Germany but in numerous other European countries. In Britain, the 
Conservatives dominated the 1930s with large majorities. In France no political tendency 
was able to gain the upper hand, as a series of Moderate, Radical and Socialist 
governments failed to substantially improve the economy until a centre-right Radical 
government presided over economic recovery from 1938 onwards. In the fourth long­
wave downswing in the 1980s, Conservatism dominated British politics, in the USA, 
right-wing Republicans. In Germany as in much of Europe, the Christian Democrats were 
prevalent.
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B. The shift to conservatism.
In the historical chronology of Chapter 2 it was notable that the period of fifteen to 
twenty years into a long-wave downswing is characterized by an increasing tendency 
towards conservatism. In the latel880s/early 1890s, the policies of Salisbury and the 
Conservatives in Britain, Bismarck and the Cartel coalitions in Germany, the 
Opportunists in France and both the Democrats and Republicans in the USA were largely 
designed to establish the superiority of the right and prevent any leftward change. In the 
late 1930s British Conservatives, German Nazis, French Radicals and American 
Democrats all attempted to preserve the new economic arrangements and political status 
quo. In the late 1980s/early 1990s, the Bush presidency largely concentrated on 
consolidating the Reaganite reforms, whilst the Christian Democrats in Germany 
presided over little in the way of domestic change. In France by this period Mitterrand 
was supporting the status quo whilst both the left and right concentrated on little other 
than attempts to improve the economy. The Major governments were something of an 
exception, though even here the pace of economic reform slowed and a consolidationist 
trend developed.
This period comes after the implementation of the strategy for economic regeneration. 
In general, little in the way of social or political reform is either attempted or 
implemented within this period. The priority for both voters and governments is 
improvement in the economy and social and political changes, especially radical ones, are 
perceived as jeopardizing this process and the desire for such reforms diminishes. 
Dramatic deviations to the left or right or the launch of controversial political or social 
changes may disturb or even reverse this process. The most important issue is the revival 
of the economy and nothing should disturb this.
Initially the new economic reform programme is supported, often enthusiastically, by 
sections of the electorate. However, the downswing period usually suffers a further 
recession before the final recovery and this may dampen enthusiasm for the 
programme. Not only did the old economic programmes fail but the new one appears to
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be no better. This further dampens enthusiasm for change or reform and makes voters 
increasingly sceptical about the possibility or desirability of change.
However, there are other reasons for the increasing conservatism of the electorate. One 
is that of Ingleharts’ explanation for increased deference as mentioned in the section 
above. Beckman also provides a psychological reason as to why downswings should be 
associated with increasing conservatism.
“Economic hardship will produce an emotive response. When people experience pain 
or hardship they often become subdued, retrench, and seek some type of solace to avoid 
further discomfort. When people see their friends and relatives suffer a depression, and 
see the world as a risky place to live, they feel helpless. Individuals lose faith in their own 
powers. Most people believe they are in complete control of their own destinies, but 
during periods of severe economic dislocation, this belief is openly challenged. People 
become cautious, introspective, and unwilling to accept risk. They attempt to shelter 
themselves from uncertainty wherever possible.”36
In other words, a deteriorating or poor economic climate leads to pessimism - a vast 
change from the excessive optimism of the late upswing. At a time of economic 
uncertainty and instability there is an aversion to risk-taking. Change is potentially 
dangerous and perceived as offering the possibility of further instability. Voters feel that 
they have less control over events and are more likely to defer to a higher authority.
Additionally, it is usually the right that are in power, and conservatism and a desire to 
preserve the status quo is what comes most easily to the political right. Much of the 
downswing is spent attacking the changes previously offered by the left, or blaming these 
for the economic deterioration and/or political instability of the earlier period. Industrial 
militancy can also be blamed for these occurrences. In addition to reviving the economy, 
the right makes efforts to either halt the advance of progressive reform or implement 
reversals. Overall these measures help to add to a climate in which progressive change is 
perceived as harmful and undesirable.
Finally, at a time of slow or negative economic growth, there are fewer economic 
opportunities and sections of society are less amenable to distributing economic wealth to 
alleviate poverty. The importance of the issue of cutting taxes in the 1980s and 1990s 
suggests that in a climate of economic uncertainty a significant section of voters are more
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interested in their own plight. In other words, there is greater competition over scarce 
resources, leading to a less altruistic outlook and a greater level of self-interest, and it is 
unsurprising that fascism should have gained support in the 1920s and 1930s. At a time 
of increased competition over resources, the belief fostered by the left that a future based 
on egalitarian cooperation and solidarity appears to be increasingly utopian and 
unrealizable. The more pessimistic view of human nature being based on self-interest 
preferred by the right looks more realistic. It appears that progressive change is not only 
undesirable, but not even possible.
C. The Left Revival and the return to Consensus
The final period of each long-wave downswing, the ‘recovery period’, has witnessed 
a revival of the political forces of the left, though the degree of success achieved by the 
left at this time has varied considerably. In Britain, the 1840s saw the rise of Chartism 
and the Anti-Corn Law League, though they achieved significantly different levels of 
success. In the 1890s Liberal revivals occurred in Britain and Germany although neither 
were particularly strong and they achieved very little. In the USA, the Republicans finally 
managed to spread their economic agenda to the conservative South with the unwitting 
aid of the Populist movement. Socialist parties did however improve their standing at this 
time, revivals occurred in Germany and France whilst syndicalism also emerged in 
France.
In the 1940s, Labour came to power in Britain and, despite setbacks over projects such 
as planning and corporatism, implemented a successful programme of social and 
economic reform. In the USA, the NAACP revived and Truman offered the Fair Deal 
though neither had much success. In Germany the Social Democrats re-emerged but 
narrowly missed coming to power whilst the left dominated early post-war governments 
in France. In the mid-late 1990s there were electoral victories for the parties of the centre- 
left in Britain, USA, France, Germany and elsewhere, often after long periods of right- 
wing domination.
The possibility and reasons for a revival of the centre-left in the late 1990s were 
discussed by a number of psephologists.37 The position of the British Labour Party was 
typical, if somewhat exaggerated, of that being experienced by other centre-left parties at
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this time. Assessing the possibilities for a Labour revival, Rose maintained that the 
structural decline of the working-class now meant Labour had little or no chance of being
IQ
re-elected. However, Crewe, following the recent dominant trend in voting behaviour, 
maintained that whilst Labour was seen as poor on economic performance they were 
unlikely to accede to government, but improvement on this might allow re-election. 
Accordingly, Heath, Jowell & Curtice detected some change within the electorate during 
the 1990s and suggested that ‘party image’ was a major problem for Labour.40 Other 
commentators noted a decline in the importance of economic performance and an 
increased emphasis on social policies such as education, health and crime.41 Following 
both a renewal of party image and greater emphasis on social policies Labour scored a 
landslide victory in 1997, despite a low turnout and percentage of the vote. Assessments 
of this victory also concentrated on Labour’s ideological re-positioning towards the 
centre and its shift away from a distinctly left wing stance.42 With a similar position being 
followed by the Democrats in the USA to end their image as a left-wing ‘tax-and-spend’ 
party and the development of the ‘neue mitte’ by the Social Democrats in Germany this 
was seen as part of an international trend.
The recent nature of these findings and the possibility that some of these trends may be 
incidental or only transitory make an explanation of the left revival at the end of 
downswings using voting behaviour somewhat uncertain. However, they do at least 
suggest that the following reasons may explain this revival. During the course of the 
downswing voters become distinctly pessimistic about the possibility of implementing 
social and political change. At a time of economic difficulties neither are they prioritized. 
The electorate shifts to the right and if the parties of the left want to come to power they 
have little choice but to follow the electorate. In order to attain power they have to offer a 
distinctly less radical and somewhat more centrist agenda. The ‘third way’ of the 1990’s 
in many respects was presaged by the social democratic ‘middle way’ adopted by the left 
in the 1930s and 1940s, and even earlier by the third way ‘solidarisme’ of the Bourgeois 
government in the 1890s. Other examples would be the acceptance of Liberalism by the 
New Model Unionists of the 1840s and the more determinist and reformist socialism 
encouraged by Engels in the 1880s/90s.
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At the end of each downswing the economy begins to recover, albeit in a moderate 
way. With the worst of the economic downswing over, some voters are cautiously 
optimistic about the possibility of some social change. In general, the downswing has 
exacerbated poor social conditions and led to higher crime levels, together with a neglect 
of political and social issues. Voters continue to desire improved economic performance, 
but once this is in evidence some social and political matters can also be addressed. It is 
the left that is more likely to address the pressing social problems created by years of 
economic difficulty, assuming the left can also be trusted with the economy.
However, the economic recovery can appear fragile, and the left may have difficulties 
in resisting its more natural tendency of embarking on profound social and political 
change. Whether voters are willing to pay for these changes, bearing in mind recent 
economic difficulties, may also be a problem for the parties of the centre left. In addition 
the right will usually attempt to limit progressive reform to a minimum, and in a still 
largely conservative political climate, the left revival can be short-lived and unsuccessful.
Thus, a detectable shift away from voting by economic performance towards the 
importance of social issues together with a more moderate approach by centre-left parties 
appear to offer an explanation for a left revival. However, the climate of conservatism 
may result in this revival being short-lived.
3.4 Realignment
Having discussed the reasons for the rise of issue voting and voting by economic 
performance and the effect these have on the political climate it is now possible to return 
to the question of why partisan alignment might form at the beginning of each upswing, 
thus helping to explain the pattern of change identified in Chapter 2. The early period of 
each long-wave upswing appears to be characterized by partisan alignment and 
consensus. As the upswing progresses, continued prosperity causes partisan dealignment 
and the rise of issue voting. Voting behaviour is volatile whilst the left-right dichotomy 
becomes increasingly polarized. If partisan alignment and voter loyalty are to be the 
characteristic form of voting behaviour in the early part of the next long-wave upswing, 
then some form of voting re-alignment needs to occur during the course of the
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downswing. However, realignment would not necessarily be based on the same factors as 
the previous alignment -  much has changed in the intervening period. Why, though 
should realignment occur?
When voting behaviour dealigned in the late 1960s/early 1970s there was some 
speculation as to whether a realignment would occur. Early theories often rested on 
structural changes in society, towards a divide between the industrial and service sectors, 
or possible other social factors and a possible shift towards voting according to region, 
the public/private sector divide in industry and housing.43 However, to date there has 
been no detected realignment although a number of studies investigated whether the 1997 
election in Britain might bring about a realignment in voting behaviour.44
Several alignments and realignments do however, appear to have occurred within the 
last two centuries, the pattern in Europe being different to that of the USA. In Europe, by 
the 1850s, on the left the middle and working classes supported a broadly liberal or 
republican agenda in contrast to the traditional aristocratic and agrarian order supported 
by the right. In the boom of the 1860s through to the depression of the 1870s and 1880s 
this dealigned. Large sections of the middle-class, fearful of socialism, trade-union 
militancy and economic ruin shifted to the right, whilst a small section of the working 
class shifted towards a largely reformist socialist position. The alignment that developed 
in the 1890s‘ was of an aristocratic and middle-class right facing a reduced middle and 
working class left still attached to Liberalism, Radicalism and Republicanism. In addition 
a small section of the working class supported socialist or syndicalist positions.
In the boom of the 1910s issue voting reappeared and increased support for the middle 
and working-class left-wing parties occurred, to be followed by the worsening economic 
climate of the 1920s and 1930s. This dealigned the previous arrangement. The liberal 
middle-classes, initially supportive of the left were once again fearful of socialism, 
revolution and economic destitution and joined the Conservative or Christian Democratic 
right, sometimes via fascism. The working class shifted first to socialism and anarcho- 
syndicalism, sometimes to Communism in the upswing, and ultimately to social 
democracy during the 1930s and 1940s. The realignment that formed in the 1940s and 
1950s was of a middle-class right and working class left, which eventually dealigned 
from the 1960s onwards.
125
In the USA,45 the initial alignment of Jeffersonian Republicanism/Jacksonian 
Democracy versus the Federalist/Whig alignment gave way in the boom and bust of the 
1830s and early 1840s. It was replaced by an alignment constituted by a Republican 
North opposed to slavery and a Democrat South in favour of slavery and the Compromise 
of 1850. The boom of the late 1860s/early 1870s and subsequent depression offered the 
possibility of dealignment and the two mainstream parties faced a number of third party 
challenges. Ultimately, however, probably as a result of the bitterness engendered by the 
Civil War an alignment based on regional antagonism was perpetuated. The critical 
election of 1896 may have allowed the Republican agenda of liberal capitalism to 
dominate the whole country, but the Democrats quickly re-established political control in 
the South and the previous alignment persisted.
The economic boom of the 1910s gave rise to issue voting, notably on progressive 
issues, and partisan dealignment. In the more difficult years of the 1930s, the electorate 
began to realign and the party system that emerged bore a stronger resemblance to the 
left-right European model. The New Deal was able to attract the industrial and urban 
working class to the Democrats whilst the middle-classes opposed to wealth 
redistribution opted for the Republicans. However, in rural areas the old North-South 
divide persisted with the conservative South still supporting the Democrats. The 
alignment that persisted into the 1940s and 1950s and usually associated with the New 
Deal coalition contained a mixture of regional and left-right elements. In the 1960s this 
dealigned, most notably over civil rights and the extension of the vote to blacks, with the 
conservative South now supporting the Republicans. Thus the regional element finally 
disappeared leaving the American party system further resembling the left-right 
dichotomy typical of European party systems -  the Democrats on the left, the 
Republicans on the right.
Based on this history, and having rejected a structural explanation for dealignment in 
the 1960s/1970s in the first section of this chapter, one possible explanation for partisan 
alignment is that party loyalties in the early consensus period of the upswing are 
grounded in the ideological and economic battles of the previous long-wave. In the early 
part of the downswing the positions of the left and right parties become increasingly
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polarized, each associated with particular policies, beliefs and ideas. Voters are judging 
parties initially on issues but increasingly on economic performance. To reverse the 
deterioration of the early downswing economic reforms need to be implemented - 
government needs to be seen to be doing something. In the zero-sum game of distributing 
resources at a time of economic slowdown there will invariably be winners and losers.
During the latter stages of the downswing voting positions are still in a state of flux 
but voters becomes increasingly aware as to which parties in government have either 
improved or worsened their economic and social position. Voters begin to form loyalty to 
the party that has improved their position, or enmity towards a party that has caused a 
deterioration. At a time of economic difficulties and of political conservatism these 
loyalties gradually become entrenched. Party loyalty is based upon preserving gains that 
have been made, or upon preventing further losses. In addition, as political apathy set^m 
towards the end of the downswing, many voters lose interest in politics, especially as the 
policies of the mainstream parties converge. Often it is simply easier to vote for the same 
party as in the previous election, rather than take the trouble of discovering how the 
policies of other parties differ in minor detail. This leads to the reemergence of partisan 
alignment.
In addition, the generation that has politically matured during the economic 
downswing has only known a period of difficult economic circumstances or instability. In 
contrast to that which emerged during the later upswing, it is cautious, conservative, 
materialist, averse to risk-taking and more deferential to authority. In the meantime the 
older generation, more likely to be interested in post-materialist affairs, has had to modify 
or moderate its political ambitions. Faced with declining economic conditions and 
opportunities during the downswing it has had to downgrade its expectations. Large; 
sections of the electorate are now cautious, conservative and pessimistic about the future. 
There is a consensus on both the left and right that radical change is either not possible or 
not desirable, or both. Not until there is another prolonged period of economic expansion 
will this begin to change. In the meantime there is consensus and a new alignment in 
voting behaviour.
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Summary
The ‘political long-wave’ identified in Chapter 2, thus appears to be constituted by 
three (or possibly four) distinct phases of voting behaviour: partisan alignment, issue 
voting, voting by economic performance, and possibly a form of realignment voting. It is 
these changes within the electorate that contribute to the changing fortunes of the parties 
of the left and right. The explanation for these changes appears to be largely a 
psychological one, rather than a result of structural changes. Following a line of thought 
developed by Inglehart, much of this development can be attributed to changing 
economic circumstances. Material prosperity during the upswing leads to greater 
confidence, increased optimism, reduced deference, more risk-taking and a wider interest 
in political and social issues. This development benefits the political forces of the left.
However, the rise in issue voting also leads to greater electoral volatility and political 
polarisation. This helps give rise to the period of political turmoil that follows, especially 
when the economy starts to deteriorate in the early downswing period. A return to 
material uncertainties follows the economic deterioration and a political climate less 
conducive to progressive change and largely concerned with economic matters and the 
importance of establishing an economic strategy for recovery. This tends to benefit the 
right, a process that is enhanced by an increasing degree of conservatism within the 
electorate. Finally, the left finds it necessary to adapt to the realities of the new situation 
and with a more moderate agenda and a renewed interest in social reform, it becomes 
more electable once the worst of the economic problems appears over. However, success 
is not guaranteed. At this point some form of realignment becomes evident within voting 
behaviour, a result of voter volatility being followed by a period dominated by economic 
reconstruction and political conservatism.
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However, the emphasis of these studies has been more concerned with the positions of 
the major parties rather than the behaviour of electorates, though in a functioning 
democracy the two are obviously inter-linked. Although variations occur on the exact 
chronology of these changes, most accounts broadly endorse the following pattern:
1st party system: 1800-1828 Jeffersonian Republicanism (dominant) versus Federalist,
2nd party system: 1828-1850s Jacksonian Democrats (dominant) versus Whigs,
3rd party system: 1850s-1890s Republicans versus Democrats, one party domination did 
not occur, this was an era of close party competition,
4th party system: 1896-1930s Republicans (dominant) versus Democrats,
5th party system: 1932/6 -  1960s/1980s New Deal Democrats (dominant) versus 
Republicans.
tV» thThere is then uncertainty about the change from a 5 to a 6 party system,
6th party system: 1968 - ? Republicans (dominant) versus Democrats,
1980 - ? Reaganite Republicans (dominant) versus Democrats.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CLASS STRUGGLE and LONG WAVE ECONOMICS
Introduction
In recent decades the changing nature of voting behaviour has been an important 
concept in explaining the dynamic of the political process and thus the changing fortunes 
of the left and right. However, it is not without its rivals, one of which is the role of class 
conflict. Many political history narratives and theories have involved the use of social 
class as a means of identifying the different actors in any given historical situation and
* • ththeir likely motivations, actions and goals. Further, since the mid-19 century the 
competition between social classes has also been seen as a key factor in creating a 
dynamic political process. Although, the struggle between the aristocracy and the 
industrial bourgeoisie was a key component of the political battles of the 19th and early
tVi20 century, attention has increasingly turned towards the struggle between employers 
and employees, the middle classes and the working class.
The political parties of the left and right have often been closely linked with 
particular social classes and if class conflict is a key component of the modem political 
process it could be expected to have an important impact on the fortunes of the left and 
right. In addition, historically, there have been close links between trade-union 
movements and working-class parties of the left, whilst employers federations have also, 
at times, been supportive of particular political parties. As such the changing fortunes of 
these two social movements and their importance in modem society might also be 
expected to have an important impact on the fortunes of the left and right, and thus class 
struggle theories may help to explain the pattern found in Chapter 2.
As reviewed in Chapter 1, a number of authors have linked changes in class struggle 
activity, trade union membership and other features of industrial relations to changes in 
long-wave economics.1 In general, in recent years, these authors are largely agreed upon 
a common pattern of correlation that links features of industrial relations to long-wave 
economics, although there is considerably less agreement on why this pattern occurs.
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The general pattern agreed upon is that the level of worker mobilization tends to rise 
during periods of economic prosperity, reaching a peak of intensity towards the end of 
long-wave upswings. A typical upswing pattern is one of low, but rising, levels of trade 
union membership and strike activity in the first half of the upswing. The second half of 
the upswing sees a generalized increase in strike activity and union membership, until a 
peak in militancy is reached in the final three or four years of the upswing. Screpanti 
describes this peak in militancy as proletarian, general, autonomous and radical. In the 
downswing this trend is reversed, levels of worker mobilization decrease to a low point 
mid-way through the downswing. Some authors also recognize a revival in mobilization 
towards the end of the downswing though there is somewhat more disagreement on this.
This chapter will assess the competing theories put forward to explain this pattern of 
worker mobilization, and explore the possible implications of this pattern of mobilization 
for the political forces of the left and right.
4.1 Long-Wave Upswings
For structuralists, a major feature that both causes and enables political change is the 
presence of a class-divided society. The existence of social structures both enables and 
defines the limits to which political change can take place. All modem societies have 
been marked by divisions based on social class, and these often determine the major 
political fault-lines within any given society. Within such a stratified society conflicts of 
interest will almost inevitably occur, and the way in which they do so, is according to a 
number of theorists structured by the path of the long-wave.
Cronin, developed a structural explanation linking long-waves and worker 
mobilization drawing on theories developed by Gordon and Hobsbawm, in addition to 
Schumpeter’s theory of waves of innovation driving the long-wave process forward. 
Gordon saw the processes of depletion and regeneration of the economic infrastructure 
during downswings as being closely tied to the constitution and reconstitution of the 
social structure. 4 Using this as a basis, Cronin closely linked the rise and fall in the 
fortunes of organized labour and proletarian insurgencies to the pattern of the long-wave.
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In terms of the history of working-class protest he largely follows the theory outlined by 
Hobsbawm in Labouring Men.5
According to Hobsbawm, at some point in the mid-nineteenth century, industrial 
workers typically began to protest at the height of the trade-cycle, rather than during poor 
economic times as had been the case with agricultural workers. For Cronin, this came 
about, partially as workers learnt to adapt to a new economic environment and to press 
for changes at the most propitious time, but above all for structural reasons. Each new 
upswing in the long-wave recreates the working class. With social structure tied 
intimately to the economic infrastructure, each new upswing and its new technological 
innovations brings with it a new set of workers - “long waves, specifically the upswings 
of long waves, do not simply produce prosperity and economic growth, but are 
profoundly innovative in terms of social relations as well”6.
As such, each new manifestation of the working class attempts to assert its own 
interests within wider society. Each change implies “different possibilities and patterns of 
collective organization”, the chance to “redraw the lines of class cleavage throughout 
society and the parameters of collective action”.7 As the working-class exerts itself 
during the upswing, there is an increase in industrial action, union membership and left 
activity all of which lead to an insurgent peak of strike activity found at the end of each 
long-wave.
This explanation would not of course necessarily apply to only the working class. The 
emergence of any new social class after a major restructuring of the economy would 
likely see that social class attempting to project both its political and economic demands. 
Quite likely the prevailing possible conditions in which this new class emerges will not 
be entirely to its liking- and at a time of confidence it will attempt to alter the social, 
political and economic conditions in such a way as to make its existence more amenable. 
Thus, such a process could also apply to the emergence of the industrial bourgeoisie in 
the early nineteenth century. In Britain, for instance, this class had two long-lived 
political upsurges, those between 1812 to 1832 and between 1860 and 1874, as it 
attempted to incorporate itself into the political mainstream at the expense of the landed 
aristocracy. As part of this process it introduced a substantial raft of political, social and 
economic legislation that suited the particular needs of this social class.
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Cronin’s explanation would thus apply to the emergence of any social class. However, 
a weakness of this structural approach is that it does not identify the specific mechanisms 
by which a particular social class might mobilize once it has identified its overriding 
interests. New social classes may emerge or be re-made but why does their political 
mobilization follow a particular pattern? For this it is necessary to turn to other 
explanations.
Implicit within many theories attempting to explain higher levels of worker 
mobilization is the assumption that low levels of unemployment greatly favour the 
position of the working class. During a long-wave upswing forces in the labour m arket 
appear to work in favour of the workforce. Long-wave upswings have been characterized 
by low levels of unemployment, typically averaging less than 5% (See Table 1, Appendix 
B), at a time of increased demand for labour. In particular, shortages of skilled and semi­
skilled labour lead to an improved bargaining position for workers in these categories. 
Both wages and working conditions can be improved easily if  labour scarcity is a 
continued problem for employers. This also has the effect of raising the general wage 
levels even amongst unskilled workers.
In addition, at times of economic boom and when profits are easily made, employers 
will not want to see production paralyzed for long periods of time. They will want to 
settle disputes quickly, often conceding the demands of organized labour, at a time when 
high levels of profit also allow concessions to be made with relative ease. However, 
although a belief in the ability to effect change in the workplace and favourable market 
forces are conducive to worker mobilization, a mechanism for effecting change is still 
needed.
One approach that linked changes in the level of worker mobilization to long-waves 
and using a largely psychological explanation was provided by Screpanti.9 In an attempt 
to explain the recurring working-class insurgencies at the end of each long-wave 
upswing, he maintained that the level of working-class militancy is determined by two 
factors - achievement and frustration. During the course of the long-wave upswing, the 
high employment levels and greater job security that economic growth brings produces 
greater workers’ self-confidence. As economic conditions improve workers press for 
greater claims, and, at a time of prosperity employers are able to offer better wages and
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working conditions. As a result, the level of achievement increases, but as achievements 
are consolidated so greater expectations are raised. However, as the level of demands 
rises it begins to outstrip achievements -  there is a limit as to what is available. This leads 
to a high level of frustration, which is amplified by the arrival of a new more militant 
generation of younger workers. This frustration explodes into a militant working-class 
insurgency at the end of the long-wave upswing.
However, there are a number of problems with this explanation. Firstly, the level of 
success achieved by industrial action at the end of the upswing is typically higher than at 
any other time in the long-wave. Each upswing peak has seen a notable pay explosion, 
indicating a high degree of success in raising wages. This was the case in the period 
1917-20 and also during the 1968-74 strike wave, when wages often rose well above the 
rate of inflation. In addition, it is common in this period for workers to achieve a 
reduction of working hours and other improvements in working conditions. In the early 
1870s many British workers secured the 9-hour day, whilst during 1918-20 the 8-hour 
day and 48-hour week were secured in a number of countries. Finally much of the 
legislation favourable to workers organizations has been secured in this period, British 
trade-unions enjoyed a notable run of success between 1867 and 1876. Typically strikes 
are short-lived and often achieve the demands put forward by labour. It is thus unlikely 
that frustration is a motivating force at this point in the long-wave.
Kelly offers an alternative explanation for this militancy based on strike 
effectiveness.10 The peak in industrial militancy is not a result of frustration but quite the 
opposite, a result of success. Reviewing the situation between 1908 and 1920 he 
concludes;
“As the scale of strike activity increased, so did the win rate, and as the win rate 
increased, bargaining coverage rose, more workers perceived unions to be effective and 
joined them, which in turn enabled more strikes to be called... and so on.”11
In other words success breeds success. Once strike action is perceived to be successful 
in one area, usually a key group of workers, other workers calculate that the likelihood of 
success is also high in their own industry leading to a generalized strike wave. This 
suggests that Screpanti’s causation of frustration is incorrect, and that achievement, 
resulting from high levels of employment, is a more likely factor in generating a
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generalised wave of militancy. As with theories of voting behaviour, it is increased levels 
of confidence that appear to be driving higher levels of worker mobilisation.
Kelly also, however, considered that a heightened awareness of injustice might be at 
the root of worker militancy during upswings. Likewise, Phelps Brown, in an attempt to 
explain the pay explosion of the late 1960s/early 1970s, maintained that a raised 
awareness of ‘relative deprivation’, or of being less wealthy than others, increased during 
the 1960s.12 Possibly due to the impact of television many workers saw that others had 
benefited from the boom to a greater extent than they had, due to the uneven distribution 
of wealth as it was created.
However, somewhat in contradiction of this, Kelly also found that the number of 
discrimination cases taken to citizens advice bureau’s was actually higher in the 
downswing years of the 1980s.13 This may indicate a higher level of perceived injustice 
at this point in time, or possibly that strikes are used when they are likely to be successful 
and other means of resolving injustice used at other times. It may not be the case that 
awareness of injustice or relative deprivation is the motivating factor here, since this is 
always present in a society where wealth/power is unevenly distributed. An alternative 
explanation might be that there is always an awareness of injustice, but only at certain 
times is there a sufficient level of confidence that industrial action is capable of 
addressing this.
Writing in 1975, Phelps Brown followed a further line of thinking in attempting to 
explain the rise of worker militancy and the pay explosion between 1968 and 1973.14 He 
used a largely generational approach for an explanation of this period of union 
militancy, and likened it to the period of worker militancy that occurred between 1910 
and 1920. He maintained that both periods of militancy resulted from a very similar set of 
conditions -  raised expectations, trade union expansion, a high level of strike success and 
full employment. Both followed long periods of buoyant economic expansion, so much 
so that the generations growing up during these periods knew only increasing prosperity, 
and were oblivious to the difficult economic times that preceded them.
The early part of both these periods of prosperity (Phelps Brown does not refer to long- 
waves) were relatively tranquil in terms of class struggle activity. This, he maintains, was
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because the generation that had entered into the workforce during the previous difficult 
economic conditions was cautious and conservative in its outlook. Having experienced 
periodic bouts of high unemployment, economic crises and thus high levels of job 
insecurity, this generation of workers was not inclined to industrial militancy. They 
placed job security before increased income. However, during the prolonged periods of 
prosperity that followed, the workforce was increasingly made up of a younger 
generation that had not experienced the hard times of the older generation.
This younger generation had known only increasing levels of wealth and expected 
continuing improvements and thus had higher aspirations and were more optimistic about 
the possibility of change than older generations. These younger generations of workers 
reached a critical mass within the workforce by 1968, by which time they constituted 
75% of the workforce, and the result was a period of union militancy and a pay 
explosion.
He also described the way in which the absence of unemployment during the economic 
booms changed the mindset of workers. At times of high unemployment workers were 
subordinate within the corporate hierarchy, since they were easily replaced from within 
the reserve army of labour that existed. The absence of unemployment during protracted 
periods of economic prosperity, however, removed a major weapon in the employers’ 
disciplinary armoury. With the threat of the sack or redundancy no longer effective, 
workers became more assertive, more independent of employers and more likely to 
challenge the prevailing working arrangements. Workers also began to question the very 
nature of the society that they lived in, and their subordinate position within it, leading to 
the political upheavals of the periods around WW1 and around 1968, and an increased 
level of interest in workplace occupations and socialism. Thus the major causation for 
periods of worker mobilization was to be found in a belief that existing injustices could 
be rectified.
The above discussion indicates that heightened levels of confidence are key to 
initiating high levels of worker mobilisation, but there is still the question of how this 
mobilisation is effected. Organizational arguments, such as that of Kelly, have looked at 
the way in which the changing nature of trade-union organisation affects the ability to
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mobilize.15 To effect successful mobilization it is necessary that workers have the 
appropriate organizational means to do so. In the modem era, this has effectively meant 
trade union or associated bodies. It is also likely that these bodies will be affected by the 
economic climate within which they operate. It could be expected that the very different 
economic climates of the long-wave upswing and downswing would have markedly 
different effects upon the ability of workers organizations to operate.
In the economic expansion of the long-wave upswing, crises and recessions are few 
and relatively mild, thus labour movements are likely to find it considerably easier to 
expand their organizations without the major disruptions caused by economic crises. 
High levels of employment provide a larger pool of possible adherents, and all long-wave 
upswings have seen a notable rise in union membership and density, at first slowly, but 
dramatically towards the end.16 In addition, with higher consumer demand and rising 
profits, employers are able to concede more of the demands of organized labour. Unions 
become associated with successful bargaining thus attracting more members hoping to 
share in elevated levels of success.
The absence of damaging periods of high unemployment also allows greater continuity 
at the rank-and-file organizational level. It is difficult for employers to blacklist or 
intimidate union activists at times of full employment. Rank-and-file activists are able to 
build up levels of organization unhindered by high unemployment, periodic recession and 
employer intimidation. This process allows a gradually improving ability in the use of the 
strike weapon (or other forms of industrial activity) and an improved learning of how it 
can be most effectively used and with least damage to union members.
It might be expected that changes in the long-wave would have a comparable effect 
upon employers’ federations.17 Upswings bring prosperity, a larger number of.businesses 
and thus potential members, together with an influx of funds and greater lobbying 
possibilities. Conversely downswings bring bankruptcy and fewer potential members and 
funds and thus reduced lobbying possibilities. However, the acute variations experienced 
by organized labour do not appear to be experienced quite so dramatically by employers’ 
federations. Even at the depth of the downswing, employers federations do not suffer the 
range of hardships being experienced by trade-union members - persecution and 
intimidation, a hostile media and government and possible anti-union legislation. Elite
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economic groups usually have greater access to power resources and a thus a greater 
ability for political leverage. Thus employers federations do not suffer to the extent of 
trade unions during long-wave downswings. When the upswing returns both employers 
and trade-union federations benefit, but the unions start from a lower base and their 
position thus shows a relatively more acute improvement throughout the upswing.
Thus a number of factors are needed to explain the pattern of worker mobilization in 
upswings described by long-wave theorists. Firstly a structural element that sees the 
expansion of new sections of the working class at a time of low unemployment and a 
beneficial labour market. In addition, with this economic expansion arrives a younger 
generation of workers uninhibited by the experience of previous economic difficulties. At 
first, worker mobilization rises only slowly but, aided by low levels of unemployment, 
these forces accumulate, union membership and density rises, organization improves and 
strike effectiveness increases, and so confidence soars leading to an explosion in worker 
militancy at the end of the upswing.
The Effect on the Left and Right
In general, given the often close link between union movements and the parties of the 
left, it might be expected that increased worker mobilization would tend to benefit the 
political parties and movements of the left. Typically, the political forces of the left draw 
most of their support from the subordinate social classes within society. Long-wave 
upswings are characterized by increased levels of economic activity and thus increasing 
levels of employment. New sectors of economic activity, new technologies and new 
innovations also produce a changing workforce, much of which will initially be in a 
subordinate position in society. The potential support for political movements supporting 
subordinate social classes is thus improved, notably for the left since its aim is a 
progressive redistribution of power within society.
Indeed this appears to have been the case in each upswing. During the 1860’s Liberal, 
Socialist, Radical and Republican movements all gained increased momentum, in part 
due to increased support from working-class organisations. During the third upswing, 
Socialist parties enjoyed a notable and prolonged upsurge in membership and electoral
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support from the working class. Again, in the 1960’s left parties and movements enjoyed 
increased support and membership at a time of increased worker mobilisation. Initially, at 
least, the heightened level of confidence amongst the working class appears to translate 
into improved prospects for the left.
However, one major factor may work against the parties of the left at such a time. In a 
study of nineteenth century labour movements, Hunt found a direct relationship between 
industrial action, political action and the ups-and-downs of the short-term business
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cycle. Over the short-term, when the business cycle improved and economic conditions 
were advantageous, workers concentrated on industrial action, since they were most 
likely to effect gains at this time. Conversely, during economic recessions, attention 
shifted towards effecting change through the political process, since gains were unlikely 
to be extracted from employers in the workplace during difficult times, or in order to do 
so may have proved extremely damaging to trade union movements. At such times 
workers were more likely to turn to the parliamentary process to effect gains, a classic 
case being the Chartist movement at the depths of the 1842 depression.
As such, the period at the end of the long-wave upswing, which is characterized by an 
intense peak in industrial militancy by organized labour, could actually witness a 
decrease in support for the parliamentary parties of the left amongst the working class. 
With gains being effected in the workplace with relative ease, working class activists may 
devote their attentions to effecting change through economic organizations. There may be 
a belief that the political level is of little importance, and thus a lower a lower level of 
support for the parliamentary parties of the left than might be expected at such a time.
Thus, a period of intense worker radicalism may actually benefit the parties of the 
right. In addition, as shown in Chapter 3, this period is characterised by issue voting, 
electoral volatility and increased ideological awareness. Many, younger workers and 
activists may be attracted to extra-parliamentary or revolutionary left movements and 
parties, further eroding the electoral support of the mainstream left. Added to any 
backlash or reaction that the period of labour militancy generates, this could explain why 
parties of the left might begin to lose momentum in the latter part of the upswing or in the 
early part of the long-wave downswing
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The Revolutionary Left
Chapter 2 strongly indicated that the revolutionary movements of the left have 
experienced a heightened level of support and mobilisation at the end of each upswing.19 
The first International at the end of the second upswing, anarcho-syndicalism and 
revolutionary Communism at the end of the third and the revolutionary Marxist, anarchist 
and post-materialist groups in the late 1960s/early 1970s. The explanation for this appers 
to lie in the above discussion. During upswings, trade unionists are achieving higher 
levels of success at both the level of national bargaining and the level of industrial action. 
Together with the fact that rank-and-file activists are effecting much of this action, and 
taking matters into their own hands, this situation leads to an increased level of interest in 
socialist ideas of workers control and other facets of socialist thinking
An implication of these findings, is that they tend to directly contradict one of the 
assertions of Marx, namely that workers are radicalized through immiserisation and that 
socialism will emerge from economic crisis. Influenced by the French Revolution of 
1789 and the revolutions of 1848, both of which followed an economic crisis brought on 
by poor harvests over two or three years, Marx adopted the belief that revolution would 
follow on from economic crisis.21 However, revolution did not follow the downturn of 
1857, as Marx had hoped. In fact, during the prosperous 1850s and 60s, the organized 
working class in Britain appeared to be increasingly incorporated within mainstream 
society, supporting Liberalism and further democratization, and benefiting from a series 
of laws passed between 1867 and 1876 that were favourable to the trade unions. To 
explain this level of integration Marx invented the theory of the aristocracy of labour.
According to this theory, as a result of Britain’s profitable Empire, capital was able to 
raise the standard of living for some workers, notably skilled workers, and these workers 
began to identify politically with capitalism, particularly through their support of the 
Liberals and thus lost interest in revolution. A lack of mobilization by unskilled workers 
resulted from the fact that skilled workers had collaborated with capitalists leaving the 
unskilled with no one to lead them. A more modem manifestation of this argument was 
the theory of ‘embourgeoisement’, raised in the 1970s to explain a perceived decline in 
support for Labour and class dealignment amongst the working class. This theory
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maintained that the raised living standards of the 1950s and 1960s had led to more 
affluent workers losing interest in socialism and the parties of the left and being more 
likely to accept bourgeois values and identify with middle-class parties.
However, both theories had a number of problems. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
studies by Nordlinger and Goldthorpe found that affluent workers were more likely to
99support the Labour Party than those who were financially worse off. This chimed with a 
widespread observation in the nineteenth century, that those workers involved in socialist 
and radical parties and trade unions were likely to be the more skilled, better-educated 
and more prosperous members of the working-class. Unskilled workers were considered 
to be more conservative, apathetic towards any form of politics, uninterested in social
9^
affairs and also as potential strikebreakers. Thus both the theory of the aristocracy of 
labour and embourgeoisement appear doubtful.
These studies also call into question the likelihood of when revolution will occur. The 
Marxist position was that social revolution, one that led to systemic changes, was most 
likely during a period of deepening economic crisis. The reasons for this were, firstly, 
that the economic system was clearly failing and thus needed replacing with something 
better, and secondly that the poverty induced by economic crisis would have a motivating 
force, inspiring workers to take action against the ruling forces in order to improve their 
position.
Marx was influenced by the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, but these occurred in 
agrarian societies, could it be assumed that a similar pattern would follow in 
industrialized economies? During the long-wave, downswings of 1873-1896, 1920-1948, 
and 1973-1999, only one proletarian social revolution occurred, the short-lived and 
unsuccessful Spanish revolution of 1936/7, Hobsbawm also called the theory of Marxist 
revolution into question in Labouring Men.24 He found that the pattern of protest during 
the 19th century changed as the workforce shifted from being predominantly agrarian to 
industrial. In agrarian societies, protest and rebellion followed high unemployment and 
high prices brought on by poor harvests and economic crisis. In industrial societies, 
protest and rebellion came at the top of the business cycle, whilst during recessions he
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believed that falling prices offset high unemployment, making economic crises more 
bearable.
The implication of this is that economic crisis is not likely to induce revolution in an
• * 9 5industrial society and an alternative to the Marxist position was put forward by Davies. 
Davies suggested that revolutions followed a J-curve pattern. He maintained that 
revolutions occurred after a two-stage process. Firstly a society enjoys a long and 
protracted period of economic prosperity and success, a period in which expectations 
amongst the population are raised but also met. The society then experiences some form 
of economic, military or political crisis. This leads to a position where raised expectations 
can no longer be satisfied and revolution breaks out amongst a dissatisfied population. 
Davies cites the French Revolution, Russian Revolution, Dorr’s Rebellion of 1842 and 
Egyptian Revolution of 1950 as examples. Perhaps of more importance, however, are 
those cases he does not mention. Virtually every industrializing or industrialized country 
experienced such scenarios in 1873, 1920, and 1973 or shortly afterwards, yet no 
revolutions occurred in these years or in the immediate aftermath of the economic 
downturn.
The chronology in Chapter 3 would suggest, however, that Davies is partially correct. 
Revolutions broke out in 1871 in Paris, in Russia in 1917, Germany in 1919 and most of 
eastern and central Europe in the same year. All occurred towards the end of a long-wave 
upswing and a long period of expanding prosperity, but also following military defeat, or 
perhaps more crucially, once military defeat had created a temporary or unstable power 
vacuum. A power vacuum after a long period of economic prosperity would seem to be 
the most likely environment for social revolution in industrialized economies, not at the 
depths of an economic crisis. This would also explain the widespread absence of 
revolution as a feature of industrialized economies, as opposed to the predictions of 
Marx, since such short-lived windows of opportunity have been few and far between. In 
addition, in democratic polities power vacuums are rare, since elections can be called to 
replace a failing government before any such power vacuum becomes a serious threat to 
the polity.
Thus, contrary to the beliefs of Marx, the above discussion appears to indicate that 
interest in socialism and revolution are more likely to occur towards the end of a long
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period of prosperity rather than during a prolonged economic crisis. The overriding 
reason for this appears to be that the conditions produced by economic prosperity lead to 
a growing belief within subordinate social classes that revolutionary change is not only 
desirable but also possible; the conditions of the upswing bring a newfound confidence 
that encourages people to believe that they have the ability to run their own lives. It is this 
that would appear to explain, as found in Chapter 2, that the most promising period for 
the revolutionary left is the late upswing and it is at these times that they have enjoyed 
the greatest level of support and influence
4.2 Long-Wave Downswings -  the ‘Crisis Period’.
Both the work of long-wave researchers and the chronology in Chapter 2 show that 
the pattern of class struggle in downswings is distinctly different to that in upswings. 
Typically industrial militancy peaks at the end of the upswing. In the early downswing, 
the level of worker mobilization remains high but unevenly declining. During the middle 
period of the downswing worker mobilization reaches a low point. This is then followed 
by a short-lived revival towards the end of the downswing during the ‘recovery period’. 
Sometimes, however, the latter appears to be absent. A similar pattern for the fortunes of 
trade union movements occurs. As with the upswing there is general agreement on the 
pattern of mobilization, but disagreement on its causation.
Cronin’s reasons for the decline of working class and left political activity during the 
long-wave downswing were predominantly structural, though additional reasons were 
given. The repression of organized labour in the early years of the downswing was seen 
as a major reason for the decline of social movements, as is the onset of economic 
depression. To compound this “the failure to storm the heights at the peak of insurgency 
leads to apathy and cynicism, to in-fighting within the left, and ultimately to passivity or,
77at least, to a lowered plateau of struggle.”
Above all, however, the reasons he cites are structural. The onset of depression brings 
the collapse of major industries and with it the collapse of the social structure, 
diminishing the capability to mobilize. The working class is then re-made during the
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depressions of the long-wave downswing, with the recreation of the economic 
infrastructure. Out of the slump materializes a new social structure that begins to exert 
itself, at first tentatively towards the end of the downswing, but with greater force 
throughout the course of the following long-wave upswing. However, as with his 
explanation for the upswing there still rests the specific mechanisms by which this 
process unfolds.
In the depressed economic conditions of the downswing, forces in the labour 
market tend to eventually favour employers. In the initial period, worker militancy is 
still high, and at a time of economic decline this creates protracted problems for 
employers. A poor economic climate means reduced demand and a squeeze on profits. 
Employers will typically respond with job losses or by attempting to reduce wages and 
working conditions. Industrial action is likely, with trade unions put on the defensive. 
Employers can no longer afford to end disputes quickly and strikes may be protracted and 
bitter.
However, with employers offering less, expectations amongst employees are slowly 
lowered. Increasingly workers attempt to defend concessions they have already gained 
rather than go on the offensive and seek improvements. Strike action tends to be 
defensive rather than offensive. Higher levels of unemployment allow employers to lower 
wages and working conditions. Job scarcity also leads to inter-union disputes and 
declining levels of worker solidarity as competition for jobs increases.
Turning to further mechanisms by which this occurs, Screpanti followed a 
psychological argument that was the inverse of that he used for the upswing.28 At the 
beginning of the long-wave downswing, in the worsening economic climate, 
achievements secured by workers start to decline whilst demands are still high. This 
means levels of frustration are still high and continuing, though declining, and relatively 
high levels of industrial militancy still occur. As the level of economic growth remains 
low, however, it brings with it high levels of unemployment and low levels of workers’ 
welfare. Claims are gradually lowered, bringing them into line with achievements, thus 
lowering frustration and resulting in the low levels of worker militancy that characterize
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the later part of the downswing. As with his explanation for the industrial militancy at the 
end of the upswing, however there is still a problem with using the concept of frustration. 
If frustration is not causing the initial militancy, then a decline in frustration, if  it occurs, 
is not likely to be pertinent.
Phelps Brown explained the absence of intense industrial militancy and political 
upheaval between 1920 and 1968 in Britain as resulting from the generational
• • 90  •expenences of the inter-war years. High unemployment, wage cuts, and the failure of 
industrial action in the 1920s, notably the devastating defeat of the 1926 general strike, 
all left their imprint on the generation of workers that entered the workforce during the 
1920s and 1930s. These workers saw industrial action as potentially damaging and 
disruptive and their overriding concern was job security. In difficult economic times 
industrial action often failed, and conditions were made worse as employers took 
advantage of defeat and weakened unions.
Even after the return to full employment in the post-1948 boom, the workforce was 
mainly constituted by workers who had entered the workforce during the previous 
difficult period. These workers carried generational experiences with them, making them 
reluctant to engage in any mass political or industrial upheaval. In the 1920s and 1930s 
militant left movements had often provoked the rise of fascist movements. The economic 
recovery after World War Two often appeared fragile and many expected a return to the 
mass unemployment of the 1930s. Any engagement in radical left activity or industrial 
action could, it was thought, produce a return to the problems of the inter-war period.
As with patterns of voting behaviour described in Chapter 3, Phelps Brown believed 
that generational effects could explain apparent time lags in class struggle behaviour in 
relation to the long-wave. In the early downswing industrial militancy is still relatively 
high because a generation of workers that emerged in a period of prolonged prosperity 
take time to adjust to a new set of economic conditions and to be joined by a younger and 
less radical workforce. In the early upswing, industrial militancy is initially low since a 
generation that emerged in a period of prolonged economic deterioration and instability 
constitutes a considerable section of the workforce.
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As with the upswing there is also the question of organizational abilities. Kelly noted 
that typically unions experienced a decline in both membership and density during 
downswings.'0 The difficult economic conditions of the long-wave downswing, the 
periodic crises and recessions, and higher levels of unemployment all have a detrimental 
effect on both the size and density of trade-unions and the effectiveness of their 
organization, notably at the rank-and-file level. Economic crisis usually results in an 
employer’s offensive against organized labour. A loss of markets and profitability results 
in a greater need to break strikes and the ability to intimidate and blacklist union activists.
As the economic situation declines at the beginning of the downswing, employers are 
able to concede fewer demands made by labour whilst confidence amongst the workforce 
remains relatively high initially. This may lead to high levels of confrontation, and the 
early downswing period is usually marked by a number of lengthy, bitter and expensive 
industrial disputes that easily turn violent.31 However, in a deteriorating economic 
climate employers are less able and less willing to make concessions. In addition rising 
levels of unemployment make it easier to break strikes.
Organized labour suffers a greater number of defeats than previously, thus breaking 
workers confidence and resulting in a lowered level of militancy. Strike effectiveness 
now declines; strike action is now potentially damaging to workers. Loss of employment, 
expensive loss of pay, union derecognition, blacklisting, picket-line violence and the 
threat of arrest, fines and imprisonment have all to be considered when taking industrial 
action. With membership, and thus finances, reduced, trade unions are weakened and 
industrial action is harder to organize and less likely to be successful. The likelihood of 
success through industrial action is diminished, and thus workers are less likely to engage 
in such action.
The overall result is that by the end of the ‘crisis period’ of the downswing, forces in 
the labour market have tended to work in favour of employers. High unemployment 
breaks the organizational abilities of organized labour and thus reduces the abilities of 
trade unionists to effect favourable changes at the economic level
152
The Effect on the Left and Right
At the beginning of the downswing the increasingly confrontational nature of the class 
struggle has the effect of intensifying the sense of political turmoil identified in Chapter 
2. Strike activity initially remains relatively high at a time of economic decline adding to 
a sense of impending chaos. Many of the strikes are prolonged, violent and take on a 
specifically political character. Both sides know the stakes are high and thus winning is 
of crucial importance. Wider political forces on both the right and left, already polarized, 
are drawn into disputes, the disputes then taking on a symbolic and highly politicized 
character.
Much of this tends to favour the political forces of the right. Industrial action appears 
disruptive, damaging and a major feature in the ongoing economic deterioration. Blame 
for economic deterioration and industrial violence can be directed towards the left, 
sections of which are still agitating for revolution. In addition, the left’s belief in progress 
comes into doubt, the attempt to fundamentally change society appears to be leading 
towards chaos, political turmoil and possibly economic breakdown.
There are, however, some countervailing tendencies. In the initial downturn, in the 
worsening economic climate, workers may turn away from industrial action towards the 
parliamentary process in order to effect change. With expectations of political change 
still high, this is most likely to translate into increased support for the left and may well 
result in pressure on left parties to adopt a more radical position, even whilst a more 
generalized rightward shift occurs amongst the wider electorate. As the economy further 
deteriorates, this may work to the detriment of the parties of the left. Shifting to the left 
whilst the wider electorate shifts to the right will most likely lead to electoral defeat.
In the longer run, however, most factors work in favour of the right. With labour 
market forces working in the employer’s favour, industrial action often results in failure. 
As the economy deteriorates, expectations are lowered. The social classes that emerged in 
the upswing with a gradually increasing set of demands now realize that they will have to 
settle for what they have already achieved. Further demands might result in losses. The 
emerging social classes become increasingly conservative and thus more susceptible to 
voting for the right.
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The Demise of the Revolutionary Left
Marx maintained that a deteriorating and crisis-ridden economic period would lead to 
proletarian revolution, but the chronology in Chapter 2 showed that it is more likely to 
lead to political reaction - revolutions in economic downswings have been few and far 
between. The above discussion indicates why revolution is unlikely. For revolution to 
occur, a large section of the population need to feel discriminated against and that the 
present system is unable to meet their expectations. More importantly however, they need 
to feel confident and well organized, that revolution is not only desirable, but also 
possible and that any attempt at revolution will result in success, rather than defeat and 
the possibility of repression, reaction and death. During a downswing both expectations 
and confidence are lowered making revolution increasingly unlikely.
In fact during long-wave downswings, the forces of revolution are more likely to 
dissipate than storm new heights. In the 1860s and early 1870s workers were attracted to 
the revolutionary ideas of socialism, anarchism and the First International and the 
insurrection of the Paris Commune. But in the more difficult economic climate of the 
Great Depression revolutionary enthusiasm gave way to less utopian expectations. The 
socialist movements that emerged in the 1890s at the end of the downswing were, with 
the exception of the French syndicalists, almost entirely reformist in both practice and 
outlook.
In the 1910s, workers were attracted to the revolutionary movements of anarcho- 
syndicalism, left Socialism and Communism, and the revolutionary events in Eastern and 
Central Europe. But once again revolution gave way to reform during the difficult 
decades of the 1920s and 1930s. Anarcho-syndicalist movements. were destroyed, 
socialists became social democrats, and Communists opted for Popular Front alliances 
with social democrats and the progressive middle-classes. The movements that emerged 
in the 1940s at the end of the downswing were largely social democratic in nature, with 
revolutionary forces almost nowhere to be seen.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a large array of anarchist, Marxist, post-Marxist and 
post-materialist movements of the New Left emerged proposing revolution, attracting 
both middle and working-class support. Again these movements declined during the 
economic difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s to be replaced by a social democratic ‘third
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way’, or Green or other alternative parties working within the parliamentary framework. 
Post-materialist groups in this period were more likely to turn to market forces than 
Marxist ideology, in order to argue their case
On each occasion prolonged economic crisis has, in contrast to the position taken by 
Marx, produced not revolution, but a dramatic decline in the fortunes of revolutionary left 
movements. As unemployment rises, as the economy worsens, as unions fail to deliver, 
the belief in the possibility of socialism or any other form of utopia declines. Workers no 
longer feel they are able to control events. Strike failures lead to further demoralization. 
A feeling of loss of control leads to a situation where union and party leaders are able to 
regain control from the rank-and-file. Increasingly leadership is seen as more important, 
whilst a deteriorating economic and political situation encourages the leadership to 
pursue a more cautious and conservative approach.
The Rise of the Reactionary Right
Chapter 2 showed, that during downswings, the forces of the reactionary right have 
been in the ascendant, sometimes with sufficient support to take power. In addition to 
being a means to mobilise against the revolutionary left, the reactionary right appears to 
be more popular for two main reasons. Firstly, downswings result in heightened 
economic insecurity and/or an absolute decline in living standards for certain sections of 
the population. This may result in Inglehart’s ‘authoritarian reflex’- a desire for strong 
leadership, and a willingness to accept a more subordinate position and thus a diminished 
distribution of political power.
Secondly, the economic contraction may occur whilst the economy is being 
restructured, with certain social classes facing extinction or severe diminishment and the 
prospect of immiserisation at the same time. Under such circumstances, sections of the 
population may seek to return to a previous era, a supposed ‘golden age’ in which they 
enjoyed relative prosperity. They may attempt to reverse the progressive changes that 
have previously been made and for which they blame their economic deterioration. Under 
such circumstances they resort to supporting reactionary political parties and movements
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in an attempt to reverse political, social and economic changes that are perceived to have 
put them at a disadvantage.
As can be seen from the chronology in Chapter 2, prolonged periods of economic 
malaise are more likely to produce political reaction than revolution. In the 1870s and 
1880s European workers faced reaction and repression after the defeat of the Paris 
Commune as state and employers sought to smash the First International. In addition the 
German socialist parties and unions suffered a period of illegality between 1878 and 
1890, whilst Bismarck staffed state institutions with reactionaries. In France, Boulangism 
sought to destroy democracy and liberalism, whilst a rise in support for the monarchist 
and religious right challenged the new republic. In both France and Germany, far right 
anti-Semitic parties became a feature of the political scene. In the USA, blacks in the 
South were effectively disenfranchised.
In the 1920s and 1930s fascism and a proliferation of far right movements emerged 
with the intention of smashing organized labour along with liberalism and democracy. 
Attempts to attract the working class were largely unsuccessful and fascism relied largely 
on the middle-classes and agrarian classes for its support. It was successful in a number 
of countries, effectively destroying the independent labour movements.
Thus, contrary to the predictions of Marx, this appears to indicate that interest in 
socialism and left revolution are less likely to occur during a period of economic crisis. 
The overriding reason for this appears to be that the conditions produced by economic 
crisis lead to a growing belief within subordinate social classes that revolutionary change 
is neither desirable nor possible. The conditions of the. downswing bring a sense of 
insecurity that discourages people from believing; that they have the ability to run their 
own lives. Reaction, rather than revolution, is more likely.
4.3 Long-wave Downswings - The ‘Recovery Period’
For long-wave researchers linking changes in industrial relations to long-waves this is 
the most contentious period of the cycle. This period is believed to see a renewed 
increase in worker mobilization though it is of considerably less intensity than that of the 
upswing and not always present - in some countries it appears to be entirely absent. This
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has led Screpanti to maintain that these periods of worker mobilization are purely 
‘national peculiarities’. However, in a discussion on this period of the cycle, Kelly 
believes this to be ‘neither plausible or parsimonious’ but does not arrive at any firm 
conclusions, noting that the ‘minor strike waves’ in this period are ‘more variable in 
duration, intensity and timing compared with major strike waves’.32
In an attempt to shed further light on this period it seems most productive to return to 
the historical record. In Appendix B, the ‘recovery periods’ were dated as 1843-48, 1888- 
1896, 1938-1948, and 1993-1998. Following the chronology outlined in Chapter 2 a brief 
description of the state of worker mobilization during these periods can be used for 
further evaluation.
In Britain, the period of the mid-late 1840s, saw a revival of unionism after the 
disastrous years of 1836 to 1843 in the shape of the New Model Unionism, notably 
amongst skilled artisans, and that went on to form a close alliance with Liberalism. The 
years after 1844 saw some revival in industrial action, notably amongst building workers 
and masons in the North West and skilled mining workers in the North East, and to a 
lesser extent elsewhere. Despite initial gains successes tended to be short-lived and soon 
reversed by employers during the period of depressed trade that occurred in 1847/8. In 
Germany, the most notable strike action was the Silesian textile workers revolt in the 
mid-1840s which ultimately failed, and the strike action during the 1848 revolution, as in 
France, but which also resulted in failure after initial successes. In the USA, there appears 
to have been only the most limited of revivals after the depression of 1837-42.
The years between 1888-1893, years of economic recovery, saw a revival of trade 
unionism and industrial action in Britain, France, Germany and the USA. All four 
movements experienced rapid increases in union membership, notably amongst sections 
of the workforce that had previously been organized, but had experienced deunionization 
during the difficult years of the 1880s. Demands were for raised wages and the 
implementation of the 8-hour day. Initially all four movements scored notable successes, 
but in the economic decline of 1893-96, most of these were reversed and trade union 
membership fell sharply except in France.
The years 1938-1948 saw a revival of industrial action in France in 1947-8 and USA 
amongst miners and railway workers in 1945-6, but neither of these were extensive or as
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militant as the movements in 1936-37. In the USA, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 
represented a major defeat for organized labour. There was no great revival of industrial 
action in Britain though the average number of strikes rose between 1944 and 1947. In 
Germany revival was always unlikely. According to Cronin, there was no revival in 
Britain as industry shifted to areas not traditionally noted for union organization, whilst 
industry failed to revive in areas of traditional unionism.33
In the 1990s, France witnessed the public workers strike of 1996 successfully prevent 
the governments attempts to reduce the scope of the public sector. In Germany the early 
1990s saw an increase in strike activity notably amongst metal workers, but mobilization 
fell later in the decade. Britain and the USA saw only a limited increase in industrial 
action from already very low levels.34
In general, these ‘strike waves’ appear short-lived, vary in militancy and usually occur 
at the height of the business cycle. Quite often they are of less intensity and militancy 
than strike waves earlier in the downswing. In many cases a strike wave is only apparent 
because previous levels of activity have been extremely low, making any level of activity 
look reasonably impressive. In general they appear to be confined to sections of the 
workforce where unionization is well established, whilst early successes are often 
reversed.
It seems possible that the revivals that do occur are as a result of workers having 
adapted to the difficult conditions of the long-wave downswing. In many cases, unions 
have responded to employers offensives by federating existing unions together in the 
hope that larger bodies are more likely to be; able to resist attacks on wages and working 
conditions or to survive anti-union drives. This was particularly notable in Germany, 
France and the USA during the Great Depression of 1873-1896, and also occurred 
unsuccessfully in Britain in the 1829-34 period of militancy. In the USA in the 1930s the 
CIO was launched to overcome the narrow sectionalism of the AFL. In other cases, trade 
unionists adopted different methods of industrial action, for instance the sit-down strikes 
of 1936 and 37 in France and the USA. At times of high unemployment, walkouts are 
less likely to produce union victories.
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Revivals of industrial militancy in the late downswing tend to coincide with the 
gradual improvement of the economy, slowly increasing employment and increased trade 
union membership. The improving economic climate allows for improved working 
conditions, if workers can organize successfully. It also offers the possibility of 
correcting reversals suffered during the depths of the ‘crisis years’. In contrast to the 
generalized strike peak at the end of the upswing, that at the end of the downswing, if it 
occurs, tends to be confined to skilled workers or those in industries that have a tradition 
of strong organization. In general it is only these groups that are confident enough to 
benefit from an improving economy.
However, even when these movements achieve notable success, their gains have often 
been reversed when the economy dips in the final downturn of the long-wave 
downswing, or further ambitions thwarted by changes introduced by employers or 
politicians. This appears to finally end the militancy that arose at the end of the upswing. 
Possibly, following Phelps Brown’s line of argument, by now a younger and more 
conservative generation of workers have reached a critical mass within the workforce 
whilst the older generation have downgraded their aspirations. Job security is the first 
priority after the years of economic instability and high unemployment during the 
downswing. Possibly an improving economy also offers the prospect of material 
improvements without needing to use industrial action.
At the political level these revivals of worker mobilization appear to have little effect. 
Industrial militancy at this time may benefit the right since it can be portrayed as 
jeopardising economic recovery, but by now the left has usually adopted a centrist 
position and may also condemn industrial action. If industrial action is absent or if it is 
unsuccessful, it is likely to add to the generally centrist and consensual nature of this 
period.
Summary
This chapter indicates that class struggle theories can be useful in explaining the 
pattern of change observed in Chapter 2. In general, findings are more limited than was 
the case with voting behaviour theory, but in particular it is useful for explaining the 
changing fortunes of the revolutionary left and reactionary right. In addition, in terms of
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causation it tends to reinforce the findings of Chapter 3. Socio-psychological arguments 
are of great importance with levels of confidence and attitudes towards authority being 
crucial.
In the long-wave upswing, low levels of unemployment improve the bargaining 
position of employees. Together with a structural expansion of a re-created working class 
this leads to a belief that progressive change can be effected, whilst a less deferential 
attitude in the workplace leads to increased support for socialist movements. This all adds 
to the leftward momentum experienced during the last two-thirds of the upswing. 
However, the higher levels of union density, strike effectiveness and worker mobilization 
together with an upsurge of left radicalism and socialist agitation eventually add to the 
sense of political turmoil and ideological polarisation. In contrast to the pattern 
elaborated by Marx, this is the most likely time for social revolution.
The deterioration of the economy during the early long-wave downswing brings about 
more protracted and embittered industrial disputes, adding to the sense of political 
turmoil and crisis. High levels of unemployment and industrial restructuring fracture the 
strength of organised labour. Expectations and militancy decline and labour defeats add 
to the renewed confidence of the right. Employers gain the upper hand and add to the 
momentum of the right. This period of economic crisis results in a rapid decline for the 
revolutionary left. Increased insecurity, the search for strong leadership and anatagonism 
towards the revolutionary left lead to increased support for the reactionary right.
The end of the downswing sometimes sees short-lived revivals of worker 
mobilization; However, successes can easily be reversed and this appears to have little 
impact on the political process. A generation of workers grown use to the problem of job 
security helps contribute to the period of consensus and conservatism that dominates the 
early part of the next upswing.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PARTY COMPETITION and the DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Introduction
If representative democracy functions correctly, trends in voting behaviour and 
changes in the class struggle should be reflected at the level of party competition. Parties 
need the support of voters to be elected, whilst employers and union federations have 
been amongst the most prominent of pressure groups in the modem political process. 
This chapter will turn to the question of party competition and how the theories 
associated with this process may help to explain the changing fortunes of the left and 
right outlined in Chapter 2.
In so doing it will also introduce the importance of ideology and its pertinence to the 
process of party competition. The chapter will draw heavily on the discussion in 
Appendix A, using the concept of the distribution of power within society to define the 
meaning of the left-right cleavage, and how this relates to the process of party 
competition over the course of a long-wave.
5.1 Trends in Party Competition Theory
There were two main developments in the theory of party competition during the 
fourth long-wave of 1948-1998. Initially party competition theory was dominated by a 
Downsian approach that appeared to successfully explain the existence of a political 
climate characterized by consensus in the early post-war period.1 Such a consensus was 
explained by the fact that parties on both the left and right of the political spectrum were 
converging on a median voter who was positioned somewhere near the centre of the 
political spectrum. This gave rise to a theory of party competition based on preference 
accommodating strategies -  where parties simply tailored their policies towards those 
held by the median voter. As such, policies on both the left and right appeared similar in 
nature and were believed to perpetuate the existence of the consensus.
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However, by the early 1970s this theory appeared inadequate to some theorists of 
party competition. Politics within liberal democracies was by now considerably less 
consensual with an increased level of conflict and major divisions between the left and 
the right. They considered that the Downsian model of party competition was unable to 
explain this. Following the publication of Samuel Finer’s Adversary Politics in 1975 it 
was increasingly believed that liberal democracy was not shaped by a consensually based 
polity but by the adversary politics of party competition.2 This became the new 
orthodoxy and attempts were made to show why Downsian theory appeared to be 
mistaken and how the theory could be improved.
For the most part, theoreticians turned to the role of political activists and/or the 
pressure groups and financial interests that backed political parties. It was maintained that 
these groups were highly motivated, more engaged in the political process and thus more 
likely to take up ideological positions on the left and right. This was unlike the median 
voter who tended to be somewhat disengaged from the political process, less interested in 
politics and thus less ideological and more likely to be somewhere near the political 
centre.3
As a result of the activist’s position on the political spectrum, the leaders of the 
parties, who would prefer to be chasing the median voter in the centre, were forced away 
from the centre in order to accommodate the belief systems of party activists and 
supporters. This meant that leaders were pulled in two opposite directions, and one 
possible resolution of this problem for leaders was to adopt preference-shaping 
strategies. In other words, party activists could assume a more influential position than 
the median voter. Leaders attempted to implement policies that would draw voters away 
from the centre towards either the left or the right, closer to the position of the activists. 
The result was adversary politics.
However, both preference-accommodating and preference-shaping theories have their 
strengths and weaknesses. Downsian theory has established the importance of the median 
voter and the use of this concept has remained widespread within party competition 
theory. Downs position on the significance of ideology in the process of party 
competition is more controversial, though, and is inconsistent and confusing. On the one
167
hand he plays down the role of ideology in his model. Ideologies, he believes, were 
adopted by parties as a useful tool once the democratic process was up and running, in an 
attempt to come to terms with the views of voters. He maintains that ‘political parties are 
interested in gaining office per se, not in promoting a better or an ideal society’, that 
ideologies are simply used by political parties as a means to attain power.4
On the other hand, he also saw ideology as emanating from ‘the heterogeneity of 
society, the inevitability of social conflict and uncertainty’.5 Voters were considered to 
believe ideology as important; ideologies being used to differentiate between parties with 
similar policies, or as a short cut which eliminates the cost of being informed about 
specific issues. He also used ideology to explain the dynamic of party competition, and 
to determine the position of the median voter, voters were aligned along a left-right 
ideological axis. In addition, Downs believed that parties could not leapfrog over one 
another along the left-right axis, that parties needed to demonstrate reliability, integrity 
and responsibility in order to be elected. Leapfrogging would damage the credibility of 
the party in the eyes of the electorate, again indicating the importance of ideology to 
voters.6
Clearly this is inconsistent, the left-right dichotomy is at the centre of the voting 
model, ideology is important to voters, but ideology is also considered as little more than 
a useful tool for voters and parties. In addition, historically, ideological divisions usually 
predated the creation of functioning party systems based on election. Ideologies such as 
Liberalism, Radicalism and Socialism were at the heart of social movements before they 
became engaged in the electoral process. These divisions were often a key feature in the 
establishment of modem political parties, not simply a useful tool later adopted by parties 
looking for votes. Downs’ position contrasts with that of preference-shaping theories 
where ideology is seen as a belief system or a guide to creating a better world, or 
alternatively to maintaining the present one if it is believed change is undesirable. In 
addition, ideology is regarded as representing the interests of a particular social group or 
class within society, that ideology helps to clarify and project the demands of particular 
interest groups.
It was evident in the 1960s and 1970s that as the electorate polarized, ideology was 
certainly of prime importance. As the centrist consensus of the immediate post-war era
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broke down, some voters moved to the left, and it was those parties traditionally 
associated with the left that took a more left-wing position. As other voters moved to the 
right, parties traditionally associated with the right shifted to the right. If ideology were 
unimportant the direction of the parties would have been more random in nature with 
some leapfrogging others. Approximately 50% would shift their position on the axis. This 
was never the case. All parties maintained their respective positions on the left-right 
spectrum.
The strength of preference-shaping party theory was its identification of ideology as a 
key determinant in understanding the process of party competition. However, it too was 
not without its problems. Firstly, it tended to move the politics of liberal democracies 
away from the orthodox theory of pluralism to one closer to elite theory. Thus the role of 
the electorate in liberal democracies is undermined, whilst that of political elites grows in 
importance. As such the importance of the concept of the median voter is brought into 
question. Secondly, as admitted by Dunleavy,7 many of the examples used to demonstrate 
preference-shaping strategies could equally be considered to have a preference- 
accommodating motivation, notably those concerning the political-business cycle (where 
the economy is boosted before elections) and manipulation of the housing market 
(satisfying a demand for owner occupation). These policies could equally be seen as 
satisfying the demands of sections of the electorate and thus not elite-led.
Thirdly, and more importantly, it fails to engage with the findings on voting behaviour 
in the 1970s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this period saw the decline of 
partisan alignment and the rise of issue voting. It also saw electoral volatility, heightened 
expectations and an increasingly polarized electorate, sections of which were considering 
the far right and far left as viable political alternatives. Voters were not necessarily at the 
centre of the political spectrum. Neither were they necessarily disengaged from the 
political process, if anything voters were more interested and more likely to participate in 
political movements than in the period characterized by partisan alignment. In other 
words, adversary politics could alternatively be explained by the fact that parties were 
following voters that had moved away from the political centre towards the left and 
right.8
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The previous chapters on voting behaviour and class struggle indicated that it was the 
position of voters moving away from the centre towards the left and the right that was 
causing consensual politics to give way to adversary politics, not the influence of activists 
who had always taken a more ideological stance anyway, even during a period of 
consensual politics.9 In other words, ideology is always important, it is just that during 
the consensus period this is not immediately apparent. In addition, the median voter is 
also always of importance, but its needs to be recognised that the median voter will not 
always be at the ideological centre.
With this in mind, the rest of this chapter will aim to show how existing theories of 
party competition can help to explain the pattern of political change described in Chapter 
2. In doing so, it will also draw on the discussion in Appendix A in using the struggle 
over the distribution of power as the key determinant in distinguishing the positions of 
the left and right.
5.2 Long-Waves and Party Competition.
If the process of party competition in the modem era has been defined around the 
distribution of power within society, then the fluctuation in the fortunes of the left and 
right could be explained by changing attitudes within society with regards to this matter. 
The beneficial economic conditions of the long-wave upswing tend to favour the left, 
thus the dominant motivation of electorates/citizens could be expected to be one that 
favours greater distribution of economic, social and political power. In contrast, the 
difficult economic conditions of the long-wave downswing could be expected to give rise 
to a different set of motivations that tend to favour the right. Many amongst the 
electorate/citizenry might seek to either limit further distributions of power through the 
maintenance of the status quo, or to actively seek a reversal of previous distributions and 
to concentrate power within a smaller section of society. These differing motivations 
would alter the fortunes of political movements, and result in the left and right becoming 
of differing importance under different sets of economic conditions.
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Consensus Politics
Each political long-wave begins with a period of relative consensus, that lasts around 
a decade, and in which the parties of the right are more likely to be in power. This can be 
explained by the median voter being close to the centre of the political spectrum with 
both left and right parties vying for his/her support. Chapter 3 indicated that electorates 
see little hope or need of significant political change at this point in the long-wave. No 
significant ideological shifts to the right or left are envisaged whilst a period of centrist 
politics dominates the political agenda. Preference accommodating strategies are the most 
likely ones for political parties since it is relatively easy to move a little to the left or right 
whilst the median voter is in the centre. As such, political parties tend to perpetuate a 
period of consensus-based politics.
A. B.
No. of 
voters 50 100
LEFT RIGHT LEFT
50 100
RIGHT
Figure 5: A. Consensus Politics and Preference Accommodation -  median voter in the 
ideological centre.
B. Progressive Politics -  median voter moves to the left.
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For conservative sections of the right this should pose few problems. Maintenance of 
the status quo, continuity in policy-making and only minimal levels of reform are 
characteristics of conservatism. As such they are more at ease with such a political 
climate and more likely to be in power. Once in power, partisan alignment may keep 
them in government. Right-wing governments dominated the consensual periods of the 
1850s, 1896-1906 and the 1950s.10 With the electorate not seeking any major 
redistribution of power within society there is less reason to vote for the left. Thus, for the 
left this period proves problematic. With its desire for the redistribution of power stunted 
by public opinion, it may have to accommodate itself with conservatism, thus offering 
little of an alternative to the right.
Progressive Politics
The long-wave upswing is characterized by prolonged and buoyant economic growth, 
a phenomenon that Chapter 3 indicates gives rise to a more optimistic and progressive 
climate of opinion amongst wide sections of the public. Electorates are more likely to be 
open to change, less deferential, more confident, risk-taking, and with the economy 
performing well, more interested in social and political matters. Such a climate is 
conducive to a redistribution of power.
At the economic level, long-wave upswings could be expected to see demands for 
major redistribution’s of wealth, be it through an extension of economic activity, more 
effective trade-union action or through a system of progressive taxation, and this was 
often the case in the 1860s, 1910s and 1960s. The prosperity of the long-wave upswing 
provides governments with the means to effect such change. With high levels of tax 
revenue or potential tax revenue, the funds are available for effecting progressive 
political and social change. Indeed, with potential overheating of the economy a constant 
possibility, higher taxation levels may serve the double purpose of meeting the demands 
of the electorate and steadying the economy.
At a political level, the redistribution of power would be represented by either moves 
towards democratization, the implementation of democracy or qualitative improvements 
in the democratic process, possibly through constitutional changes, extension of the
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franchise or a deepening of the democratic process. The first three upswings all saw 
concerted attempts to extend the electoral franchise, whilst the idea of direct democracy 
was often raised during the fourth.
At a social level, each long-wave upswing would witness a surge in social movements 
hoping to implement extensions of civil rights, to bring marginal groups and their 
activities into the social mainstream, and attempts to broaden cultural perspectives would 
receive a major boost from the prosperity of the long-wave upswing. In other words, 
major attempts to reduce social exclusivity will characterize the upswing political 
climate, to broaden social inclusion and cultural pluralism. Typically these periods have 
seen movements aimed at ending the exclusion suffered by sections of the working class, 
women and ethnic minorities.
Political and social change, especially that benefiting poorer sections of society often 
requires large amounts of government revenue. Instituting political and social change can 
be expensive, especially if it is done ineffectively and needs correcting and with the 
economy booming, governing parties are able to devote more time and resources to 
political and social matters.
As such long-wave upswings are characterized by a desire to see a greater distribution 
of political, social and economic power. The median voter moves to the left of the 
political spectrum. Not surprisingly the parties of the left should benefit from this 
movement, assuming they have not overly accommodated to the conservatism of the 
previous consensual period.
However, this period is more problematic for parties of the right. In order to attract the 
median voter, parties of the right will have to shift towards a more progressive position 
and implement progressive policies to retain that support. This will clearly not be popular 
with all sections of the right. Nevertheless, the practical goal of achieving power will 
undoubtedly result in many on the right accepting such a strategy, at least for a limited 
period of time. A government of the right may be able to limit the more radical 
distribution of power being advocated by the left.
There are, however, limits to this process. The importance of maintaining its 
ideological essence is always important for any political party or movement of the left
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and right. The membership of political movements share a broadly similar political 
ideology which they believe should be implemented through either parliamentary or 
extra-parliamentary processes. If the leadership or a particular section of the party takes 
the organization too far from the desired ideological viewpoint, the possibility of 
divisions and damaging splits emerge.
The possibility of new parties or movements emerging to outflank them amongst their 
traditional supporters, if they stray too far into ‘enemy territory’, is always present. 
Downs identified these as ‘real’, where the new party attempts to replace the established 
one, or ‘intention’ parties, where the new party acts more as a pressure group, hoping to 
pressurize the established party into returning to a more acceptable ideological position.11 
Right-wing parties at this point may also seek to engage in preference-shaping strategies 
in the hope of drawing the median voter towards the right, and thus reduce the possibility 
of damaging splits. Overall, though, this period is more likely to see the left, rather than 
the right, in power.
The Radical Left and Adversary Politics
The end of each long-wave upswing has experienced a rapid increase in support for 
radical left positions. The median voter is on the left of the political spectrum. The 
expectations of the electorate, after years of prosperity and an expanding economy, are 
high, especially amongst the younger generation. To attain power, parties of both the left 
and right are likely to compete to promise the electorate more than their opposition. This 
has the effect of raising expectations even further and something of a snowball effect 
develops.12
However, the left’s attempts or desire to effect even greater redistribution’s of power 
will almost invariably affect vested interests. This period also experiences an increase in 
worker militancy and industrial action, a pay explosion and rapidly rising prices, and the 
left may experience the emergence of radical or extra-parliamentary left movements. For 
sections of the electorate this proves increasingly unacceptable. In particular the 
movements and parties of the right and their supporters are likely to seek to stall or 
reverse these tendencies. Not only is it ideologically unacceptable, but with sections of
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the electorate alarmed by the way things are developing, there is increasing support for 
right-wing ideologies. The 1870s, 1920s and 1970s all witnessed the emergence of new 
parties, or tendencies within existing parties, adopting a more hard-line right-wing 
agenda to counter the perceived excesses of the left.
This tendency is exacerbated with the onset of the downswing. The electorate 
polarizes across the left and right, with the centre being relatively diminished -  a bimodal 
distribution of voters. Together with electoral volatility and the establishment of issue 
voting, this leads to a period of adversarial politics with the left and right adopting 
distinctive and often irreconcilable ideological positions. Adversary politics results in the 
period of political turmoil characteristic of the first decade of each downswing, with an 
intense battle over the redistribution of power in society.
As a result of this, parties may indulge in preference-shaping strategies, not 
specifically because of the influence of party activists, but in order to attract voters from 
the other half of the political spectrum. This does not deny the fact that other policies will 
be preference-accommodating, simply that both strategies become pertinent in the 
struggle to attract potential voters at a time of political polarization. The onset of 
preference-shaping strategies may well result in the persistence of adversarial politics and 
further polarisation at the party level and intensify the level of political turmoil.
Conservative Politics
Downs maintained that a polarized, or bimodal, electorate would almost certainly lead 
to revolution. A bimodal electorate, he claimed, ‘means that government policy will be 
highly unstable, and that democracy is likely to produce chaos’. ‘When the distribution 
has become so split that one extreme is imposing by force policies abhorred by the other
I T *extreme, open warfare breaks out, and a clique of underdogs seizes power’. In reality, 
with the possible exception of the 1936 Spanish revolution, this has never occurred in a 
functioning democracy.14 The effect of the downturn in the economy has usually been to 
favour the forces of the right and to moderate the position of the left for the reasons given 
in Chapter 3.
The economic difficulties during the long-wave downswing lead to a more 
pessimistic, cautious and conservative climate of public opinion. At a time of economic
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difficulties, for many, self-interest becomes a greater priority. Altruism, generosity and a 
progressive redistribution of wealth take a backseat. With periodic crises and recession 
interspersed with sluggish economic growth, tax revenue for governments will also be 
lower, and with profits squeezed business will be calling for lower taxation levels, or 
‘retrenchment’ as it was known in the 1870s/80s and 1920s/30s. Indeed regressive 
taxation policies are typical of downswings. As such, the availability of revenue for 
public spending is likely to be reduced, whilst governments are more likely to be 
concentrating on reviving the economy than contemplating radical political and social 
change.
Following on from this, long-wave downswings will be characterized by attempts 
and/or implemented policies that seek to stall or reverse distributions of political, social 
and economic power that were implemented or attempted in the previous upswing. At a 
political level, this could be represented by either moves towards authoritarian 
government, or limitations of the democratic process, a typical feature of the 1920s and 
1930s and also in evidence in the 1880s. In particular, this would occur during the period 
of political turmoil that characterizes the early part of the long-wave downswing. Each 
long-wave downswing could be expected to produce moves towards limiting the 
distribution of political power.
At a social level, each long-wave downswing would witness an increase in the activity 
of conservative and reactionary social movements hoping to counteract the extensions of 
civil and social rights and attempts to bring marginal groups and their activities into the 
social mainstream that were characteristic of the previous upswing. Racist and anti- 
Semitic movements were common in the 1870 and 1880s, 1920s and 1930s and more 
recently in the 1970s and 1980s. Attempts to broaden cultural perspectives would be 
opposed and further obstructed by the difficult economic conditions of the long-wave 
downswing. In other words, major attempts to preserve social exclusivity will 
characterize the downswing political climate, to limit social inclusion and cultural 
pluralism.
At the economic level, the early period of long-wave downswings would be expected 
to produce major attempts by the right to limit any attempts towards workers control of 
the means of distribution. The economic crisis accompanied by high unemployment and
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reduced public spending will see reversals in the distribution of wealth, perhaps 
compounded by regressive taxation policies. These, together with the reduced activity of 
trade unionism, see the balance of class forces shift towards the employer.
As such the median voter begins to shift to the right and the bi-polar element of the 
previous period becomes less pronounced. For the parties of the right this is clearly not a 
problem. The left is usually slow to accept this, and initially will attempt to resist this 
direction of change. However, just as the right is unlikely to passively accept a period of 
opposition during the long-wave upswing, neither will the left during the downswing. As 
the median voter shifts to the right, so the parties of the left will need to do likewise to 
attain power and to maintain their position. Left parties will have to take up more 
conservative positions to be elected or remain in power. Economic positions gradually 
become of more importance than social and political change.
Thus, the left is most likely to adopt a position of defence, attempting to preserve the 
gains of the long-wave upswing in the face of the reaction of sections of the right. As 
with the parties of the right in the upswing, this is potentially dangerous for the left with 
the possibility of damaging splits and divisions, as sections of the left prefer to adopt a 
more ‘purist’ ideological position, rather than compete with the right to be more 
conservative. For example in the 1930s, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) split from 
the Labour Party as it considered the latter was moving to close to the political centre, 
whilst the opposite occurred in the 1980s when the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
emerged, believing that Labour was too slow in moving towards the centre.
Preference-shaping strategies may appeal to the parties of the left in order to shift the 
position of the median voter towards the left, for instance Mitterrrand’s electoral reform 
in the 1980s aimed at splitting the right-wing vote. Overall, however, as shown in 
Chapter 2, this period usually sees the right in power.
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Figure 6: A. Adversary Politics -  bipolarised electorate.
B. Conservative Politics -  median voter shifting to the right.
Re-emerging Consensus
The final stages of each long-wave downswing have been characterized by a moderate 
revival of the centre-left and the re-emergence of consensus. The downswing-to-upswing 
transition is one of relative calm, with the emerging consensus becoming more fully 
developed during the first decade of the following long-wave upswing.
With the worst of the economic crisis apparently over and the economy showing signs 
of sustainable improvement, public opinion is cautiously optimistic. Many of the social 
and political issues that went unresolved earlier, and that may have been highlighted by 
the depressions of the early downswing, can now be addressed. However, with memories 
of recent political and economic instability, remedies to these problems need to involve 
the minimum of disruption.
This shift in the electorate helps the left experience a revival, but it is a left that has 
already significantly adjusted its ideological position in pursuit of a median voter that has 
moved to the right in the previous period. As such, although it remains committed to a 
redistribution of power in society, it is contemplating a significantly more moderate
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redistribution than was the case in the late upswing/early downswing period. With the 
median voter only accepting limited political and social change, it has to adopt a far less 
radical position in a changed political climate. It has also taken account of the previously 
dominant right-wing agenda. With the right having successfully stalled further political 
change, and with public opinion still leaning towards conservatism, the left has a limited 
room for manoeuvre. In all the late downswing periods this has occurred, the left 
adopting a far more moderate agenda than was the case in the previous upswing, for 
example, social democracy replacing socialism in the 1940s, the third way replacing 
redistributive social democracy in the 1990s.
In a political climate of conservatism, the right, by now, is primarily concerned with 
preserving the status quo and the left, needing electoral support for radical change, is not 
in a position to fundamentally challenge it. The median voter slowly returns towards the 
centre, and both left and right if they want to be electorally successful need to converge 
on this position. The long-wave downswing thus ends with a period of emerging political 
consensus, as the right attempts to consolidate and preserve the status quo. The left 
meanwhile continues its quest for greater distribution of power on a far more restricted 
platform and with far more moderate demands. There is a jockeying for position as each 
seeks to determine the shape of the consensus that follows.
Summary
As such, existing theories of party competition can be very useful for explaining the 
pattern o f political change outlined in Chapter 2, in particular in explaining why the left 
and right are more likely to be in government during particular periods. However, the 
importance of left-right ideology and the median voter need to be borne in mind at all 
times.
Downs maintained that the absence of leapfrogging within the left-right spectrum 
was a result of a political party’s need to demonstrate reliability, integrity and 
responsibility, whilst at the same time he downplayed the importance of ideology. The 
above discussion offers an alternative explanation for the absence of leapfrogging. 
Ideology is indeed central to the process of party competition, in particular the left-right 
dichotomy and the struggle over the distribution of power. Political parties have not
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simply adopted ideologies as a means of attaining office; rather ideology has been central 
to the political process in the modem era.
Political parties may well need to demonstrate reliability, integrity and responsibility 
in the eyes of voters (though electorates in recent decades appear to believe they have 
done otherwise) but, as preference-shaping theories elaborated, they also need to respect 
the ideological beliefs of their members, activists and the traditions within which they 
operate. Crucially this has been the left-right divide and the competing attitudes towards a 
redistribution of power within modem societies.
Most political parties emerged from ideological movements promoting the interests of 
a particular social class. Attachment to ideology was often a feature of political parties 
even before the democratic process had become established, not as an afterthought once 
democracy was up and running. An understanding of this allows a greater understanding 
of how party competition can reflect the changes occurring in voting behaviour and how 
these changes can be intensified.
The above discussion also shows a way in which the competing theories of party 
competition can be reconciled using the dynamic of the political long-wave. Early in the 
long-wave the voter distribution is unimodal and lends itself towards consensus and 
preference-accommodating strategies. The focussing on a centrally-placed median voter 
by both the right and left perpetuates this position. However, as the long-wave 
progresses, the political spectrum polarizes and a bimodal voter distribution develops. 
This leads to adversary politics, political turmoil and the adoption of preference-shaping 
policies alongside preference-accommodating strategies, not so much because of the 
beliefs of party activists, but to shift voters from one modal position to the other. This 
tends to exacerbate the political polarisation and can intensify ideological positions held 
on the left and right.
The shifting position of the median voter over a political long-wave and the desire to 
attain power also affects the positions of the left and right and their attitude towards the 
distribution of power. The pressures of these two factors have ensured that the two 
ideological tendencies have not always been able to strictly adhere to their chosen 
agenda. Temporary deviations have occasionally been necessary, though in the long-term 
the two tendencies have always reverted back to their more natural position, when
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favourable circumstances emerge. The line between being progressive and conservative, 
is at the end of the day a fine one. With conservatives opposing all but the most necessary 
shifts towards a greater distribution of power, whilst progressives seek gradual and 
incremental increases in the distribution of power, the possibility of the centre-left and 
centre-right straying into ‘enemy territory’ is clearly a real one. Such a phenomenon is 
largely a result of having to take account of the median voter and the changes of the 
political long-wave.
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powerful right-wing elites and strictly speaking could not be regarded as underdogs 
seizing power.
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CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS and ANALYSIS
Introduction
This thesis set out to test the proposition that the fluctuating fortunes of the political 
and social movements of the left and right could be linked to long-wave economics and 
to explore possible explanations for this linkage. The chronology in Chapter 2 strongly 
suggested that such a linkage is in evidence. Although the exact pattern of development 
over the course of a long-wave was not always in accord with those suggested by other 
long-wave researchers, there was some common ground. Likewise, possible explanations 
for this pattern discussed in Chapters 3,4 and 5 were often at odds with existing 
theoretical causations. Previously, attempts to link the political changes of the long-wave 
to theories of voting behaviour or party competition have been either non-existent or 
extremely limited in scope, but this thesis found both to be extremely useful in explaining 
a causal link. Amongst attempts to link class struggle behaviour to changes in the long­
wave, some existing theories were found to be more salient than others.
This chapter will summarize the findings of the previous four chapters, offering a 
typical trajectory of how and why the fortunes of the left and right alter across the course 
of a long-wave. It will also analyze this trajectory in comparison with those descriptions 
and theories discussed in Chapter 1, comparing and contrasting the strengths and 
weaknesses of this new trajectory with those that already exist. In addition it will 
highlight the strengths of using party competition, voting behaviour and class struggle 
theories in reaching these conclusions.
Overview
The political changes involving the movements and parties of the left and right over 
the course of a long-wave can be divided into six different periods, as suggested by 
Chapter 2. These periods differ qualitatively from each other in that distinctive alterations 
in the nature of party competition, voting and class struggle behaviour develop within 
each. Each period is characterised by a different political climate and has differing 
impacts on the movements and parties of the left and right.
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The struggle between left and right has essentially been one over the distribution of 
power within society. The industrial and political revolutions of the early modem era 
considerably enhanced the economic and political collective power within society but no 
such transformation in the nature of distributive power took place. At the domestic level, 
the major political struggles of the last two centuries have centred around the question of 
‘to what extent should power be distributed within society?’ Through its many 
manifestations, numerous ideologies and political movements, this has remained at the 
heart of the left-right dichotomy.
The rise and fall in political fortunes of the two halves of this dichotomy have, 
amongst other factors, been shaped by the fluctuations of long-wave economics. With the 
rising prosperity and sustained growth of a long-wave upswing the left is able to mount a 
concerted challenge to the existing distribution of power within society - to break with 
the established routine of political life. The response of the right is to resist or diminish 
this challenge, but it is only during the economic difficulties of the long-wave downswing 
that it is able to succeed in bringing this challenge to a gradual halt and once more 
institute a period of established routine, where the existing distribution of power goes 
largely unchallenged. The process is thus essentially dialectical in nature.
Class struggle theories indicated that the means by which this process occurs is partly 
structural, as maintained by Cronin (1979), in that each long-wave upswing brings with it 
new, or remade, subordinate social classes that slowly develop and attempt to implement 
their own political agenda.1 In general, they seek to alter the distribution of power in a 
more egalitarian direction. However, this in itself is not a sufficient causation for 
explaining the political shifts that accompany long-waves. These social classes continue 
to exist throughout the long-wave downswing but their agenda may be rebuffed, 
discredited or be largely defeated. The redistribution of power within society is largely 
stalled or even reversed. Structural theories are of limited use, and a further causation is 
needed to explain this development.
As indicated by Kelly (1998), organizational ability is also an important factor in 
political and social change in that it affects the effectiveness with which demands for 
reform can be made and transmitted.2 In the prosperous period of the long-wave upswing, 
forces in the labour market favour employees. A lack of damaging recessions together
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with low levels of unemployment allow trade-unions to organize more effectively than in 
downswings, thus aiding demands for a redistribution of power both at state and 
workplace level. This ability is diminished during the economic stagnation of 
downswings, often significantly, whilst variations in the organizational ability of 
employers federations is proportionately much less. However, at the electoral and party 
level organizational abilities for the left and right do not appear to greatly alter between 
upswings and downswings. A further causation appears necessary to explain these 
fluctuating fortunes.
Both voting behaviour and class struggle theories strongly indicated that changes 
within the political long-wave appear to be, above all, socio-psychological in nature. The 
changing fortunes of the international economy result in a process in which motivational 
direction amongst populations is altered and impacts in such a way as to affect the 
fortunes of the left and right. At different stages of the long-wave, these different 
motivations result in populations wanting to move in significantly different political 
directions. Prosperity in the long-wave upswing appears to diminish deference, to 
enhance risk-taking and to create an optimistic climate in which progress is considered 
both possible and desirable. This and a greater attention to matters of progressive social 
and political reform benefit the left.
By contrast, economic crisis and stagnation during the downswing produce increased 
deference, caution and conservatism and a more pessimistic view of the possibility of 
creating a more progressive society. This, together with a concentration on reviving the 
strength of the economy tends to favour the political forces of the right. Most 
importantly, it appears that it is the changing attitudes, ideas and beliefs amongst 
populations that result in the different political directions associated with different stages 
of the long-wave.
Thus using class struggle and voting behaviour theories helped show the importance 
of motivational behaviour in deriving a causative explanation for the pattern of change 
described in Chapter 2. Party competition theory, on the other hand, proved more useful 
in explaining why and how these behavioural changes should affect the chances of left 
and right parties to form governments, especially once the importance of ideology had 
been established, in particular concerning the distribution of power in society.
186
Long-wave Upswing
6.1 The Period of Consensus 1803-1812. 1848-1860, 1896-1906, 1948-1960.
As indicated by Hobsbawm (1975, 1994) and Beckman (1983), the first ten to twelve 
years of the political long-wave are generally marked by a ‘period of political 
consensus’.3 The period usually sees the election of centre-right governments, but above 
all it is a period in which centrist politics dominate the political agenda. The period of 
consensus sees a marked convergence between the major forces of the left and right in 
comparison with the last two-thirds of the previous long-wave. The exact nature of the 
consensus is determined by the final events of the previous long-wave political cycle,4 
and can be of either a centre-right or centre-left nature. However, whether defined by the 
left or the right, each consensus is marked by certain similarities.
Party competition theory proved particularly useful in understanding the nature of this 
consensus. First and foremost the consensus is determined by the electorate. The median 
voter is situated close to the centre of the left-right spectrum and remains there. 
Hobsbawm (1994) indicated that this resulted from satisfaction with a booming 
economy.5 However, from the discussion in Chapter 3, it appears that Beckman (1983) 
was more accurate in maintaining this resulted from the long years of austerity during the 
previous downswing.6 For the most part, the long years of economic uncertainty during 
the previous downswing have bred caution and conservatism. The electorate becomes 
uninterested in radical political and social change, thus denying the left the popular 
backing needed for radical projects; political conditions are not conducive to grandiose 
left-wing programmes. The previous long-wave downswing thus creates caution and 
moderation amongst the parties of the left.
Voting behaviour theory indicated, in addition, that partisan alignment is the most 
important determinant of voting behaviour, the alignment reflecting the major social 
cleavages in any particular society and these appear to be determined by the events of the 
previous long-wave, notably the distribution of economic resources. Economic and 
technological change has seen structural alterations within society.7 New social groups or
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classes emerge, whilst existing ones may change their political priorities. The previous 
downswing then engenders a climate of political conservatism and centrism in which the 
mainstream parties dominate. Loyalties begin to crystallize and voters increasingly revert 
to party identification as to how they decide to vote. Party image and appearance, rather 
than specific policies, attitudes or ideas, become of increasing importance in gaining 
votes.
Class struggle theories showed that for the trade unions and organized labour this is a 
quiet period. As maintained by Kelly (1998), union membership at the beginning of this 
period is relatively low, having suffered from the high unemployment of the previous
o
downswing. With unemployment levels gradually falling, trade-union leaders are most 
likely to be concerned with expanding the membership of the trade unions. In terms of 
industrial relations this is usually a quiet period, any industrial action is likely to be only 
amongst the most skilled of workers - those most confident of secure employment. As 
indicated by Screpanti (1984, 1987) this appears to be a result of low expectations 
brought on by poor economic growth and high unemployment during the previous 
downswing, but also, as Mandel (1980) maintained, resulting from losing major strikes 
and political confrontations.9 In addition, as indicated by Phelps Brown (1975), the 
workforce is dominated by those who have experienced years of job insecurity, the rank- 
and-file is quiescent, and there is generally very little industrial action.10 Above all, 
damaging periods of high unemployment and economic recession have resulted in low 
levels of worker mobilisation.
The forces of the left enter the period of consensus aware that ambitious projects for 
radical political and social change have little backing amongst the electorate. Any attempt 
to proceed with such projects is fraught with problems, and risks a successful counter­
reaction from the right. The forces of the right enter the consensus for different reasons. 
By nature the right dislikes rapid political and social change, and a period of consensus 
and political stability offers to preserve the status quo. The right feels more at home with 
a period of consensus and continuity, and thus is more likely to be in power.
The consensus is, above all, a period of time when no major deviation towards the left 
or right occurs. Both forces maintain a largely centrist agenda. This is not to say that the 
policies, practices and aims of the left and right become identical, only that, with the
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electorate maintaining a centrist political agenda, neither force is able, or willing, to shift 
its ideological position significantly. The left and right do not lose their inherent value 
systems or ideological tendencies; it is just that they are less polarised than at other times.
The consensus tends either towards the centre-left or centre-right, the ideological 
tendency dominant within the period of consensus depending on the balance of 
ideological forces at the beginning of the period. Where the left has proved stronger in 
electoral and ideological terms towards the end of the downswing, it should be able to set 
a centre-left agenda that will normally continue throughout much of the early upswing. 
Once the consensus agenda has been set, neither the right nor the left is likely to 
fundamentally challenge it.
The right, by nature, prefers to preserve the status quo and for the most part centre- 
right governments are elected during this period, the right adapting more easily to an 
essentially conservative political climate. In the absence of any popular left-mobilisation 
the left parties are unable to successfully pursue any protracted programme of radical 
change. The few attempts by either the right or the left to institute radical change are 
likely to be quickly rebuffed, prove unsuccessful and have the effect of discouraging 
further attempts. The years of the consensus are more likely to be marked by a period of 
political consolidation, building upon the political features that marked the initial stage of 
the consensus.
For most governments, their first priority is to ensure that the newly buoyant economy 
continues to expand. Mindful of the difficult economic times of the previous downswing, 
economic policy tends to be cautious and conservative. Major changes in economic 
policy are usually discounted, whilst those changes that are instituted are done with the 
aim of creating the minimum of disturbance to the business climate. Elsewhere 
governments devote their attention to ameliorating the worst social effects of the previous 
depression and to overseeing institutional changes that have been made necessary by the 
social and economic changes of the previous long-wave.
The far right that emerged during the previous downswing may still be active on the 
fringes of the political scene, but its influence is declining, as the increasing prosperity 
removes the atmosphere of despair and recrimination in which it thrives. The far left is 
also notable by its absence, the long years of pessimism, conservatism and the numerous
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defeats it has suffered during the previous downswing have seen its confidence and 
numbers dwindle to unimportance. Both groups remain confined to the fringes and have 
almost no impact during the consensus period.
6.2 Period of Progressive Change. 1812-1825, 1860-1867, 1906-1914/16, 1960-1967.
Most observers linking long-waves to political and social change maintained that each 
upswing eventually experienced a generalised shift to the left, and the chronology in 
Chapter 2 shows this to be the case. Overall, the period of progressive change marks a 
break with the previous consensus. The consensus begins to suffer its first major cracks, 
as the mainstream political agenda shifts firmly to the left. This period, is marked by a 
considerably increased level of support for the parties and movements of the left, and 
often sees the election of left-wing governments.
Hobsbawm (1975, 1987, 1994) offered different explanations for the left-wing surge 
in each upswing, but there does appear to be a common explanation for this occurrence.11 
During the early upswing, there has been a general improvement in living conditions as 
the economy expands, creating higher employment rates, increased prosperity and 
increased consumer demand. As the economy continually improves, and the difficult 
years of the previous downswing become a distant memory, the popular mood, as 
maintained by Beckman (1983), slowly becomes more optimistic about the outlook for 
the future.12
From voting behaviour theory, it can be seen that this and the following period are 
characterised by a belief in progress, that society can be changed for the better through a 
progressive redistribution of power. Voters are open to new ideas, and voting behaviour 
begins to shift away from ‘party identification’ as new ideas capture the support, or 
opposition, of different sections within society. Increasingly the battle of ideas and 
ideology begins to dominate voting behaviour.
Sections of the electorate enjoying rising prosperity are optimistic about the future, 
willing to take risks and encompass political change. Following Inglehart (1977), with the 
economy performing well, voters, in particular those of the middle-class, can turn their
1 3attention to social and political affairs, a move that tends to benefit the left. Much of the
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left agenda is constituted by attempts to effect social and political change, and to create a 
more inclusive and pluralistic society. In times of increased prosperity, governments can 
afford to expand social services and experiment with political change.
Following class struggle theories, this period also sees an increased level of 
mobilisation amongst organised labour. As indicated by Screpanti (1984) and Phelps 
Brown (1975) this results from high employment rates, allowing the labour movement to 
grow in strength and confidence.14 Workers increasingly mobilise, seeking to establish 
better pay and conditions within the workplace, and wider society, as increased levels of 
growth allow employers to make greater concessions and living standards to rise. 
Initially, this occurs in the better-organized sections of the labour movement, and notably 
at the top of the business cycle.15 In addition, as indicated by Phelps Brown (1975), the 
balance of power within the unions begins to shift towards the rank-and-file and strikes 
are increasingly unofficial in nature.16
Party competition theory showed that as the median voter shifts leftward, the 
movements of the left experience a revival in their political fortunes and often come to 
power during this period, especially if they are able to capture the popular mood for 
progressive political and social change. Although the foundations of the consensus are 
still in existence, the left begins to institute, if  in power, or agitate for if out of power, a 
more progressive agenda, notably in political and social affairs. If the consensus is based 
on a centre-right agenda, the break between the period of consensus and the period of 
progressive change will be more noticeable than if the consensus was centre-left driven, 
in which the two periods merge slowly together.
With the electorate shifting leftwards, the right faces a dilemma. If in power they may 
go on the defensive or adopt preference-shaping strategies to move the median voter 
rightwards, but this risks electoral alienation. Adopting a hard-line conservative or 
reactionary stance in the face of a leftward shifting electorate risks electoral defeat. Most 
likely, a more progressive position may be adopted in order to stay in power or regain 
power if lost, and this only adds to the progressive nature of the period. However, 
mindful of their supporters and the possibility of damaging splits or newly emerging 
parties attempting to preserve a more traditional ideological position, the mainstream
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right can only go so far in a progressive direction, although electoral success can do much 
to diminish this possibility.
6.3 The Peak in Left-Wing Radicalism. 1825-34, 1867-73, 1916/17-1920, 1968-1973.
This is the period most widely studied by long-wave researchers, and class struggle 
theories proved particularly useful, especially concerning the rise of the extra- 
parliamentary or revolutionary left. As indicated by long-wave researchers such as Kelly 
(1998), Screpanti (1984, 1987), Hobsbawm (1975, 1994) and Beckman (1983) the final 
years of each upswing have seen a dramatic peak in left-wing radicalism both at the 
political level and the activity of organized labour.17 It is a time of mass demonstrations, 
widespread political participation in grassroots movements, and a period when a plethora 
of new ideas, ideologies and movements arise, some confined to small groups of 
intellectuals and activists, but others reaching out to the mainstream left. For organised 
labour, this is a period of rapid union expansion together with a generalised strike 
movement that produces high levels of success.
Some researchers, such as Kelly (1998) and Mandel (1980), suggested this peak in 
left-wing radicalism resulted from an increased sense of injustice or from the beginnings 
of economic problems.18 From the discussion in the previous three chapters this appears 
unlikely. The political climate is one of great optimism, of a strong belief in a progress, 
of the ability to make considerable headway in creating a better world. Following 
Inglehart (1977), the electorate is less deferential as a result of years of prosperity.19 
Increased wealth and material security have resulted in an electorate that believes it not 
only should have a greater input into running the country, but also the belief that it is able 
to do so.
In a climate of material security and political optimism, progressive ideas on political 
and social change easily make progress amongst the public. Following Cronin’s (1979) 
structural explanation, social and economic changes that accompany the economic 
expansion of the long-wave upswing may also begin to make the established political 
order look archaic and anachronistic and thus in need of modernisation. In terms of
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electoral behaviour, the partisan alignments of the consensus years have further eroded, 
and issue voting is increasingly evident. At a time of optimism about the future the 
electorate is open to new ideas, beliefs and ideologies, usually associated with the left.
Generational theories, from both voting behaviour and class struggle accounts proved 
particularly useful here. As maintained by Inglehart (1977) and Phelps Brown (1975), 
receptivity to new and radical ideas is especially strong amongst the younger generation - 
a generation that has only known increasingly prosperous times, and is unfamiliar with 
economic depression, unemployment and poverty.21 For many of this generation, 
optimism is at a peak. High levels of mass participation at political events, meetings and 
demonstrations occur, and a feeling that anything is possible pervades this generation. As 
such, this period is thus one of political and social experimentation, and gives rise to 
numerous utopian and revolutionary ideas and movements.
As maintained by all long-wave researchers, except Gordon (1978) and Dunlop 
(1948), this is also a period of intense class struggle with high aspirations for much of 
organized labour and the wider working class. Following Kelly (1998), union 
membership rises rapidly at a time of a generalised strike wave, but rather than resulting 
from a heightened awareness of injustice, it results from a greater level of belief that 
unions are able to make a significant difference. As indicated by Screpanti (1984, 1987) 
and Phelps Brown (1975) this has resulted from forces within the labour market 
favouring employees.24 For twenty years or more there has been high levels of 
employment and economic prosperity. At a time of full employment, employers are 
unable to use the sack or redundancy as a form of worker-discipline. The spectre of 
unemployment, economic hardship and damaging bouts , o f economic recession are a 
distant memory. This has allowed the labour movement to become well organized, 
confident and militant, and, as maintained by Kelly (1998), strikes and union 
organization are more likely to be effective, encouraging a generalised stnke wave. 
Typically the strike wave begins with success for a key group of workers.
For the most part, strike activity is largely ‘unofficial’, driven by the militancy of a 
confident and militant rank-and-file. In a period of heightened class struggle, it is also the 
case that economic grievances can easily take on a political dimension. For the most part 
industrial action revolves around increasing wages and improving working conditions
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and is usually successful. But with levels of confidence at a fifty-year high and with 
labour, through the use of industrial action and militancy, less deferential and 
increasingly dictating terms to management, the ideas of socialism, workers control and 
industrial democracy are likely to become part of the political agenda as Phelps Brown 
(1975) suggested. Beginning to feel confident about their ability to effect concerted 
change, the wider left-wing climate leads to many workers considering the possibility of 
taking over, or participating in, the running of their workplace. Socialism is once more 
seen as a distinct possibility. Contrary to Marx’s expectation that economic crisis would 
lead to revolution, this is the period of the political long-wave when revolution is most 
likely to occur.
Hobsbawm (1994), Gordon (1978) and Dunlop (1948) all suggested that economic
97prosperity would lead to political complacency and accommodation with capitalism. 
However, the result is exactly the opposite. Both voting behaviour and party competition 
theories showed how high expectations are placed on political parties in government at 
this time. Government is increasingly expected to pursue a popular left programme of 
radical political, economic and social change. The political climate is one that expects a 
radical and progressive redistribution of power, and thus is most likely to be beneficial to 
the parties of the left. It is most likely to be a period of left-wing government, with 
radical changes either enacted or pursued, in a political climate dominated by the desire 
for rapid change.
Party competition theory showed too, that for the right, this period poses a major 
dilemma. It may attempt to outbid the left in meeting rising expectations. If the right is in 
power, it may pursue a degree of progressive change to meet electoral demands. 
However, this might impact upon the vested interests of supporters of the right, and can 
cause ideological divisions with the more traditional sections of the right and the 
possibility of political schisms. However, to remain conservative at a time of high 
electoral expectations also carries risks; electoral defeat is likely. In addition, if the 
parties of the right in power fail to move with the progressive times, they may face a 
concerted revolutionary or near-revolutionary situation.
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However, some class struggle theories suggested that this period also brings with it 
problems for the left. The older party leaders of the left are likely to be considerably less 
militant than the younger generation. Their more moderate agenda is unlikely to satisfy 
the militant or revolutionary left. The pace of change by the mainstream left may be too 
slow. At a time of successful industrial action, the militancy of the younger generation 
may result in a renewed strength for radical or extra-parliamentary movements of the left. 
Following Hunt (1981), workers might not see the need to support the parliamentary left 
with change being successfully implemented in the workplace.28 The mainstream left 
may be unable to fully benefit from the leftward shift in the political climate. This period 
can thus see the beginnings of a concerted split in the ranks of the left, between 
progressive, radical and revolutionary movements.
Long-wave Downswing
The Crisis Phase
6.4 The Period of Political Turmoil. 1825-1834, 1873-1884/6, 1920-1933/6, 1973- 
1982/4
The beginning of the long-wave downswing sees a period of political turmoil as an 
intense left-right battle becomes entrenched within the political process. Voting 
behaviour theory showed that this period is characterised by issue voting and electoral 
volatility, making this period prone to political instability, especially when combined 
with high expectations- and economic difficulties setting in. Party competition theory 
showed how this could be manifested in political polarisation, as voters stretch across the 
entire political spectrum, and further enhance the level of instability. Under such 
circumstances a new phase of party competition occurs, that of adversary politics. Each 
side attempts to gain ideological supremacy and establish their own preferred political 
hegemony. In addition class struggle theories showed that although levels of industrial 
action are declining unevenly, disputes are increasingly protracted and hard fought, 
further adding to the sense of political turmoil.
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Few long-wave researchers considered this period, Beckman (1983) saw it as one of 
political turmoil but gave no reason for this.29 However, using voting behaviour theory it 
can be shown that electoral behaviour is dominated by issue voting and electoral 
volatility and thus political turmoil is always a possibility. As indicated above, the 
electorate is open to new ideas, beliefs, attitudes and ideologies and thus may switch to 
new parties and movements associated with these. Already there are divisions on the left, 
as radicals expect a rapid and fundamental progressive redistribution of power. Divisions 
on the left begin to be mirrored on the right.
Party competition theory showed how these divisions together with electoral volatility 
could result in political polarisation. The leftward drift of society is too much for 
conservatives used to the old traditions and certainties. The spectre of revolution or 
radical change looms, and facing the possibility of systemic changes, of socialism and 
workers control, sections of the right are attracted towards parties, movements and 
ideologies that aim to halt the leftward direction of society. This position may be 
strengthened by the continued militancy of organized labour, especially once it becomes 
evident that the economy is facing protracted problems.
The beginnings of a counter-offensive by the right become evident. Those that wanted 
to follow a moderately progressive line to counter-act the left’s radicalism begin to lose 
out to more hard-line conservative or reactionary ideologies. They believe that a 
moderate redistribution of power has only encouraged a belief that more is possible. It 
has not stemmed the leftward drift and this period sees the germination of a ‘new right’ 
agenda in response to militant left activity. The stirrings of a conservative backlash 
begins to get underway, as sections of the right believe that political change has gone too 
far. It also has the effect of increasing ideological divisions within the right.
As indicated by party competition theory, the result is that the positions of the left 
and right become polarized across the entire political spectrum, from the far right to the 
far left. Ideology has become increasingly important. Driven by the increasingly 
polarized ideological positions of the electorate, the parties of left and right begin to 
pursue political policies and agendas that can appear as more a product of an ideological 
clash than as a response to the demands of the electorate. At this point in time the 
overriding concern for political movements appears to be that their half of the dichotomy
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should determine the prevailing political hegemony, whilst defeating that of their 
opponents.
This ideological clash is accompanied by the beginnings of the economic downswing. 
At first it is thought to represent only a dip in the business cycle, rather than the entering 
of a new phase in the state of the world economy. Initially people do not realize that the 
boom years of the long-wave upswing are over. The downturn in the business cycle is 
assumed to be a short-term feature, and the economy will soon return to the ‘good old 
days’.30
However, class struggle theories indicated that this downturn in the economy usually
has the effect of lessening the strike wave that accompanies the end of the long-wave
upswing. As noted by Kelly (1998), Cronin (1979) and Screpanti (1984, 1987), the
• • • ^1 •beginning of the downswing usually sees a decline in worker mobilisation. Screpanti 
(1984) attributed this to declining economic growth and higher unemployment resulting 
in declining levels of ambition, and thus frustration.32 However, following Kelly (1998) 
and Hunt (1981), the decline is more likely a result of declining strike effectiveness at a 
time of economic difficulties.33 Higher levels of unemployment bring a level of caution 
and weaken the position of organised labour. Strikes are more likely to be lost and thus 
less readily turned to.
The decline, however, was described by Cronin (1979) and Screpanti (1984) as 
initially slow and erratic and industrial militancy remains; the unions are still well 
organized, the rank-and-file still confident and there is a limit to what employers’ 
federations . can achieve.34 Initially left-wing activity remains militant due to the 
momentum built up during the long-wave upswing, and the radical left remains strong for 
a number of years into the downswing. Following Hunt’s theory, the downturn in the 
economy may shift support amongst the working class towards the parliamentary left 
whilst the economy is faltering, since gains in the workplace are becoming more difficult.
As such, initially expectations amongst the electorate remain high. However, in the 
light of declining economic performance and slower economic growth, governments may 
be forced to rein back public spending. Typically they are unable to meet the demands of 
an electorate used to receiving more. This period becomes associated with a crisis of
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governance, and governments, continually facing economic and political crisis, often 
prove to be short-lived. In addition, at a time of political polarization and electoral 
volatility, government may swing from left to right and back on a number of occasions. 
Typically neither left nor right dominate this period.
The sense of crisis is added to by the fact that the radical left attempts to maintain a 
radical agenda, and that industrial action may remain prevalent, disputes often being 
violent and protracted in nature. Class struggle and party competition theories showed 
that the result of this is likely to be the emergence of reactionary political movements. 
These are determined to not only oppose and destroy the forces of the left, but to impose 
an essentially reactionary political order upon society. Voting behaviour theories 
indicated that, with the economy worsening, these forces are able to exploit the 
increasing insecurity within those sectors of the population that appear to face a bleak 
future, that are facing economic decline, or being pushed to the sidelines of the political 
mainstream.
The left and right remain locked in a battle that often appears to ignore the 
considerations of the electorate whilst each attempts to gain ideological supremacy over 
the other. With a polarized electorate, parties may engage in preference-shaping 
strategies to draw voters to their half of the dichotomy. With both the far left and right in 
evidence, they are aware that they cannot be too close to the centre, usually steering a 
hard left or hard right course. However, prioritising ideological positions through 
preference-shaping strategies may also deepen the antagonistic ideological battle adding 
to the sense of political turmoil.
6.5 The Rise of the Right and conservatism. 1834-1844, 1882/4 -1888/90, 1931/36- 
1942/3, 1979/83 -  1992/95.
Voting behaviour theory strongly indicated that this period is characterised by a shift 
towards voting by economic performance and a gradual decline in issue voting. It also 
sees a decline in the level of worker mobilisation and an employer’s offensive, and class 
struggle theories indicated that this point represented nadir in the fortunes of organized 
labour. Typically, party competition theory showed the median voter shifts to the right
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and thus offers greater opportunities to the parties and movements of the right. In 
addition, the left becomes increasingly defensive and as a result adversary politics starts 
to decline. With economic recovery the main priority, interest in social and political 
change decreases and conservatism comes to dominate the political climate.
The ‘period of political turmoil’ is usually brought to an end by economic crisis and 
depression. For most long-wave researchers, the worst and deepest depression of the 
long-wave downswing arrives after approximately 8-10 years.35 It becomes increasingly 
evident that the economy is in crisis and is not about to make a rapid return to the boom 
years of the upswing. In the face of rising unemployment, and entrenched economic 
problems, voting behaviour theory showed that, first and foremost voters concerns begin 
to centre upon the state of the economy, with the priority being the search for a 
government that can rescue the economy. Increasingly voters are judging parties on 
economic performance and competence, or potential performance in the case of 
oppositions. As part of this process, voters become more cautious and pessimistic about 
their immediate future, and less interested in progressive political and social change. 
Electorates begin to have doubts about the wisdom of radical change. A more 
conservative political climate begins to develop, especially amongst those most 
vulnerable to economic crisis.
With a realisation that the best economic years are now over and that the economy is 
in crisis, leftwing politicians, previously attached to ideas of political and social reform 
associated with an expanding economy can look helpless and out of touch. The economic 
crisis after a decade of political turmoil can lead to a crisis of modernity. A belief in 
progress may be shattered, and with it a belief in the ideas of the left. Following Inglehart 
(1977), sections of the electorate may experience an ‘authoritarian reflex’.36 In the face of 
a deepening economic crisis, voters may feel powerless to improve the situation and the 
desire for a ‘strong leader’ becomes evident, especially amongst those worst affected by 
the economic crisis. For reactionaries this is the most opportune time to become a 
significant political force.
The economic crisis also sees employers mount a concerted attempt to revive profits 
and economic growth. With demand and profitability depressed, this usually entails
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supply-side reforms, restructuring and shedding large numbers of employees in an 
attempt to cut costs and boost profits. High unemployment ensues, severely denting the 
militancy of organized labour. Screpanti (1987) saw this period as one where levels of
^7industrial action reach a fifty-year low. With employers on the offensive, defeats are 
more likely and the overall strike trend is now downward. In the face of mass 
unemployment and major restructuring, as noted by Kelly (1998) and Cronin (1979),
•  I Qtrade-umon membership declines rapidly. Worker mobilisation is now severely in 
decline and only existent amongst the better organised sections of the workforce. Any 
industrial action is likely to be defensive, attempting to prevent further erosions in 
working conditions.
In the face of a protracted economic crisis, and with voter’s attention turned towards 
the economy, governments need to be seen to be doing something dramatic to rectify the 
situation. The general economic malaise, and in particular, the period of acute crisis has 
the effect of discrediting the established political economy orthodoxy. This orthodoxy 
invariably takes the blame for the poor economic climate -  agrarian protectionism in the 
1830s/40s, Liberal free trade in the 1870s/80s, laissez-faire capitalism in the 1920s/30s 
and Keynesian social democracy in the 1970s/80s. This offers political opportunities for 
the half of the left-right dichotomy not associated with the prevailing orthodoxy, and 
whilst most other factors favour the right at this point in the political long-wave, the left 
may benefit if the declining economic orthodoxy is associated with the right.
Most long-wave researchers identified this period as one of crisis for the left, but 
whilst Beckman (1983) and Rosenberg (1943) saw opportunities for the right, none 
identified this as a period when the right would dominate politically. The chronology m 
Chapter 2 showed that this is nearly always the case. Using party competition theory, it 
can be seen that the effect of the economic crisis is to shift the median voter to the right. 
The electorate becomes more deferential, loses faith in progress and becomes more 
pessimistic about the future. Working class militancy, and by implication the left, can be 
blamed for the crisis. The parties of the right respond more quickly to economic crisis; 
addressing the crisis brings fewer ideological problems than it does for a left attached to 
the redistribution of wealth and full employment.
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Class struggle theory was particularly useful in showing how economic crisis also 
leads to the dissipation of the revolutionary left; the utopianism of the long-wave 
upswing being damaged by economic crisis and the rise of reactionary and conservative 
forces as the right-wing backlash builds momentum. Only small numbers of the left 
remain committed to radical or revolutionary change. At a time when it may be difficult 
to find employment, creating a new society is not high on the agenda. The left in general 
is on the defensive, losing support, and in the face of mounting difficulties, division and 
disunity become commonplace. The crisis facing the idea of progress is more likely to 
see a rise in the forces of reaction.
The initial part of this period usually sees government embark on a new political 
economy strategy in order to revive the economy. Increasingly, the emphasis is on 
economic and political stability, in order to allow the economy to recover. Parties are 
judged on their economic competence. Major political and social changes are unlikely to 
be attempted unless they are seen as reviving the economy; any that are advocated are 
usually opposed or neutralised by the forces of conservatism as potentially destabilising.
Most of the electorate is no longer seeking radical or progressive political and social 
change; their priority is to avoid a worsening of the economic crisis and to see a return to 
better times. Slow economic growth and a poor business climate bring complaints that 
taxation is too high for current economic conditions, further pressurising government to 
halt plans for future public spending. Unemployment is now a cause for concern for the 
left, and a priority becomes engendering an economic climate that will allow a return to 
full employment.
As such, the left also comes to prioritise economic recovery and begins to reject any 
policies that might jeopardize this. However, in a poor economic climate, employers, in 
an attempt to restore profitability continue to shed labour, attack working-conditions or 
attempt to reduce wages. Solidarity between workers is low as the competition for jobs 
leads to demarcation disputes and inter-union rivalry. Organised labour continues to be 
defensive and at a time of high unemployment is unlikely to resort to industrial action. 
Where it does occur, it may be condemned by sections of the left through fear of 
jeopardizing economic recovery and of isolating voters. Many see a return to a major left- 
right confrontation as potentially destabilising the economy.
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The overall effect of a period of political turmoil being followed by one of economic 
crisis is to create a political climate characterised by conservative and traditional values. 
The halting of economic advance together with political turmoil create uncertainty and 
disillusionment with the idea of progress. This together with concern for economic 
recovery creates a conservative political climate allowing the ideological dominance of 
the right. Typical of this period are governments that seek to impose a new conservatism, 
to preserve the status quo. Throughout these years the conservative right seeks to set the 
political agenda in social, political and economic terms and to then preserve that agenda. 
Usually the right puts an end to any thought of further major political and social change. 
In attempting to preserve the status quo, it does not necessarily dismantle all the 
progressive changes of the previous long-wave upswing - only those that are particularly 
unpopular with the right and those which the left are unable to defend. Those issues or 
demands raised by the left during the long-wave upswing that proved contentious are 
either ignored by the right or actively discouraged. Ideological opposition to such 
progressive changes combined with a greater attention to purely economic issues tends to 
leave these issues unresolved.
The shift to the right in the political climate usually sees the continued importance of 
reactionary movements - be they of a secular or religious nature. With conservatives 
increasingly setting the political agenda, reactionaries achieve a degree of political 
influence as the political mainstream shifts closer towards their position. At a time of 
social pessimism it appears as though progress towards a better society has come to an 
end. As belief in progress, a better future, and. rationality decline, a belief in the mystical 
and irrational increases amongst some sections of society. For many the past looks 
distinctly more favourable in comparison with the economic and social difficulties and 
uncertainties of the present period. As sections of society remember the better times of 
the past, an attachment to tradition becomes stronger.
Where the attachment to the past, to tradition or some mythical golden age when 
society was more secure and certain, combines with a lack of faith in progress and an 
increasing belief in the irrational, it combines to form far right religious fundamentalism. 
Elsewhere, reactionary movements may be more secular in nature. Activity by
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reactionary movements is often widespread during this period and they continue to be 
influential. In the new conservative climate of opinion, such groups do not seem so far 
from the political mainstream and may make considerable progress with their reactionary 
agenda. They offer a source of certainty in a changing and uncertain world, in a world 
that seems beset by economic, political and moral crisis.
In general, the left lacks influence within this period. For the left this is often a period 
of painful and slow adjustment to new economic and political realities. Numerous 
divisions and disputes beset the movement, as moderates stress the need for a major 
readjustment to the new political climate. With the radicals declining in numbers and 
confidence, the moderates gradually gain the upper hand. If in power, and with a median 
voter on the right, left parties may engage in preference-shaping policies to retain power. 
In general though, party competition theory showed that the mood of the electorate and 
the difficult economic conditions will ensure that even left parties pursue a largely 
conservative agenda whilst in government. At a time of economic difficulty, support from 
business or financial circles for radical economic change is not likely to be forthcoming. 
Whether the government is of the right or the left it will only remain in power by 
following an increasingly conservative political and social agenda.
Further problems with the economy only enhance these tendencies. The priority for 
both left and right is to create political stability to allow economic recovery to develop 
more fully. Under these conditions reactionary movements must now be discouraged for 
the risk they pose to the new status quo. The radical left is further distanced from the 
mainstream as the climate of conservatism deepens.
The Recovery Phase
6.6 Left Recovery and the Emergence of a New Consensus. 1840-1848, 1888-1896, 
1940-1948, 1992-1998.
Hobsbawm (1975, 1994) described something of a revival for the left towards the end 
of each long-wave downswing.40 Likewise, Cronin (1979), Screpanti (1984) and Kelly 
(1998) also recognized something of a revival in worker mobilisation although attached
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different levels of importance to this as well as differing explanations.41 The chronology 
in Chapter 2 supports these observations, though this revival is often short-lived, not 
necessarily successful and of a far more moderate nature than that during the long-wave 
upswing. In addition, and not identified by long-wave researchers, this period gives way 
to centrist politics, characterised by political consensus.
Voting behaviour theory suggested that electorates are still judging parties on 
economic performance, or potential performance. However, as the economy begins to 
recover and the worst of the crisis appears to be over, there is also room for increased 
interest in social and political issues. It is likely that in concentrating on reviving the 
economy, previous governments have neglected social and political issues that, 
previously in the political long-wave were considered of great importance. In addition, 
those social changes that would ameliorate the worst conditions arising from the 
difficulties of the previous protracted period of economic crisis are supported. Overall, 
the median voter moves towards the centre,
As such the conservatism of the previous period partially recedes, allowing greater 
opportunities for the parties of the left. Following party competition theory, by now, the 
left has usually developed a more moderate agenda than that developed during the latter 
part of the long-wave upswing in order to attract the median voter. Although it is still 
driven by the issues that became important during the previous long-wave upswing, it has 
had to severely modify them, to take account of a depressed economy and a conservative 
political climate. Most often it represents a compromise with the demands and 
expectations of the right and is designed to have a relatively limited impact so as to 
ensure its adoption.
With the recent political dominance of the right, and an economic climate that has 
reduced the scope, as well as support, for radical change, the ‘revised programme’ must 
respond to a median voter close to the centre. In effect, the recent economic crisis and the 
only partial economic recovery limit the possibilities that are available to the left. 
Nonetheless, the ‘revised programme’ ensures that some of the progressive issues and 
demands raised during the long-wave upswing now return to the political agenda. If the 
left is successful, this period sees many of the political tensions and problems of the last
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thirty years resolved, though with the intention of minimising the disruption to the 
climate of compromise and consensus.
For the radical left, this is a period where they are confined to the political fringe. The 
revolutionary left is very quiet - almost non-existent - and very much isolated from the 
political mainstream. After years of political and economic crisis, and increased support 
for conservative and reactionary ideologies few now believe that it is possible to create a 
more utopian society. For others it is neither desirable, since any attempt to do so may 
result in a further bout of political reaction.
This period is not so desperate for the reactionary right, who may see a brief revival of 
fortunes, though overall, with the median voter moving to the centre, the political trend is 
against them. Sections of the right may become disillusioned with the mainstream right’s 
conservatism and willingness to make compromises to preserve the status quo. This may 
allow the far right to briefly gain support for a more ideologically driven right agenda. 
However, with the economy showing general recovery, this is likely to be something of 
an ‘Indian summer’ for the far right, as increasing prosperity undermines their recruiting 
base.
Class struggle theories showed why worker mobilisation reached a low point earlier in 
the downswing, both in terms of membership and industrial action. At a time of economic 
crisis, organised labour tends to suffer numerous defeats and adopts a more defensive 
attitude. However, several long-wave researchers noted something of a revival in the 
latter part of the downswing as the economy recovers. Cronin (1979) and Kelly (1998) 
saw this as resulting from structural change within industry as it shifted from the 
downswing to the upswing.42 However, Screpanti (1984) saw this revival as often being 
absent, and where it occurred more a result of local conditions, rather than any structural 
transformation.43
The discussion in Chapter 4 indicated that the revival appears to be the result of the 
improving economy, with workers hoping to reverse some of the defeats of the previous 
period, or now confident enough to resist further attacks by employers. As Screpanti 
indicated though, this revival is not universal and appears confined to the most 
economically secure groups of workers. In general, the revival in mobilisation proves 
limited in nature, is usually short-lived and often of limited success, with reversals
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always a potential problem. After years of economic crisis, high unemployment, defeats 
and falling levels of militancy and membership, it is unlikely that any strike action would 
become generalised and sustained over an extended period of time.
Party competition theory showed that the effect of the median voter moving towards 
the centre is that the ideological agendas of the parties of the left and right begin to 
converge. As the left attempts to enter the centre ground of politics, the parties begin to 
look increasingly similar in their outlook, and another brief period of ideological 
competition ensues, though this time to see who successfully occupies the centre ground 
and defines the coming political consensus. The right attempts to rebut the left recovery, 
though with the increased importance of social issues, the political initiative is more 
likely to be with the left initially. With the long years of austerity, difficult and uncertain 
economic times appearing to come to an end, the left can appeal for less constraint and 
propose at least a moderate amount of change. Unsurprisingly, this is opposed by the 
right. ,
The end of this period sees the centre-left and centre-right jockeying for position as 
they attempt to occupy the centre ground of politics, and to see the success of their own 
agenda. For the most part, the number of options for each side is limited. The fractious 
battles of previous years ensure that certain highly controversial issues are no longer on 
the agenda, whilst the two sides of the dichotomy converge on issues important to the 
median voter. Increasingly, only the politics of the centre become a realistic option. 
Differences between centre-left and centre-right are more a case of how and why policies 
should be implemented, rather than what should be done. The differences are in the detail 
rather than the bigger picture.
It is unlikely that either side gains a complete ideological victory, the centre-right 
usually has to make some concessions to greater political and social inclusiveness, 
whereas the left is unable to transform its revival into a more profound attempt to change 
society. Electorates are still aware of the possibility of economic crisis and the previous 
periods have dampened any desire for profound political change. The actual nature of the 
consensus may be determined by either the centre-left or the centre-right. Where the left 
revival has effected changes, these are usually accepted by the right as it attempts to
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occupy the centre ground. If the right successfully prevents any left reforms, the left, 
without sustained support from the electorate, has little choice but to accept the status 
quo.
Thus the period, and the entire long-wave, ends with the emergence of a new 
consensus, be it largely defined by the centre-right or centre-left. The consensus is 
significantly different to the one that characterised the beginning of the long-wave. 
Structural and technological changes within society, and fifty years of political dispute 
between left and right, ensure that significant changes have been attempted and 
incorporated within the polity and wider society. Its only similarity is that politics once 
again is established on the centre ground with no significant deviations made to the left or 
right.
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CHAPTER SEVEN DISCUSSION
Introduction
Chapter 6 analyzed the usefulness of existing political science theories for 
understanding the pattern of change described in Chapter 2. It also described and 
explained a typical trajectory for a political long-wave and how this description and 
explanation compared with existing accounts. This chapter will review how closely this 
theoretical trajectory corresponds to the historical events over the four long-waves that 
have occurred, for it is also clear from the analysis that there have been occasions where 
deviations from the expected trajectory have occurred. With such an exercise comes the 
benefit of explaining why these deviations occurred, and should give a greater insight as 
to which are the most important factors in defining and causing the continuation of the 
political long-wave. In addition, this offers avenues of exploration for continuing 
research in this field. Finally, this chapter will discuss the implications of the findings of 
this thesis for long-wave and political science theory.
7.1 Historical Review.
First Political Long-Wave 1803-1825-1848
Of the four long-waves that have occurred, the first appears to deviate the most 
strongly from the political long-wave model. Although certain features of the model are 
in evidence, at times the first long-wave only hesitatingly shows the characteristics of the 
theoretical model, which in general are more strongly defined in later long-wave^ The 
first political long-wave appears to only really be in evidence in Britain, the only 
significantly industrialising economy at this time, though glimpses of its trajectory do 
appear within the other economies of Western Europe and North America.
For instance, the difficulty of finding a dividing point for the upswing and downswing 
perhaps explains why Hobsbawm simply described the whole period as the Age o f 
Revolution.1 He does, nevertheless, suggest two dividing points, 1815 and 1830 based on 
the idea that the Napoleonic wars stimulated industrial production in a number of
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countries but that this fell away after the wars ended. According to Hobsbawm, a revival 
in the industrial process did not occur until after 1830, from when on industrialisation 
became of increasing importance.
This trajectory would seem to fit the USA, France and Germany where their economies 
remained overwhelmingly agrarian in nature. These countries show only intermittent 
traces of a political long-wave. Periods of reform and reaction do to some extent coincide 
with periods of economic growth and stagnation. However, they are often punctuated by 
short bursts of political and social unrest brought on by poor harvests and which disrupt 
any established political trajectory that may have been developing. It would appear that 
the continued importance of agriculture as the mainstay of the economy was preventing 
any regular political long-wave cycle from developing.
However, in Britain the early industrial stimulus clearly continued throughout the 
entire period, and the theoretical trajectory expected does, to a large extent, appear to 
occur in Britain during the first long-wave upswing. As could be expected, it began with 
a conservative Loyalist consensus that gradually gave way to an increasingly militant 
reformism that reached a peak with the Peterloo massacre of 1819. The origins of the 
Reformist movement are often attributed to opposition to repressive government 
introduced because of the exigencies of the Napoleonic Wars. However, following the 
theoretical discussion of earlier chapters it was the expanding economy of this period and 
the structural emergence of social classes associated with industrialisation that gave 
reformers the confidence to mount a challenge to the authorities. The fact that the 
reformist challenge continued in the years after the Wars ended would indicate that this 
was also the case.
Between 1810 and 1819, there was a marked increase in radical, militant and 
revolutionary activity and propaganda, activity that was expressed through the Luddite, 
Reformist and Radical movements and associated with the structural emergence of the 
industrial working class and bourgeoisie. For the most part it was characterised by an 
attempt by both classes to establish civil liberties, constitutional rights and access to the 
ruling polity through the introduction of democracy and marked by increased industrial 
action and political agitation. The movement was temporarily brought to an end through 
the use of troops and the repressive Six Acts.
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A major anomaly, however, is the absence of any radical peak in left-wing activity 
towards the end of the upswing. General economic prosperity appears to have continued 
within the British economy until 1825. Both working and middle class movements appear 
to have moved away from direct confrontation and left militancy was largely absent 
during this period. Nevertheless it did see Owenite ideas on co-operativism and socialism 
make rapid headway within a growing trade union movement. Middle-class Radicalism 
appears to have concentrated its efforts on reducing agrarian protectionism and 
influencing the ruling Tories, resulting in Liberal Toryism.
If Flinn’s analysis on price and wage movements is correct (see Appendix B), then a 
possible explanation for this is that with real wages rising rapidly after the price peak 
caused by the Napoleonic Wars, workers were experiencing a rising level of living. A pay 
explosion was occurring without a strike wave - workers did not need to strike to improve 
their standard of living, this was already happening. Instead workers were able to devote 
their efforts to improving union and co-operative organization and successfully agitate 
for trade union legalisation at a time of economic prosperity.
A lack of radical middle-class activity between 1820 and 1825 could also be explained 
by rising real wages. This would undoubtedly have eroded profitability but rather than 
drive down wages, Radicals concentrated their attentions on attempting to repeal the 
Com Laws in an attempt to reduce food prices, thus making it easier to lower wages. 
However, although Radical ideas had made significant headway amongst manufacturers 
by the early 1820s and generated a plethora of liberal economic theories, in practice, the 
Radicals failed to gain more than a few concessions from Parliament. The initial strategy 
of responsible lobbying largely failed.
The first long-wave downswing arrived with the banking and financial crisis of 1825. 
The response of employers was to drive down wages and attack union organisation. This 
initially took the union movement by surprise and they suffered some serious defeats. 
The following period then saw a period of left-wing radicalism and a period of political 
turmoil occur, untypically, in conjunction. Despite the generally poor state of the 
economy between 1825 and 1833 the labour movement had presumably gained a 
sufficient level of organisation and confidence in the upswing for it to mount its own
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offensive from around 1829 onwards in the shape of general unionism. The reform 
impulse of the upswing also continued at the political level with the Whigs now willing 
to contemplate electoral reform to end a long period of Tory rule. A peak in left-wing 
activity did eventually arrive in 1832, though seven years into the downswing.
In general, this agitation resulted in political victory only for the middle-classes. In 
addition, the general union movement, despite some early successes, was challenged and 
destroyed, thus producing a double defeat for the working classes. Coming in years of 
general economic crisis and recession the efforts of the working class ended in almost 
complete failure. Despite middle-class victories, left reformist activity peaked in the early 
1830s as the Tories fought a long campaign, after failing to overturn electoral reform, 
over the issue of registration to suit the reform to their own electoral purposes. For almost 
ten years the Whigs and Radicals fought a rearguard battle to save the voting reforms, all 
parties eventually accepting the new voting system and extension of democracy. This had 
the effect of stalling the reform impulse and economic crisis returning after 1837 added to 
an increasingly conservative political climate as would be theoretically expected.
A return to recession and then depression in the early 1840s saw the return of 
economic concerns and economic restructuring at the political level. Later long-waves 
would see a major economic reform period typically arrive in the middle part of the 
downswing. Its late arrival in this downswing was probably a result of the middle-classes 
only gaining enfranchisement in 1832 and then spending a long period defending this, 
whilst the ruling aristocracy supported the prevailing economic policy, that of agrarian 
protectionism. Thus no major economic reform was able to emerge in the late 1820s/early 
1830s, whilst preoccupations lay elsewhere and until franchise extension had been 
secured.
The depression also, untypically for the late downswing period, spurred a re- 
emergence of left-wing activity in the shape of Chartism and the Anti-Corn Law League. 
This could be seen as part of the left recovery that occurs towards the end of the 
downswing, though unlike in later downswings it began before the economic recovery 
began. Why? Both movements rested heavily on the determined activism of a small 
number of militants and, Chartism in particular found it extremely difficult to sustain 
itself as a movement - no doubt a result of apathy and a lack of receptivity for radical
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ideas, typical features of the middle years of a long-wave downswing. It is also noticeable 
that organised labour had moderated its demands and this probably helped sustain its 
existence. The early syndicalism and desire for workers control of the general unionism 
period was gone; Chartist efforts were now concentrated on gaining acceptance into the 
existing polity.
The Chartist agitation may, in fact, be a typical example of a ‘transition movement’ -  
one that shows features typical of both agrarian and industrial social protest, as indicated 
by Hobsbawm in Labouring Men. In this early period, it could be expected that features 
of agrarian and industrial protest might overlap and Chartism would be one example of 
this. The Anti-Corn Law League, on the other hand, appears to be simply a belated 
economic reform movement. With the extended franchise now secured, agitation for a 
major economic reform to pull the economy away from depression could be attempted, 
and with skilled political manoeuvering ultimately proved successful.
The New Model Unionism and improved electoral fortunes of the Liberals in the mid- 
1840s were more typical of later ‘recovery periods’. This, and the failure of Chartism, led 
working-class activists back into a political alliance with the Liberals/Radicals. This 
alliance together with landowners who had supported the repeal of the Com Laws saw a 
political realignment that was to ensure a Liberal-Whig-Radical progressive alliance that 
dominated British politics for the next thirty years and formed the basis of the following 
consensus.
Overall, the period, being characterised by the beginnings of industrialisation whilst 
agriculture remains important, appears to be of a ‘transition’ nature. Elsewhere, in the 
1840s left movements gained increased levels of support, notably in France and 
Germany. Rather than this being part .of the ‘left recovery’, typical of the end of 
downswings, it appears more likely that it was the revival of the process of 
industrialisation from around 1830 onwards that eventually led to an increased level of 
opposition to the prevailing ideologies and regimes. The structural rise of the industrial 
bourgeoisie and working class appears to be the most important factor. The revolutionary 
intensity of the 1848 events is probably the result of this tendency combining with a 
period of poor harvests. It thus appears to be a ‘transition movement’ combining elements
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of both agrarian and urban unrest. It is noticeable that revolution only broke out in those 
countries making the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy. Those 
countries that had already industrialised, Britain and Belgium, remained free from 
revolution. Revolution at the end of a political long-wave would be wholly untypical.
Second Political Long-Wave 1848-1873-1896
The upswing of the second long-wave conforms considerably better to the theoretical 
model than that of the first. The period began with political consensus in the 1850s, 
whilst during the course of the 1860s a distinct leftwards shift manifested itself in a 
‘golden age of middle-class Liberalism’. This leftward shift also gave rise to the First 
International and revolutionary working-class movements. The greater conformity to the 
theoretical model is probably explained by the fact that industrial capitalism was not only 
becoming entrenched within the British economy, by now an urban society, but was 
extending in its geographical scope to include most of the major powers of the day. As 
such agrarian society was in decline and with it its forms of political expression. Factors 
arising solely from fluctuations in the success of harvests were having an ever- 
diminishing effect upon the political process, as the industrial trade-cycle became firmly 
entrenched within the Western world.
In structural terms, the second political long-wave represents, other than in Britain, 
the arrival of the industrial bourgeoisie and the middle-classes as a significant political 
force across the more developed economies. In general, these social classes found 
themselves seeking to displace the political, economic and social dominance of the 
traditional landowners/aristocracy alliance. In political terms this struggle found its 
representation through the emergence of Liberalism, Republicanism and Radicalism on 
the left, and Conservatism, Monarchism and the U.S. Democrats on the right. At the core 
of the movements of the left were the aspiring bourgeoisie and the middle-classes, though 
according to circumstances, sometimes allied with progressive sections of the working 
class or land-owning class. On the right, were the landowners, aristocracy, and 
established Church, sometimes in alliance with the peasantry.
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In general, the oppositional nature of left-wing politics during the upswing was 
greater in the lesser developed countries - France, Germany, USA - than in Britain, and 
one reason for this appears to be the nature of the initial consensus. In Britain, the 
consensus formed after the repeal of the Com Laws favoured the progressive Liberal 
alliance. Elsewhere, the initial consensus benefited the right, thus the left sought to break 
with the status quo more dramatically than in Britain.
As would be expected, in the latter half of the upswing there is a definite ascendancy 
of left movements and parties amongst both the middle and working class. With this 
upsurge of the left a definite trend towards greater democracy, extension of the franchise, 
and the increasing importance of parliamentary government and republicanism occurred. 
This represented a distinct move away from the authoritarian, aristocratic and clerical 
regimes associated with the aristocracy and land-owning class and from their associated 
ideologies. Conservative movements and ideas are continually on the defensive 
throughout this period.
In France and the USA, Republicanism and liberal capitalism were largely successful 
in breaking the power of the established land-owning class. In Germany, the Liberals 
achieved only a partially parliamentary regime. The gains of the Liberal movement in 
Germany were not perhaps as extensive as could be expected. Universal male suffrage 
was achieved and the Liberals were able to dominate parliament until the late 1870s. 
However, they were unable to break the political power of the aristocracy, the Prussian 
Junkers and gain parliamentary control over the executive. This is usually attributed to 
the economic power of the Prussian land-owning class, and the political skills of 
Bismarck. In addition, the intermittent military adventures of the monarchist regime and 
its attempts to promote an aggressive German nationalism hampered the ability of the 
progressive middle-class to pursue a successful strategy to capture the executive.
An indication of the progressive nature of the political climate towards the end of the 
upswing is the fact that both Disraeli and Bismarck attempted to use extensions of the 
franchise to deny political power to their Liberal opponents. For conservatives of this era, 
a significant extension in the distribution of political power was considerably out of 
character. However, at the height of a long-wave upswing this is very much in keeping 
with the contemporary political climate. Bismarck’s calculation was that the extension of
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the vote to the conservative peasantry would shift the balance of party competition 
towards the Conservatives, and to the disadvantage of the urban-based Liberals. This was 
also the calculation taken by Disraeli in extending the suffrage in 1868. Attempting to 
outmanoeuvre a Liberal party already committed to an extension of the franchise to 
skilled workers, who were generally considered to be potential Liberal supporters, he 
extended the vote to sections of the lower classes in the hope that their conservative 
inclinations would deliver votes to the Tories. In the event, neither strategy was 
successful, the left continued to dominate the electoral process into the 1870s.
For the working class, as would be expected, the long-wave upswing ended with a 
period of union building, and militant industrial action. The economic prosperity of the 
upswing was accompanied by increasing trade-union strength, organisation and 
membership levels. Confidence led to greater industrial action with a wave of strikes as 
union membership soared between 1866 and 1873. In most countries this was 
accompanied by an upsurge in radical and revolutionary left activity, notably that of 
Anarchism and Socialism. This was most marked within France and undoubtedly 
contributed to the nature of the Paris Commune - the only insurrectionary movement of 
this period. A partial exception to this was the workers movement in Britain, probably 
since their alliance with the Liberals was delivering most of the reforms they wanted; 
though a notable increase in Radicalism was evident amongst organised labour in the 
1870s. In the USA, although there was increased levels of worker mobilisation, the 
tendency towards worker militancy was also less developed. A possible cause for this 
was the fact that the civil war had impeded the establishment of the union movement 
whilst intense industrialisation occurred later than in France and Germany allowing less 
time for a militant worker movement to become established.
In political terms, most of these working-class movements were initially allied to the 
progressive political movements of the middle-class, be they Liberals, Radicals or 
Republicans. However, as labour organization and confidence grew in the prosperous 
years of the late 1860s, sections of the working class began to adopt more radical and 
class-based politics. In general, as is often the case, the progressive alliances of the early
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upswing began to dealign in the period of left radicalism at the end of the upswing, 
paving the way for the possibility of political realignments.
In general, the second long-wave downswing conforms closely to the theoretical 
model. The onset of the downswing saw a reaction to the increased left radicalism from a 
more assertive right during the 1870s. A period of political turmoil was followed by an 
entrenched right-wing conservatism attached to imperialism and protectionism during the 
1880s. The left revival at the end of the downswing was a weak and short-lived affair, 
notably for Liberalism, but did lay the foundations for a more permanent form of 
industrial unionism amongst the working-class.
In all the major industrial countries the left radicalism of the late upswing period 
provoked a right reaction, whilst increasing unemployment checked the advance of 
organised labour. In France, this was also achieved through the repression that followed 
the break-up of the Paris Commune. In all countries a protracted battle was fought 
between left and right, often with several changes of government, in a battle for 
ideological hegemony. During the course of this struggle, significant sections of the 
bourgeoisie and middle-classes switched from supporting the political forces of the left to 
becoming supporters of the parties of the right. In Britain, Germany, and the USA this 
process resulted in a victory for conservatives, as Liberals and Radical Republicans were 
forced on the defensive.
Only in France were the forces of the left ultimately victorious in the early period, 
undoubtedly a result of divisions within the forces of the monarchist right. However, 
once victorious, the Republican camp split into two, with the Opportunists on the right 
dominating the remainder of the long-wave downswing. Thus although their trajectories 
were somewhat different, all the major industrial countries experienced a period 
dominated by the right in the 1880s. For the most part this saw little in the way of 
legislative innovation, notably in the social and political spheres.
In general it saw a concerted attempt by conservative politicians to halt the tide of 
progressive or radical reform that had been characteristic of the 1860s and 1870s. In 
USA, both Republicans in the North and Democrats in the South experienced
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conservative domination within their parties, whilst in Britain Conservative rule between 
1886 and 1893 saw no new government initiatives other than to forestall more radical 
reform and to militarily crush the Home Rule movement in Ireland. In general the 
fortunes of the left were at a low ebb, and any challenge to conservative rule was more 
likely to come from the extreme-right - Boulangism in France and anti-Semitic Social 
Christians in Germany. Only Bismarck’s attempt to introduce social legislation and the 
rudimentary beginnings of a welfare state in 1886 were a departure from this trend, 
though this was done with the specific aim of boosting right-wing nationalism by 
drawing working-class support away from the Socialists. However, not only was its aim 
unsuccessful but it also met with concerted resistance from employers, worried about the 
expense of the scheme.
The period did, however, typically witness numerous strategies for reviving the 
economy, notably state intervention in the economy, protectionism and imperialism. A 
long period of depression and deflation ensured that economic reform became paramount 
and resulted in a shift away from free trade and free competition.
This period was one of extreme difficulty for organised labour. With high 
unemployment, an employers offensive, declining levels of union membership and 
government repression in continental Europe aimed at crushing the First International 
following the defeat of the Paris Commune, the revolutionary optimism of the late 
upswing period had dissipated almost entirely by the beginning of the 1880s. However, 
this process exacerbated divisions within the left. Whilst middle-class Liberals and 
Radicals and working-class Socialists moderated their respective programmes, they grew 
further apart and previous links between progressive sections of capital and labour 
gradually broke.
Organised labour in the USA was a partial exception. A strong period of union 
building associated with the Knights of Labour occurred during the economic recovery of 
1879-84. Mandel saw this as a ‘delayed upswing peak’ since the civil war had earlier 
prevented the momentum for such a surge to occur in the early 1870s. Once the 
movement collapsed in the mid-1880s depression that followed, its trajectory was similar 
to the labour movements in Europe, taking a more moderate line under the aegis of the 
AFL in the latter half of the downswing.
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Eventually, as the international economy entered the recovery period from around 
1888 onwards, the left experienced a partial recovery in its fortunes, though in general 
this was more evident amongst the working class and Socialist parties than amongst the 
middle-classes. Liberal parties in Britain and Germany experienced only weak and short­
lived recoveries in the early 1890s and were unable to displace the dominant 
Conservative ideological hegemony. Possibly the relatively high level of industrial action 
and growing support for socialism amongst trade unionists was keeping the middle- 
classes on the right, worried that the Liberals were unable to keep these movements in 
check.
The working-class revival in this downswing recovery was considerably stronger than 
in the other three, notably in the industrial arena. A short-lived surge in union 
membership and strike activity occurred between 1888 and 1892, though a dip in the 
business cycle accompanied by an employers counter-offensive eradicated many of the 
gains made by this movement. In Britain this was known as New Unionism, though other 
than Socialist activity within certain unions, there was little that was actually new about it 
- much of it being similar to the union movement created in the early 1870s. In Germany, 
it saw a strengthened union movement and in France and USA the beginning of 
syndicalism and the AFL respectively.
The greater surge of organised labour here than in other long-waves during this period 
may be a result of the structural ascendancy of the industrial working class at this time. 
The various union movements were still dominated by workers in craft unions, even after 
1893, industrial factory workers were largely non-unionised. Union organisation had 
extended to industrial workers in the 1870s, notably in Britain, but most of this had 
collapsed by 1879, and thus by the late 1880s there were many industrial sectors where 
unionisation was non-existent. There was thus a greater possibility of increasing union 
density than during later downswing recoveries added to which large numbers of workers 
wanted to reverse the losses of the depression years, the opportunity arriving in the 
economic revival of 1888-93.
In general, the strength of the industrial recovery of the working class was not 
reflected at the political level. Although Socialist parties saw an increase in membership
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and improved organisation, their ability to find electoral support was extremely limited. 
Only small numbers of Socialists were able to gain election, even in Germany where the 
Socialist movement was at its strongest. Continued restrictions of the franchise partially 
explain this, but after the long years of economic depression and high unemployment it 
would be unlikely that many workers believed that workers control of industry was an 
imminent prospect.
The emergence of Populism in the Southern and Western USA amongst independent 
farmers at this time could be seen as part of a left recovery though it may simply be a 
coincidence that it occurred at this time. Its occurrence followed on from poor harvests 
and a particularly bad economic depression in 1893. A radical response to hard times, as 
Hobsbawm noted,3 was more typical within agrarian communities than industrial ones. 
Although it impacted upon the electoral process, eventually to the benefit of the 
Republicans, it seems likely that it was not a feature of the political long-wave, but a 
result of agrarian crisis.
The second long-wave ended in a Liberal-Conservative consensus, known in 
Germany as the ‘marriage of Iron and Rye’. In USA, the Republican victory of 1896 
ensured the extension of liberal capitalism to the South, and thus the consensus favoured 
the moderate left, but the weak Liberal revival in Britain and Germany ensured a 
consensus more acceptable to the right. In France, the picture was more confused, and the 
period was perhaps more marked by centrism since attempts at consensus were short­
lived and often challenged by the left. Possibly this could be explained by the fact that the 
original Republican left had successfully achieved much of its agenda by 1884 and was 
replaced by a Radical left that had not been ideologically defeated, unlike elsewhere; this 
allowing it to pursue new aims since confidence levels were not so low.
In general, the realignment was one of a middle-class and aristocratic conservatism on 
the right. On the left, Liberalism still gained support, albeit depleted, from sections of the 
middle-class and working class but sections of the working class were now also aligned 
with Socialism. In the USA, no realignment had occurred and the major political division 
remained the regional one of North versus South.
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Third Political Long-Wave 1896-1920-1948
With the industrialisation process now entrenched within a dozen or more countries 
and with these countries dominating world trade, the aspects of political behaviour 
associated with an industrialised economy are now the most dominant ones. A major 
exogenous force acting upon the model is, however, the presence of World War I. As 
such, the third long-wave upswing conforms closely to the theoretical model, although a 
number of anomalies do occur. The initial consensus was one formed by landowners, 
industrialists and the middle-classes. Although the leftward surge from the mid-1900s 
onwards was primarily driven by socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, it also saw 
something of an ‘Indian summer’ for middle-class liberalism. A revolutionary peak was 
reached at the end of the upswing during and after WW1.
As would be expected, the early period was defined by consensus, and one that 
largely favoured the right. However, it excluded the Socialist left since, during the second 
long-wave, Socialism had been a minor ‘third force’ with the major political battles being 
between the Conservative landowners and the Liberal/Republican middle-classes. The 
situation in the USA and France was slightly different. In the USA, the Republican 
victory in 1896 represented a victory for liberal capitalism and defeat for the conservative 
land-owning elites of the South, as such the consensus favoured the left. In France, where 
the left was stronger, the centrist consensus was broken by the Dreyfuss affair and 
although this led to electoral victory for the Radicals, centrist politics remained largely in 
place until 1905.
The third long-wave upswing saw the structural emergence of an expanded industrial 
working class and its political demands being expressed through both parliamentary and 
revolutionary movements. These movements were often in competition with the middle- 
class Liberal parties also on the left, and had often fared poorly in the establishment of 
the consensus at the beginning of the period. Not surprisingly then, the upswing saw 
challenges from both the middle and working-class left and explains much of the 
oppositional nature of the third upswing.
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As could be expected, by the middle of the upswing, almost everywhere saw advances 
for the parties of both the middle and working class left. Socialist parties everywhere 
gained support, whilst the middle-class parties of the left effected progressive reforms in 
Britain, France and the USA. In Germany, the Social Democrats became the largest 
political force, but the monarchy’s control of the executive ensured the continued 
domination of Conservative elites.
However, the political dominance of the left was disrupted by the outbreak of World 
War One. The conflict created divisions within the British Liberal party, effectively 
removed the French Radicals from power, whilst Wilson’s decision to enter the war 
resulted in falling levels of support for the Democrats - the party considered to have most 
effectively captured the progressive vote up to that point. Only in Germany did the 
conflict ultimately benefit the left, with the Social Democrats coming to power in the 
revolutionary events of 1919. Effectively the war proved highly damaging for the middle- 
class parties of the left and brought their revival or period of ascendancy to an end. This 
allowed the emergence of right-wing government in France, a Republican revival in the 
USA, and parliamentary gains for the Conservatives in Britain in coalition with Lloyd- 
George’s Liberal
Elsewhere, as would be expected, the working-class socialist and anarcho-syndicalist 
movements gained strongly during this period in terms of membership, militancy, and 
influence despite repression during the war years. To some extent the difficulties of 
Liberalism/Radicalism benefited the working-class left. Typically the end of the upswing 
saw a pay and price explosion whilst socialist movements reached a peak in militancy, 
influence, confidence and membership in the years 1918-20. General strikes and 
revolutionary events were a notable feature of the final years of the upswing.
The following downswing of the third long-wave also conforms largely to the 
model, although with a number of exceptions. The downswing saw the mobilisation of 
fascists and other elements of the far right against the left revolutionary trend. A period of 
intense political turmoil in the 1920s and early 30s usually saw fascists and conservatives 
politically victorious, though everywhere conservatism eventually became prevalent. The
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left revival in the 1940s was usually driven by former socialist movements, now 
reconciled to a more social democratic approach.
Typically, the early period was chaotic. The years from 1920 until the mid-1930s were 
ones of intense political turmoil, notably in the newer democracies. The new democracies 
of Eastern and Southern Europe often fell to authoritarian rule, and anti-democratic 
forces also emerged in France and Germany. In Europe many of the governments were 
short-lived with power frequently changing hands as politicians sought to deal with 
protracted political polarisation and economic difficulties.
An exception to the latter trend was the USA, where three conservative Republican 
presidents were elected in succession, giving the impression of political stability. The 
huge influx of capital during World War I allowed a greater degree of financial and 
economic stability through tax and interest rate cutting, and this postponement of 
underlying economic difficulties probably led to a false sense of political stability. 
However, the Republican domination of the Presidency disguised the protracted political 
battles occurring at the grassroots level and this domination also appears to be at least 
partly a result of major divisions within the Democrats that made the latter difficult to 
elect.
The political and economic instability of the 1920s did however see trends typical of 
the political long-wave. The fortunes of the radical and revolutionary left tended to 
decline whilst the right became more successful. Together, working-class militancy and 
economic difficulties appear to have further eroded the fortunes of middle-class 
liberalism as the middle-classes moved over to conservatism, or fascism, in a similar way 
to that of the 1870s. The reactionary far right, and fascism in particular, were also much 
in evidence, possibly the extreme nature of the right’s response resulting from the 
revolutionary nature of the left’s challenge in the period after WW1.
The slump of 1929-33/6 marked the economic nadir of the third long-wave 
downswing and had a number of political repercussions. As would be expected, 
economic revival became the priority of voters everywhere and there was a marked shift 
by governments towards protectionism and state intervention in the economy. Almost
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everywhere the depression removed the ruling party from power, though on a more 
general level it was the forces of the right, notably the far right, that gained most from the 
crisis, as would be expected. Almost everywhere the left, and notably the far left, lost 
ground and were eventually forced to adopt far more moderate ideological agendas. 
However, parties were judged primarily on economic performance and in some cases this 
benefited the left.
The countries where the parliamentary left remained strongest appear to be those in 
which the economy had fared best in the mid-late 1920s. These included the USA and 
France, though in France the Socialist attempt to deal with the depression, despite a 
period of progressive reform in 1936, ultimately proved to be short-lived. In the USA, the 
Democrats were not an established left party though much of the left established itself 
within the party through the course of the 1920s and 1930s. The Republicans had the 
misfortune to be in power at the beginning of the Slump and together with laissez-faire 
capitalism took the blame for the crisis. Such a scenario benefited the left and Roosevelt 
was able to come to power on a left agenda that emphasized economic recovery through 
the New Deal. The Democrats ability to buck the electoral trend towards the right was 
possibly also a result of the party already having an in-built electoral alliance with a 
section of the right - the Southern Democrats -  though, along with other conservative 
forces, the Southern Democrats effectively halted the New Deal reform process by 1936.
As expected, from the mid-1930s onwards, domestic politics was increasingly 
dominated by conservatism. Almost everywhere, after the political and economic turmoil 
of the previous fifteen years, administrations sought to nurture their economies back to 
full health, whilst being reluctant to engage in social and political changes that might 
prove disruptive to this project. This was as much the case in the reactionary regimes of 
Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini as it was in the liberal democracies of Britain, France and 
USA. Once the political turmoil of the earlier period had petered out and a new 
economic strategy had been implemented, domestically, conservatism became prevalent.
According to the political long-wave model, the early-mid 1940s should have seen a 
revival for the left, but in many countries this failed to occur, most notably because of 
World War II and the Nazi occupation of much of Europe. Only in Britain and the USA 
did a left revival occur from around 1942/3 onwards, unless the left-led Resistance
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movements within Nazi-occupied Europe are considered. The end of the war did, 
however, witness a burst of left-wing activity almost everywhere. No doubt much of it 
was a reaction to the fact that military defeat often represented defeat for the political 
forces of the right, but it was also an attempt to reverse the political and social defeats of 
the 1930s and early 1940s. In general, it was the more moderate social democratic left 
agenda that proved most successful.
Fourth Political Long-Wave 1948-1973-1998
The fourth long-wave upswing conforms closely to the model, though again there 
are a number of exceptions. Economies are fully industrialised by now, whilst on the 
political level representative democracy and some form of social democracy is evident in 
most advanced capitalist countries. The period started with the ‘middle way* consensus 
of the 1950s, but by the 1960s was being challenged by the post-materialist forces of the 
New Left. The end of the period saw these movements joined by a reinvigorated social 
democracy and a period of intense industrial action by the working class in the strike 
wave of 1968-74.
The initial consensus was largely social-democratic in nature and thus tended to 
favour the left. However, the left revival of the 1940s proved short-lived and it was 
usually centre-right parties that presided over the newly founded social democracies in 
the consensus years of the 1950s. The predominant alignment in this period was of a 
social democratic working-class left opposed to a conservative or Christian democrat 
middle-class right.
After the intensity of the third political long-wave, the fourth was relatively calm in 
comparison. This was probably the result of two factors. Firstly, the working class had 
been incorporated into the political and economic mainstream by means of the social 
democratic compromise - full democracy, the mixed economy and the welfare state. 
Through this compromise the forces of the left had secured a significant redistribution of 
power and all the major social classes were represented within the consensual
229
arrangement. Secondly, the initial consensus, tending to be social democratic in nature 
was beneficial to the left, and changes to the polity required a less oppositional nature.
When the increase in left activity in the later upswing did occur, in structural terms it 
was most closely associated with students, youth, the professional middle-classes and 
white-collar workers of the service-sector economy. This represented the rise of the New 
Left and its association with post-materialist causes. The more traditional left tended to 
concentrate on attempts to deepen social democracy.
As would be expected, the 1960s saw an increase in grassroots left activity and 
movements across the developed world. In general, there was a revival in the fortunes of 
the left at the parliamentary level. A partial exception to this trend was France where 
despite support for left parties increasing in this period and ultimately witnessing the 
social explosion of May 1968, the Gaullists remained in power throughout. Several 
explanations might be relevant. The Communists were the largest political force on the 
left and at a time of Cold War and nuclear tensions many voters, fearing a Communist- 
led coalition and the uncertain international consequences of this, were reluctant to vote 
left (also the case in Italy). In addition, de Gaulle had altered the constitution of the 
executive through the direct election of himself as president. Mindful of the executive
• f Uinstability that was typical of the 4 Republic, some voters were reluctant to elect a left- 
led parliament because this may have led to a period of unstable cohabitation. Dunleavy 
regarded de Gaulle’s constitutional arrangement as a typical example of institutional 
manipulation preference-shaping behaviour.4 Finally, de Gaulle’s appeal for a 
rassemblement of the French people to cut across party lines after the debacle of the 4th 
Republic,., did succeed in persistently attracting a section of the left vote thus 
strengthening the right-wing Gaullist movement and weakening the parties of the left.
The end of the upswing also saw right-wing parties elected in Britain, France and the 
USA, contrary to what might be expected. In the USA, the Vietnam War proved 
damaging and divisive for the Democrats, with different sections supporting and 
opposing the war, allowing Nixon to be elected president in 1968. In Britain, Labour’s 
economic record was considered to be poor in office and failed to live up to the 
expectations of left-wing voters. Possibly, the Cold War was also creating a political 
climate that made the left less electable, since sections of the left were pro-Soviet or took
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a more conciliatory line. However, the governments of Heath, Nixon and Pompidou all 
found themselves presiding over progressive reform or modernisation programmes once 
in power. These policies might normally have been expected more from left-wing 
governments indicating that each found it necessary to move into progressive politics in 
order to be elected and/or re-elected -  an indication of the progressive nature of the 
period.
More typically, however, the upswing ended with a peak in radical left activity. The 
strike wave of 1968-74 was accompanied by a pay and price explosion, together with 
radical student and youth movements, and the emergence of radical anti-war, women’s, 
ethnic minority, gay and environmental groups. In addition, a number of radical left-wing 
terrorist/urban guerrilla groups emerged across the developed world.
The fourth long-wave downswing conforms closely to the model with only a few 
exceptions. The turmoil of the 1970s saw the demise of the radical left whilst a 
reinvigorated right attached to neo-liberalism became increasingly influential. The 1980s 
were dominated by the end of social democracy and the ascendancy of the New Right 
and hardline conservatism. The left revival at the end of the period was guided by a ‘third 
way’ social democratic approach reconciled to free-market capitalism.
As would be expected, the period began with political turmoil and the 1970s were 
marked by economic instability, political polarisation and the concept of government 
overload. Together the period was seen as one characterised by a ‘crisis of govemability’ 
with high electoral expectations coming up against the problem of slower economic 
growth levels. Although left-wing governments were still being elected, in general, the 
period marked an advance for the forces of the New Right and increasingly saw 
Keynesian social democracy on the defensive. By the 1980s the left was in retreat almost 
everywhere with right-wing governments predominating, the New Right project being 
most successful where social democratic and corporatist institutions were least 
entrenched. The economic depression of 1980-82/3 was the worst since the 1930s and 
typically saw the implementation of a major economic reform programme to aid
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recovery, as the ffee-market neo-liberalism and monetarism of the New Right came to 
replace Keynesian social democracy.
A partial exception to this trend was France where the Socialists were able to buck the 
international trend and keep control of the presidency for two seven-year terms, though 
were less successful at the parliamentary level. There are several possible explanations 
for this. Initially the Socialists were able to benefit from the unpopular austerity measures 
introduced by the right in the late 1970s, although after 1983 they too were forced to 
pursue similar policies. Electoral defeat followed in 1986, but the right were still 
confronted by economic problems and were often outmanoeuvred by Mitterrand. In 
addition, the parties of the right were frequently divided both within and without 
Gaullism, a fact that Mitterrand attempted to exacerbate by switching to a proportional 
voting system in an attempt to further divide the right-wing vote, again considered by 
Dunleavy as an example of institutional manipulation preference-shaping behaviour.5
However, more typically, in order to remain electable the Socialists found it necessary 
to abandon the socialist project and adopt economic measures that, ideologically, were 
more in keeping with the beliefs of the New Right. Eventually, however, the whole 
project of attempting to block the right from power through institutional manipulation 
and ideological vacillation in the face of an increasingly conservative political and 
intellectual climate fell apart, and the parties of the right enjoyed a huge victory in 1993. 
As in the 1960s, it appears that the constitutional arrangement of a split executive and 
differential length terms for the presidency and parliament has allowed presidents to 
partially prevent the popular political mood being represented at government level.
The fourth long-wave downswing ended more typically with the centre-left 
establishing an electoral revival in all four countries. To do so, in each case the parties of 
the left had considerably moderated their platforms and accepted much of the New 
Right’s economic and social agenda. The French Socialists perhaps moved the least in 
this direction, probably due to not having experienced long years of electoral defeat. As 
such, with the left moving to the centre, via the concept of the ‘third way’, and the parties 
of the right advocating the more centrist ‘compassionate conservatism’, the political 
scene appeared set for a new period of consensus.
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7.2 Causations for Deviations from the Theoretical Trajectory
The above discussion indicates that there are number of factors that have resulted in 
deviations from the theoretical trajectory established in Chapter 6. To some extent, a 
number of short-term or contingent factors can be seen to disrupt the typical trajectory. 
For instance, the changes of public opinion brought about by the long-wave are not 
always accurately reflected at government level. Representative democracy is not a 
perfect system of government, a host of factors can limit its representative nature. The 
exact timing of elections, constitutional manipulation, inadequate leadership or 
organisation, divisions within parties or within the wider left and right may all impact on 
the electoral process.
However, the most significant deviations appear to result from three major factors, 
these showing the ability to have a more concerted or longer lasting effect.
1. International Factors/War
International factors appear to cause more deviations from the model than any other. 
The existence of war or other international hostilities have had a disruptive impact as 
witnessed by the effects of the Napoleonic Wars, American Civil War, WW1, WW2 and 
the Vietnam War. In addition the tensions resulting from the Cold War with a power 
perceived as left-wing, also impacted upon the political long-wave - the upsurge of the 
left in the fourth upswing being less successful than might be expected.
It is not difficult to suggest possible reasons for this. Faced with a hostile external 
enemy, domestic political considerations are often suspended, either partially or fully, 
whilst the priority of military victory is addressed. Coalition governments are not unusual 
at such times, whilst elections may be suspended. Military victory or defeat may result in 
the left or right winning elections at an untypical time of the political long-wave, if 
electorates use elections to judge particular parties’ war record. This appears to be 
particularly the case in WW1 where middle-class liberal parties suffered damaging 
electoral consequences at a time when they would have been expected to be electorally 
successful.
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In addition, the Napoleonic Wars, WW1 and possibly the American Civil War appear 
to have had knock-on effects altering the political climate from what otherwise would 
have been expected in the following period. In these cases, certain economic factors were 
altered thus altering the political changes that followed the ending of hostilities. Usually 
these have somewhat stunted the economic growth of the upswing period and thus had a 
greater impact on the forces of the left.
The experience of East Germany would suggest that foreign occupation also disrupts 
the political long-wave. It is likely that domestic policy, at least in part, is determined by 
the needs and considerations of the occupying power. Matters of both internal and 
external security will probably be paramount and often override those of the local 
populace. Even so, some form of legitimacy will need to be established by the occupying 
power, and where security is not jeopardized, expressions of the popular will may be 
reflected in government policy. Where an active ‘nationalist movement’ exists and 
opposes the occupying power, the left-right dichotomy might be reduced in importance, 
whilst national considerations take priority.
2. The Persistence of Agrarian Influences.
Evidence from the early 19th century strongly suggests that the persistence of agrarian 
influences impacted upon the political long-wave. The theoretical trajectory is partially 
absent from France, Germany and the USA in the first half of the 19th Century and only 
poorly expressed in Britain -  the only strongly industrialising economy. There appears to 
be an overlap between the political long-wave and effects more typical of an agrarian 
economy. Agrarian economies are very much prone to the vagaries of weather and 
climate. Poor harvests usually result in high prices and high unemployment and political 
and social unrest are likely at these times. This could happen randomly at any time and 
thus it is unlikely that any regular and repeating pattern of social and political behaviour 
could become completely established.
Hobsbawm identified a transition period in industrialising economies with regards to 
social rebellion.6 Under such circumstances, the different patterns of rebellion typically 
associated with agrarian and industrial societies overlapped for a period of time until 
industrialisation became dominant. It seems likely that this would also be the case with
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the political long-wave, the theoretical trajectory being compromised where a country is 
still in the early period of industrialisation.
As such, where industrialisation is absent, there is unlikely to be a political long-wave 
trajectory, although an exception might be where an agrarian economy has already been 
incorporated into the trading systems of advanced countries. The economic booms and 
recessions of advanced economies would thus impact upon the economy, thus allowing 
some effects of the political long-wave to be present. However, agrarian economies 
usually show very low economic growth rates and long-term fluctuations may be too 
small to have a significant impact at the political level. In addition such economies tend 
to have poorly developed state, party and democratic systems thus also diminishing the 
possibility of the political long-wave being present.
In addition, even where economies are industrialising, sections of the population, 
such as the peasantry, may remain unaffected by the effects of the business cycle and 
their political behaviour is therefore less predictable and dictated by other factors than 
those constituting the political long-wave. Where important agrarian classes are still in 
evidence, for instance the peasantry and aristocracy, deviations from the model appear 
more likely, since their economic and political interests may be tied to factors outside the 
industrial economy.
This would suggest that the theoretical trajectory is most closely adhered to in 
industrial/ post-industrial economies. The economic fortunes of the major social classes - 
the bourgeoisie, middle-class and working class -  are all tied to the fortunes of business 
cycles. Thus, the further an economy moves away from reliance on agriculture for 
generating economic growth, the more developed will become the political long-wave, 
assuming no counter-veiling factor becomes Established.
3.Authoritarian Regimes
Where authoritarian regimes exist certain features of the political long-wave appear to 
be suppressed or entirely non-existent and are unlikely to be represented at government 
level. This appears to be the case in Britain in the early 19th century, in Nazi-occupied 
Europe and possibly in East Germany. Authoritarian regimes are generally poorer at 
expressing the popular will than where democracy exists. To engage in anti-regime
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political activity may run the risk of imprisonment, exile or death, diminishing the level 
of support for certain political and social movements, usually those on the left 
challenging the established order.
The presence of the political long-wave may not be entirely absent, since even 
authoritarian regimes need some form of legitimacy, but its presence is likely to be
tVtdiminished. For instance, political developments under Louis Napoleon in the mid-19 
century mirrored those of elsewhere, but in a much more restricted manner. The presence 
of democratic procedures almost certainly allows the trends of the political long-wave to 
be expressed more clearly. Populations have at hand a more accessible and responsive 
system of government that allows changing attitudes to be more clearly expressed and 
acted upon than is the case with authoritarian regimes. Again, assuming no counter­
veiling tendencies, with the extension and deepening of democratic procedures, the 
political long-wave is likely to be increasingly in evidence.
Finally, although all these factors have impacted on the political process over the last 
two centuries, sometimes together, sometimes independently, the political long-wave has 
persisted to the present day. In general, it appears that these factors have only resulted in 
short-term deviations from the model and in the medium-to-long run, the effects of the 
long-wave have re-imposed themselves, bringing the political situation closer to that 
which could be expected from the model. The question of the distribution of power 
within society, together with the impact of economic change on political change, appear 
to be sufficiently important within modem societies for these to remain paramount even 
when faced with extraneous factors.
7.3 Implications for Long-wave Theory.
Research into long-waves dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, but the 
phenomenon is still little known and often at the margins of thinking within the field of 
economics. Although investigations into long-term economic variations within modem 
societies, such as those by Maddison, Solomou and Kindleberger, invariably use long­
wave literature as their starting point, usually they conclude that the case for long-waves
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is not yet proven.7 Goldstein maintained that, notwithstanding empirical and theoretical 
problems, long-wave economics had persisted at the margin of the discipline of
• f teconomics because of a lack of theoretical agreement between long-wave researchers. 
However, a lack of theoretical agreement is widespread across this and most other 
academic disciplines and is unlikely to be the main reason.
Commentators sometimes point to a lack of empirical evidence, though the figures for 
economic growth and unemployment in Appendix B would appear to be fairly 
conclusive. Typically unemployment in upswings has averaged around 3.4% whilst 
downswing levels are more than twice this at over 8%. Economic growth in downswings 
has averaged around 2.5%, whilst upswings have been at 3.25 -  4.75%. As indicated in 
Appendix B a host of economic factors have shown good correlation with the ups and 
downs of the long-wave.
An additional problem that has been identified by critics is the theoretical basis for 
long-waves. Initially, Kondratieff was reluctant to provide such a basis and much of the 
theoretical literature has followed Schumpeter, concentrating on waves of technological 
innovation/invention.9 However, it often proved difficult to connect this trend with the 
mainstream tenets of economics and to explain why the waves of innovation should 
follow a temporally regular pattern.
To explain these difficulties, the most recent tendency within long-wave research is to 
take a more political economy approach. One approach has been to connect features of 
industrial relations to explanations of how and why long-waves occur. Some, such as 
Cronin, have linked these to Schumpeter’s waves of technological innovation, others 
such as Screpanti and Salvati, have come closer to explanations based simply on supply 
and demand within the labour market.10 Another approach, taken by Lloyd-Jones & 
Lewis, has connected political and social institutional structures to Schumpeter’s cycles 
of innovation, emphasizing the importance of governments and employers during the 
structural crisis of the downswing.11
It is clear from this thesis that any explanation of the workings of the economy will 
need to consider the motivations and actions of the people who work within it. 
Schumpeter did this by linking the behaviour of entrepreneurs to cycles of innovation;
19 •recent work has concentrated on the equally important role of labour. The relationship
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between capital and labour may also be crucial to an understanding of long-wave 
economics.
As indicated by Screpanti, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that after each major
1 7upsurge of industrial unrest a long-wave downswing comes into existence. Glyn, 
Hughes, Lipietz & Singh, amongst others, considered that the post-1973 economic 
stagnation was not a result of higher oil prices but resulted from organised labour eroding 
productivity levels through the pay explosion of the late 1960s/early 1970s.14 Phelps 
Brown considered that this had also been the case during the explosion of industrial 
unrest between 1910-20. Marxists, such as Brenner, have opposed this explanation, 
claiming that it was competition between capitalists, not between labour and capital, that 
drove profits down post-1973.15 However, the great efforts made by governments, 
employers, the media and academics to undermine the position of organised labour 
through the introduction of supply-side economics from the late 1970s through to the 
1990s would suggest that the former theory holds much validity.
Mainstream economic thinking maintains that differing levels of unemployment 
greatly alter the bargaining position of capital and labour. The high unemployment levels 
of long-wave downswings would allow employers to erode the position of organised 
labour thus allowing improvements in productivity and a return to a profitable long-wave 
upswing. This process, together with the economic reconstruction described by those 
such as Lloyd-Jones & Lewis and van Duijn, would presumably lead to the more 
profitable state of the following upswing.
Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz & Singh described a virtuous cycle of increased economic 
growth, high levels of employment, increased demand, higher profitability, levels of 
investment and government revenue and thus continued high growth as explaining the 
existence and length of the post-war boom of 1948-73.16 Only once the position of labour 
became strong enough to improve working conditions and increase real wages 
sufficiently to erode levels of productivity, profitability and investment did the boom 
come to an end. This could indeed be an explanation of why all long-wave upswings have 
come to an end.
This thesis has shown how the economic change of long-waves is able to impact upon 
political change and worker mobilisation. In doing so it has also considered the
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possibility that these changes are reciprocated. In particular, the lowest point of the 
downswing sees a concerted effort by electorates and governments to reinvigorate the 
economy, to induce a return to economic prosperity. Equally, it may be the case that 
upswings are brought to an end, at least partly by the activities of organised labour and 
the far left. As such, it follows in the political economy approach to explaining and 
understanding long-waves and offers further evidence that a political economy approach 
appears to be the most fruitful line of research in understanding this phenomena.
Additionally, the existence of a political long-wave should help to resolve some of the 
confusion that exists around the differing dates given for long-waves, since a regular 
sequence of events allows a more precise dating scheme. In particular, the period 1914- 
20 shows characteristics more typical of the late upswing, than an early downswing, 
whilst 1940-48 is more typical of a late downswing than an early upswing. In addition, 
establishing a ‘secondary feature’, and, arguably, a more visible manifestation of long- 
waves, adds to the body of evidence for the existence of long-waves. Evidence of their 
existence at the political as well as the economic level should be beneficial in establishing 
the case for the existence of long-waves.
Turning to the literature discussed in Chapter 1, the particular trajectory of the 
‘political long-wave’ outlined in this thesis also helps to clarify a number of points that 
have developed within the field that has attempted to link political and social behaviour 
to long-waves.
Firstly, a repeated pattern of political and social behaviour can be linked to long­
wave economics, as indicated by many researchers. The use of the ‘political long-wave’ 
and its constituent parts provides a comprehensive and concise description of events 
during the course of a long-wave. Previous accounts have often been incomplete in nature 
and on occasions erroneous. Periods of the long-wave previously neglected, in particular, 
the early upswing period and the early downswing period, have now been described to 
form a more complete picture of events.
The trend towards seeing long-wave upswings as periods that benefit the left, and also 
socialist movements and agitation, is confirmed, whereas downswings have the inverse 
effect. The orthodox Marxist idea that economic booms and prosperity give rise to
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complacency and support for capitalism amongst the working class is not borne out. A 
number of Marxist long-wave researchers have moved in this direction but have been 
reluctant to take this to its logical conclusion. Namely, that Marx’s belief that prolonged 
economic crisis would result in socialist revolution appears to be incorrect. A more 
accurate picture would be exactly the opposite, with long-wave upswings resulting in a 
concerted attempt to challenge the established order, whilst downswings erode the 
position of labour, the left and socialists and reaction rather than revolution is more likely 
during economic crisis.
Whilst many researchers agreed that downswings were detrimental to the left, few, if 
any, recognised this period as being dominated by the right. Prolonged periods of 
economic slowdown or stagnation do, however, appear to be far more beneficial to the 
political forces of the right than the left. In almost all cases, the political climate has 
shifted to the right in the ‘crisis period’ of the downswing, and this has almost always 
benefited the parties of the right. The trend towards seeing something of a revival for the 
left at the end of the downswing is confirmed though.
Having covered four countries over four long-waves the evidence for the pattern of 
development described in this thesis is fairly comprehensive. Conceivably, though 
unlikely, these countries could be unique and confirmation for these findings could 
perhaps be established by discovering whether other industrial/post-industrial economies 
have followed a similar trajectory. In addition, if the long-wave cycle continues, as would 
be expected, and a fifth long-wave develops from 1998 onwards, further confirmation 
and a more concise understanding of the phenomena could be developed as the pattern 
repeats for a fifth time.
Secondly, the repeated pattern of events in each long-wave appears to have a common 
set of causations and is not the fortuitous product of a random selection of factors. 
Although structural and organizational factors are relevant, it appears that above all the 
changing phases of the long-wave produce changing long-term psychological mood 
swings that affect political behaviour. From the evidence of this thesis, it would appear 
that to further develop understanding of the link between long-waves and political change 
this is the most fruitful area of research.
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Of crucial importance appear to be the concepts of confidence and deference, 
optimism and pessimism, risk-taking and caution and economic security and insecurity. 
Although these are all closely linked concepts and certainly dependent upon one another, 
a fifth political long-wave would bring greater opportunities to study the relevant 
importance of each of these concepts, to develop more concise models and linkages, and 
a more exact understanding of the processes at work. In many ways, this thesis has been 
heavily exploratory in nature; the limited amount of literature in this field necessitating 
such an approach. However, with a basic model and pattern of development established, 
more in-depth approaches to the subject will be possible in the future.
7.4 Implications for Political ScienceTheory
Recent accounts of political change have once again raised the possibility of the ‘end 
of ideology’ and of ‘left and right’. In part this analysis is based upon the fall of the 
Berlin War and the end of the Cold War. However, it should be pointed out that the 
domestic politics in liberal democracies were rarely divided on a pro or anti Soviet 
position. Even where Communist parties were a significant electoral force, many had 
adopted Eurocommunism long before the fall of the BerlinWar.
Other accounts stress the fact that much of the left appear to have accepted the rise of 
neo-liberalism and the importance of market forces. Keynesian social democracy is 
believed to have had its day. In addition, the decline in the levels of industrial action and 
support for socialism, industrial democracy and militant trade unionism appear to indicate 
that the class war is over. Neo-liberalism was the victor, even if the left did attempt to 
add a dose of egalitarianism to it. With both the left and right supposedly following 
similar ideological programmes it is now maintained that not only are we witnessing the 
end of ideology but also of ‘left’ and ‘right’ as meaningful political terms.
However, are we witnessing the end of ideology or simply the victory of neo-liberal 
ideology over social democracy ideology? Is this simply the reverse of what occurred in 
the 1930s and 40s? At this time too the ‘end of ideology’ was predicted only to be proved 
wrong by the rise of the New Left, later to be followed by the New Right. This earlier 
prediction was also based on a period of centrist politics where the positions of the left
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and right had merged in the 1940s in support of Keynesian social democracy. However, 
subsequently it proved that they had done so for different reasons. The trajectory of the 
‘political long-wave’ would suggest that once again they have converged for different 
reasons. For the right, support for neo-liberalism and market forces was deemed 
necessary to revive capitalism and preserve a class-based society. For the left, it was 
simply a case of adjusting to the new reality and the need to be elected.
For the end of ideology and the left and right to genuinely occur there would 
presumably need to be some form of systemic change. The conditions which gave rise to 
competing political ideologies would need to come to an end. Appendix A indicated that 
these conditions were the presence of different social classes and an unequal distribution 
of power, together with the rise of the nation-state and a party system through which 
these differences could be expressed. None of these have disappeared; there has been no 
systemic political change and thus little reason to believe that the ‘end of ideology’ has 
arrived.
The trajectory of the political long-wave would indicate that the present period of 
emerging consensus is simply a temporary phenomenon. Similar type periods have 
occurred at this stage in the long-wave before and eventually given way to a shift to the 
progressive left. It would appear that this is likely to be the case once again. However, the 
question of the thesis of the ‘end of ideology’ does highlight two tendencies which have 
emerged within political science literature and which the political long-wave indicates are 
unhelpful.
Firstly, the political long-wave model highlights the importance of history. Many of 
the political science models of human behaviour are often static and abstract in nature, 
tending to neglect the fact that modem societies are in ;a constant state of change. This 
has been the case with theories of party competition, but sometimes too with models of 
voting behaviour. They are often presented as being universally applicable models. 
Invariably they are based on ‘all other things being equal’ but invariably all other things 
are not equal. Society is in a constant state of change, and in practice these models can 
only be applied to certain particular periods. Incorporating a historical or dynamic 
perspective is essential. The trajectory of the political long-wave should be a useful 
analytical tool in this respect.
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Secondly, the readiness with which the idea of ideology ending gained support. Parties 
of the right have often portrayed themselves as being ‘non-ideological’ in contrast to the 
ideologically motivated movements of the left. The implication is that the right is 
pragmatic and practical in nature, simply following a common sense approach that is in 
accord with some form of natural order. Ideological change by the left, within this strain 
of thought, is regarded as either superfluous or as potentially disruptive of the natural 
order. It is probably no coincidence that a negative view of ideology gained widespread 
acceptance during a long-wave downswing, at a time of conservatism and right-wing 
political dominance.
Such a dislike for ideology also entered political science literature during the late 
1970s/1980s. Many political science models at this time, driven by rational choice theory, 
maintained that humans are motivated essentially by self-interest. The presence of 
ideology suggests a degree of solidarity between political actors on the basis of shared 
beliefs, which is perceived as being at odds with the concept of self-interest. Models thus 
indicated that activists and politicians may claim to be ideologically-motivated, to be 
concerned with the common good, with utopian or altruistic motives, but really this 
simply hides the motivation of self-interest. Ideology is simply used to promote self- 
interest in a more socially acceptable manner.
With a pessimistic view of human nature very much in evidence, it is easy to believe 
that ideologues have ulterior motives. At times of economic difficulty, competition for 
scarce resources can easily lead to a dog-eat-dog sense of self-interest. At such times it 
can be. difficult to believe that ideologists have genuinely altruistic motives, whilst any 
ideology, such as socialism, based on the notion of a shared common interest simply 
appears naive.
For others, the ideologies of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s can be blamed for the 
problems of the recent past. Their proponents may have been well meaning, but are 
considered to have been out of touch with reality. In the 1950s, Bell proclaimed the ‘end 
of ideology’ and the need for incremental social change in its place.17 The ideologies of 
the first half of the 20th century had brought economic disaster, war, death camps and 
concentration camps. Once again this is being heard through the concept of the ‘third
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way’. Kay proclaimed that ‘the big idea is that there are no big ideas’.18 Again ideology is 
seen as harmful, that all ideologies have attempted to impose unrealistic blueprints on 
long-suffering populations. Both the ideologies of socialism and the New Right are 
flawed, because all utopian visions are flawed. The aim now is ‘appropriateness’, 
institutions must adapt to specific social and economic contexts.
As such, in a downswing political climate it is not surprising that the idea of ideology 
ending should have gained popular approval. The political long-wave model, however, 
indicates that the distribution of power lies at the heart of the modem political struggle 
and that the ideologies of left and right flow from this struggle. Whilst an unequal 
distribution of power exists within society, ideology will remain important. Thus neither 
ideology nor the left and right are likely to disappear in the near future. The present trend 
is simply a temporary one, more apparent than real, neither new nor unique and ideology 
remains of potential importance. As such this thesis reinforces a trend that has become 
apparent within political science literature during the course of the 1990s. As a response 
to the perceived failure of rational choice models to explain certain decisions of policy­
makers, the importance of ideas, beliefs and ideologies are once again being considered.19 
Although coming from a different direction, this thesis indicates that it is on a left-right 
basis that they will most clearly be understood.
This thesis has argued that the fluctuating fortunes of the political and social 
movements of the left and right can be attributed to the presence of long-waves within the 
international economy. It also maintains that this results in a regular sequence of events 
that has a common set of causations. Hobsbawm maintained that each long-wave 
upswing and downswing brings with it a distinctive historical character, with its own
90particular social, political and cultural scene. Although each long-wave produces a 
common pattern of events, each one is also unique since its nature is also determined by 
the previous sequence of events together with a differing social structure and level of 
technology. The rise of a new upswing after the downswing of 1973-1998 is likely to 
bring with it new trends in political thinking and political science. If previous history is 
anything to go by, and this thesis strongly suggests that it is, the present largely 
conservative period will eventually give way to one that favours the progressive left. At 
such a time the concept of ‘progress’ will once again becomes popular. Presumably, it
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will also bring different attitudes, amongst other things, towards the importance of history 
and to concepts of ideology and of the left and right.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINING RIGHT and LEFT
The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ have been used widely within the parlance of modem 
political thought and are familiar concepts to most people. In general, it is usually easy to 
identify which parties and social movements belong to which half of the dichotomy. 
However, there is some disagreement as to which particular features of these parties and 
movements it is that determines on which half of the dichotomy they are placed. Further, 
at certain times in history it has also been popular to discredit both concepts and to claim 
that they are no longer relevant.
Using both an empirical and theoretical basis, the following discussion is aimed at 
identifying the essential feature that identifies why a party or social movement should be 
classed as ‘left’ or ‘right’. At the same time it also shows that not only are the left and 
right essential terms within the modem polities, but that they form the key ideological 
division of modem times and remain of continuing importance. The definitions arrived at 
in this appendix are those that are used to identify the left and right throughout the thesis.
A.1 A Brief History of the Left -Right Dichotomy1
The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ date back to the seating arrangement of the French National 
Assembly during the 1789 Revolution. The original left was the French ‘Third Estate’ - 
the middle-classes and the emergent bourgeoisie, classes that, across Europe and North 
America, in their stmggle to end the privileges and traditions of the aristocracy and 
landowning classes, were attracted to Liberalism, Radicalism and Republicanism 
throughout much of the 19th century. The stmggle engendered a commitment to progress, 
an optimistic view of human nature, egalitarianism and social reform, to pursue political 
reform and democracy, and also a commitment to the nation-state. Laissez-faire 
economics, opposition to protectionism and a commitment to free enterprise were 
initially the hallmarks of their economic ideology.
Much of the Liberal and Republican agenda was defined by their opposition to their 
opponents on the right - the ‘Second Estate’ - the landowners and nobility who defined 
and practised Conservatism for much of the 19th century. Conservative ideology
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supported imperial internationalism, privilege, tradition, the autocratic state, elitism, 
opposition to change and embodied a pessimistic view of human nature. In general, the 
landowning classes opposed the introduction of democracy and extensions of suffrage 
whilst seeking to preserve a highly elitist, and largely oligarchic polity, often based on the 
privilege of aristocratic birth. Power - be it economic, political or social - was to be 
restricted to small privileged elites, in contrast to Liberals and Republicans seeking its 
greater distribution and a more pluralistic society.
• • thThis ideological battle existed for much of the 19 century. In their struggle for 
political supremacy, however, both sides came to realize the limitations of appealing 
solely to their own, relatively small, class constituencies. On the left, the Liberalism, 
Radicalism and Republicanism of the industrial bourgeoisie and middle-class professions 
sought support from other progressive sections of society, notably sections of the 
working class, but progressives within the aristocracy and peasantry where possible. 
Likewise, on the right, the Conservatives and Monarchists sought support from the 
conservative peasantry and unskilled workers where possible. Left and right became large 
electoral alliances incorporating all sections of modem society.
However, as the pace of industrialization and democratization accelerated, the 
political agenda of the aristocratic/landowning class became increasingly defensive, and 
by the end of the 19th century, with one or two notable exceptions, it had largely been 
defeated or suffered serious setbacks. Significant concessions were made by the right to 
the democratic and parliamentary process, the creation of the nation-state, the importance 
of industry, in addition to civil rights and equality before the law. With these concessions
thmade, the bourgeoisie incorporated itself within ruling polities towards the end of the 19 
century. In the difficult economic period of the Great Depression, the interests of the 
bourgeoisie and landowners often merged to form a more modem version of 
Conservatism. The right remained committed to many of the its traditional political 
features -  the importance of elites and leadership, maintenance of tradition and 
opposition to reform and revolution, but these were increasingly based upon capitalism, 
the nation-state and parliamentarianism rather than on the old feudal order. Conservative 
and other right-wing movements transformed their allegiance whilst maintaining certain 
traditional features.
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Thus, a large degree of continuity existed between the Conservative movements of the 
19th century and the Conservative and Christian Democrat parties (and the Republicans in 
the USA since the 1920s), the movements most closely associated with the right in the 
20th century. Satisfaction with the existing power structures within society, and a 
commitment to preserving the status quo with regard to the distribution of economic, 
political and social power have maintained the conservative support for tradition and the 
retention of established privileges. Support for elites and a stress on the importance of 
their leadership and opposition to egalitarianism have all been important for these parties, 
and have thus remained continuities on the right.
However, conservatism has not always been prevalent on the right. On occasions 
reactionary tendencies have become more marked. Following periods of left-led reform 
and revolution, rightist attempts to reverse the egalitarian direction have often become 
more prevalent, though rarely totally eclipsing conservative tendencies. These have 
become prominent to reestablish a more elitist structure within society. Such tendencies 
have been typical of movements of the right such as Fascism and right-wing religious 
fundamentalism, but have also appealed to sections of Conservatism at certain times, 
notably in the 1920s and 1930s, but also in the 1970s and 1980s.
Despite claims of modernity and other differences, Fascism and other sections of the 
extreme-right in the 1920s and 30s shared certain similarities with the Conservatives of 
the early 19 century - opposition to democracy, liberalism, parliamentarism and equality 
before the law, whilst supporting a system of power confined to small oligarchic elites. A 
commitment to the leading role of the autocratic State-Church-Military alliance was often 
evident, indicating that it was the maintenance of an elitist-led society and opposition to 
egalitarianism that was the driving force behind these movements, despite claims to be 
acting in the national interest.
Although some Liberal movements persisted into the early years of the 20 century 
and pursued a radical agenda into the early decades of this century, it was the political 
movements associated with socialism that became prevalent on the left. Whilst their
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attitude towards capitalism differed markedly from that of the Liberals, at the same time, 
many of the features of Liberalism and Republicanism were taken up by Socialist, 
Anarchist and Communist movements in the late 19th and early 20th century. They 
continued to seek a greater distribution of political and social power, notably extensions 
of the democratic franchise, though with an increased emphasis on economic equality. 
This was based largely on a commitment to the working-classes and trade unionism, but 
also on support for other groups considered subordinate within society. As with the 
Liberals of the 19th/ early 20th centuries these movements became associated with reform 
and revolution, opposition to the existing order, and the ending of traditional elite 
privileges.
Thus a certain continuity existed between the left movements of Liberalism, 
Radicalism and Republicanism of the 19th century and the Socialism and Social 
Democracy (and the Democrats in the USA since the 1910s) of the 20th century.2 A 
commitment to a greater egalitarianism and wider distribution of power remained 
prevalent. In political and social terms, this was characterized by attempts to extend the 
democratic process, to pursue greater equality, to restrict privilege, and to bring 
marginalized groups into the mainstream. Their economic ideologies were, in one sense, 
markedly different, but both also had the aim of placing marginalised groups into a more 
advantageous position.
Thus, there is good reason to believe that there have been certain continuities, 
throughout the modem era, as regards the movements of the left and right. In general, the 
movements of the left have sought a more egalitarian society, be it in the economic, 
political or social spheres, and have been prepared to engage in reform and/or revolution 
to achieve their ends. By contrast, the right has preferred a more elitist and unequal view 
of society, together with the importance of leadership. As such it has usually been 
conservative in nature, preferring to preserve the status quo and traditional values. At 
times, however, it has actively reversed the egalitarian changes of the left, in order to 
preserve its ideological outlook. In addition, the parties of the left and right have also 
remained the most important movements within the field of political activity throughout 
the entire period, eclipsing all others that have sought to challenge them.
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A.2 The Left-Right Dichotomy
The theoretical literature, has indeed, recognized the importance of the left and right. 
The terms left and right are widely used throughout the literature of Political Science, 
Sociology, Political and Labour History, and are familiar to most members of the public. 
Since the inception of their use in 1789, the two terms have covered a wide range of 
political movements and ideologies, but have nearly always believed to have been a 
central feature of the political process. Cleavages within modem societies have been 
based on religion, region and a centre-periphery divide, but by far the most common 
within liberal democracies is that based on left and right, and many of the other cleavages 
can be seen as expressions of the wider left-right cleavage. Throughout Europe, South 
America, Japan and Australasia party systems have typically been based on a left-right 
cleavage. The replacement of a regional party system by one based on left and right in the 
USA during the 20th century has also made it typical in North America.
A number of features have been commonly associated with the terms left and right, 
giving rise to the two broadly distinguishable tendencies within the modem political 
process.3 However, their use is not always based on any consistent theoretical basis, 
leading to some confusion as to what the terms really mean. The Fontana Dictionary of 
Modem Thought lists the following features commonly associated with the two 
ideological movements:4
LEFT
1) Egalitarian
2) Reform/Revolution
3) Radicalism
4) Economic Intervention
5) Internationalism
RIGHT 
v. Inequality
v. Tradition
v. Conservatism
v. Laissez-Faire
v. Patriotism
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All these features are familiar within the literature dealing with the political process, 
but on closer inspection of the movements and ideologies associated with the left and 
right during the last two centuries, some appear to be more salient than others.
1) Historically, a commitment to a more egalitarian society has nearly always been a 
typical feature of the left. For the most part this has been based upon political, social and 
legal equality, though those doctrines based upon a belief in socialism have also pressed 
for greater economic equality. Most left movements have shown a commitment to some 
degree of egalitarianism, a tradition that runs through both Liberal, early Republican and 
Socialist thought. Early Liberal and Republican ideology emphasized the importance of 
egalitarianism in their struggles against the ascriptive politics of ruling monarchs and 
aristocracies. In practice, such equality did not always extend to the working-classes and 
it was often left to Socialist and Social-Democrat movements to press the case for the 
political equality of the working class.
A major exception to this trend, is probably only found in the Communist regimes of 
the Eastern and Soviet bloc, where Communist Parties, whilst prioritizing economic 
equality for most of their time in power, showed little interest in extending political and 
social equality. This was particularly so under Stalin from the early-1930’s onwards 
when he actually heightened political and social inequalities within the Soviet Union, 
though this tendency tended to dissipate following Stalin’s death. However, despite the 
promise of reform under Kruschev, this tendency was reversed under Brezhnev and his 
successors and it was not until the arrival of Gorbachev that the Communist party became 
committed to a more egalitarian political order in both the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe.
Most movements of the right have opposed significant extensions of political, legal, 
social and economic equality, and remained attached to a concept of elitism and the 
preservation of societies with widespread inequality. From the Conservative aristocrats 
of the 19th century to the parties of the right in the present day, significant moves in an 
egalitarian direction have been seen as opposing God’s natural order, as potentially 
destabilizing or as attempting to overturn ‘natural’ human behaviour. Either human 
beings are a naturally hierarchical species, or this is the most appropriate system to 
preserve law and order.
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Although Conservatives such as Bismarck and Disraeli have on occasion extended 
political equality, such cases tend to be rare, reluctantly taken and largely based on 
electoral calculation rather than an ideological commitment. A belief that ‘some are bom 
to rule, and some are bom to follow’ is more pervasive throughout much of the right. 
This gives rise to a belief in the importance of leadership and deference towards it - 
concepts rarely found within Liberal and Socialist thinking - although leadership has 
often been considered of great importance within Communist movements, notably with 
the personality cults of Stalin and Mao.
With regards to the concept of egalitarianism, recent decades have concentrated on the 
differences between the left and right over the question of social and economic equality, 
somewhat neglecting the fact that political and legal equalities were once a major 
battlefield for the two tendencies. Once considered, however, it should not be too difficult 
to see some form of continuation between the Liberal, Radical and Republican 
movements of the 19th century and the Socialist , and Social Democrat parties of the 20th 
century. Clearly egalitarianism in all its guises needs to be considered.
2) Since the days of the French Revolution most left movements have been committed 
ideologically to reform or revolution, whilst often showing contempt for tradition. 
Representing social classes and groups that have usually been excluded from the 
mainstream, left movements have sought greater social, political and economic inclusion, 
usually through reform, though occasionally by revolutionary means, and this has often 
entailed the ending of longstanding traditions. Once in power, parties of the left have 
attempted to effect major political reforms, though circumstances have often conspired 
against them leaving a checkered record of success. The major exception to this would : 
again be the Communist Parties of the Soviet bloc. Stalin effected economic and political 
reforms, but which did little more than centralize state power, whilst Brezhnev eventually 
proved to be very conservative in power. On the other hand there were reform periods in 
the late 1950s/1960s and in the period following Gorbachev’s rise to power.
On the right, most movements have placed great importance to tradition and the 
preservation of the status quo. A belief in the unchanging nature of human nature has led 
to an emphasis on political and social continuity and the preservation of established
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traditions - ones that are deemed to have worked successfully in the past. Even those that 
claimed to be effecting radical changes, for instance, the Fascist movements of the 1920s 
and 30s, they still placed their efforts within an ideological framework that emphasized a 
desire to return to a former ‘golden age’ - an age when traditions had been respected and 
when social order had remained intact. Likewise religious fundamentalists have 
advocated or imposed a system of social values commonly associated with an ancient 
past when religion remained of major social importance, and when, supposedly, this led 
to stability and order.
However, parties of the right have presided over periods of reform, indeed virtually all 
governments of whatever political persuasion institute at least some changes once in 
power. Equally governments of the left do not reform everything and often strive to 
preserve the previous achievements obtained by the left suggesting support for certain 
traditions. This would suggest that the concepts of reform and tradition are somewhat 
vague and needs to be more closely defined if they are to be of use in the left-right 
dichotomy.
3) Radicalism has been associated with the movements of the left since the early days of 
the Jacobin and Radical movements around the time of the French Revolution and 
continued with the Liberal Radicalism throughout the 19th century and early 20th century. 
Radicalism has been typically associated with a desire for rapid political, economic or 
social change. Although a radical agenda has often been part of left programmes, left 
parties have at times also presided over relatively quiescent periods throughout the last 
two centuries, suggesting the fact that Radicalism may only be intermittently important 
within the left, though clearly it is more common within the left than the right. Again, the 
Communist regimes of the Soviet bloc which periodically pursued conservative aims and 
policies are an exception, and in recent years parties of the left attempting to preserve 
social democracy have been accused of being essentially conservative and backward 
looking.
Conservatism has been typical of many of the movements and ideologies on the right, 
attempting to preserve the status quo, prevent major political change, and allowing only 
gradual and very limited changes, often with the intention of preserving the established
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order, as famously advocated by Burke. Where reform has been instituted it has often 
been with the intention of forestalling more radical change. However, movements of the 
right have from time to time often claimed to be pursuing radical change, notably those 
associated with Fascism and the extreme-right. Given that the original Radicalism was 
devoted to greater democracy, the extension of civil and human rights and greater 
political equality and economic opportunity for all, it is somewhat doubtful as to whether 
Fascist movements, which have tended to move in the opposite direction, can be classed 
as radical.
The use of the word ‘radical’ is only valid in the sense that their aims and motives are 
significantly different from the mainstream or established position. Given that there is 
clearly a sense of direction involved within this concept, the radical-conservative 
dichotomy may be insufficient and a radical-conservative-reactionary trichotomy would 
probably be more appropriate - those attempting to move in the opposite direction 
typically taken by radicals, being reactionaries. Again there seems a need for greater 
clarification of what is being changed radically and what is being conserved for this 
concept to prove of use in the left-right dichotomy.
4) In recent decades it is the economic intervention-laissez-faire dichotomy that has 
tended to be used most frequently to distinguish parties of the left and right. On closer 
examination it proves to be of little use, even within recent decades. Historically, on the 
left, Liberals, libertarian socialists, anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists have all been 
hostile to economic intervention by the state, whilst on the right, Fascists, Bonapartists, 
National Conservatives, and Conservative Parties in the nineteenth century have all 
supported greater economic intervention by the state.
Few governments of either the left or the right did not increase or maintain higher 
levels of state intervention in the economy between the 1930s and 1970s. Notable 
examples of those on the right who extended state intervention in the economy were the 
governments of Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Baldwin, Adenauer, De Gaulle, Heath and 
Nixon to name but a few. Typically greater state intervention in the economy was first 
associated with Bismarck and the German Conservatives. The trend towards
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protectionism started with Bismarck in Germany, and ushered in an era of greater state 
intervention.
It is sometimes claimed that the influence of socialism was instrumental in extending 
state intervention in the economy between the 1880s and 1970s. However, there are other 
explanations. The onset of protectionism allowed greater state leverage over economic 
interest groups and this could be used by both the left and the right once in power to 
pursue their ideological aims. Equally it has been claimed that it was the arrival of full 
democracy and the working-class as a major political force that forced governments of 
both the left and right to pursue moves towards a managed economy in the difficult 
economic circumstances of the 1920s and 30s.5 Added to greater levels of protection, the 
scope for state intervention in the economy increased substantially, pursued equally by 
left and right until the arrival of neo-liberal economics in the 1980s - a period that saw 
both parties of the left and right limit and reduce state intervention in the economy.
More importantly, a major problem with this dichotomy is that it tends to be value 
neutral, the argument has often been carried out in solely quantitative terms - how much 
state intervention, not why was it being done. Such a tendency tends to limit the 
usefulness of the concept, veering away from any qualitative evaluation of why the 
states’ role in the economy was extended, and whether parties of the left and right did so 
for the same or different reasons. It is possible that parties of the right extended state 
intervention in the economy in order to enhance the overall wealth of the nation, whilst 
the left sought greater economic intervention to improve the position of subordinate 
classes and groups within society, thus pursuing a similar trend for very different reasons.
5) The left has traditionally been associated with Internationalism - no doubt 
encouraged by the presence of the First, Second and Third Internationals - whilst the right 
has often been considered parochial, nationalist and inward looking. Patriotism in recent 
decades has been typically associated with the right, though originally nationalism was 
associated with the democratic contract between state and society and pursued by the left 
in opposition to the imperial internationalism of the aristocracy. Equally many nationalist 
movements have been leftward looking, notably those in the developing world struggling 
against colonialism and imperialism.
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At an economic level, Liberals of the 19th century supported a system of international 
free trade, whilst in recent years it has been the parties of the right that have supported 
economic globalization, and the left has often supported and defended the national social- 
democratic state. Whether international attitudes can be strictly applied to the left-right 
dichotomy, a dichotomy that deals essentially with domestic concerns, is perhaps 
doubtful, given the differences that exist between nation-states and within them. 
However, parallels between strong and weak states and the class system have been 
drawn, with the left supporting greater equality between nation-states, in a similar way to 
the greater equality desired between social classes. Possibly of more importance is why 
the left and right are supporting particular national and/or internationalist positions than 
the issue of nationalism versus internationalism per se.
A.3 Ideology and the Distribution of Power
The above discussion suggests that the issue of egalitarianism versus inequality is 
perhaps the most pertinent of the features of the left-right dichotomy and one that has 
been a consistent feature of the political struggle between the two tendencies over the last 
two centuries.6 The other features typically associated with the left-right dichotomy 
appear to be simply an expression of this issue. Attitudes towards reform, revolution, 
tradition, economic policy etc. all appear to be derived from the question of 
egalitarianism and the degree to which power is distributed or concentrated within 
society. Why should this be so, and why is it more important than other features?
The question of the distribution of power in modem societies has been studied by 
sociologists such as Parsons and Mann. Mann identified four main sources of social 
power - Ideological, Military, Economic and Political (IMEP model).7 Their exact 
configuration and their relative importance in different environments, he believed, have 
determined human history and the epochs in which it is divided. Thus there are different 
‘motors of history’ in each historical epoch/era/ mode of production, not one universal 
motor as claimed for instance by Marx and Hegel. In the modem era, for Mann starting 
around 1760, it was the Military and Economic sources of social power that created the
257
configuration of modem society. However, during the course of the 19th century Political 
and Economic sources of social power became the dominant forces that defined society 
up until 1914.8
In defining four sources of social power, he draws on the work of Talcott Parsons as 
to what forms of social power are crucial in the historical process. Following Parsons, he 
identifies two forms of power:9
1) Distributive Power - the power of actor A over actor B. For B to acquire more power, 
A must lose some.
2) Collective Power - the joint power of actors A and B co-operating to exploit nature or 
another actor, C.
Thus the struggle for distributive power is a zero-sum game, whilst that for collective 
power is a positive-sum game, though the co-existence of both will clearly lead to a more 
complex struggle in which both struggles for power overlap. Thus there are two forms of 
social power, and in order for humans to access or enhance these powers, the four sources 
of social power - Ideological, Military, Economic and Political - need to be utilized. For 
Mann, it is this process that drives history forward - the stmggle for collective and 
distributive power.
Mann maintains that the beginnings of the modem era saw a massive increase in the 
level of collective power. The Industrial Revolution and the modem nation-state helped 
bring about “an unparalleled, truly exponential transformation in the logistics of 
collective power” that has vastly increased the collective economic and political powers 
of the human race.10 However, he also states that whilst collective power underwent a 
vast qualitative change, this was not the case for distributive power - “distributive power 
was transformed less during this period than theoretical tradition suggested. Classes and 
nation-states did not revolutionize social stratification.”11
If, as Mann maintains, there was no fundamental alteration in the distribution of 
power accompanying the revolution in collective power in the late 18th - early 19th 
centuries, is it likely that such a scenario would remain for a considerable length of time? 
With such a mismatch in the changes concerning the two different forms of power it 
might be expected that they constituted a series imbalance within modem society. With
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new forms of collective power creating potentially powerful organizations and social 
classes it is unlikely that they would settle for a situation where there was an extremely 
unequal distribution of power. It could be expected that this configuration would sooner 
or later face serious challenges, as the newly arising social classes and organizations 
sought access to the collective power created by the political and industrial revolutions at 
the end of the 18th century. This has, of course, been the case.
In pursuing this struggle, however, Mann believes that no Ideological social power has 
significantly contributed to the historical process in the period 1760-1914. In a discussion 
on the impact of ideology, he considers the differing ideologies that have supported the 
aims of nations and social classes and concludes that these only had a limited impact in 
defining the form of social relations between 1760 and 1914.12 However, he appears to 
have underestimated the importance of ideology in the modem era.
Mann identifies two manifestations of Ideological power - the ‘transcendent’ and the
1 'I‘immanent morale’. The transcendent shapes whole societies, as Christianity and other 
world religions did in the agrarian era immediately prior to the Industrial Revolution. He 
sees no transcendent Ideology in the modem era, though he fails to consider the 
possibility that Enlightenment thought, and the patterns of thinking derived from it, might 
have served as a transcendent Ideological social power throughout the modem era.
Immanent morale enhances the power of existing organizations, but he believes that 
neither nations nor classes achieved this to a degree that was significant enough to 
fundamentally define the early modem era. His evidence for this is largely based on the 
failure of specific ideological movements to significantly alter society. Firstly, the failure 
of Chartism in the 1840s and its replacement by an organized labour movement that 
supported the dominant Liberal cause. Secondly, the failure of Socialist movements to 
determine the nature of the ruling polity in the period prior to World War One leads him 
to believe that class-based ideologies have failed as an immanent morale. Equally, he 
maintains, no specific nationalist ideology was able to define the political direction of any 
of the major powers throughout the long 19th century. 14
However, by concentrating on ideologies attached to working class movements, he 
appears to neglect the importance of bourgeois and aristocratic ideologies - notably those
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of Liberalism, Radicalism, Conservatism and Republicanism. Further, this leads to the 
role of ‘ideology’ itself being downgraded, whilst, in fact, it clearly had a major impact at 
the political level, with all the successful political movements of this period being 
attached to a particular ideological cause.15
The economic and political revolutions of the early modem era did indeed transform 
collective power arrangements without a corresponding qualitative change in the 
distribution of power. These revolutions created the modem nation-state and gave rise to 
the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle and working-classes. Without a change in the 
distribution of power these social classes had little or no control over the political process 
- still largely in the hands of aristocrats and landowners - whilst the presence of the 
nation-state offered the means by which this situation could be significantly altered.
History shows that the imbalance between the creation of an enhanced collective 
power and the lack of a qualitative change in the distribution of this power has led to the 
stmggle for distributive power becoming the dominant political stmggle of the modem 
era. In an attempt to alter the imbalance in the two forms of power at a domestic level, 
politics has been dominated by the question - to what degree should power be distributed 
within society? In practice, all political movements have found it necessary to address 
this question, for it has proved impossible to neglect such a salient issue. In addressing 
the matter of distributive power two major, though diverse, tendencies have resulted - 
those seeking to restrict the extent of distributive power, and those seeking to diffuse its 
extent. In an ideological form this has manifested itself in the left-right dichotomy.
It could be considered that the left-right dichotomy, in its various manifestations, has 
served as an ‘immanent morale’ for actors A and B as they stmggle for control of the 
forces that determine the distribution of power. Much of the modem political process can 
be understood with reference to this stmggle, although such a stmggle has not always 
been straightforward. Collective Power, in the modem era, has resided chiefly within the 
nation-state and the modem business company. Power stmggles have manifested 
themselves at the level of international relations and business competition - which are 
beyond the scope of this thesis - but clearly overlap and complicate the stmggle for 
distributive power -  power stmggles within nation-states and within the workplace.
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Mann appears to have underestimated the salience of the left-right dichotomy. On one 
level he seems to arrive at this position by attempting to identify ideologies too closely 
with social classes and nations; on another, the underestimation may well derive from his 
belief that means, not motivation, is of greatest importance in defining social relations. 
The nature of the democratic process and of numerical supremacy within the democratic 
framework has forced class ideologies to broaden out and encompass other social classes. 
Political movements and parties are often strategic alliances that recognize the 
importance of numerical supremacy, whilst social groups and classes still retain their own 
distinct aims within those alliances. The result has been to create the left-right dichotomy.
A.4 Definition of the Left-Right Dichotomy
From the above theoretical and empirical discussions, it thus appears that there is little 
reason for dispensing with the left-right dichotomy as some writers have indicated. It is 
firstly a valid concept, since it can be seen that certain features have remained consistent 
to both tendencies throughout the last two centuries. But not only this, for secondly, the 
left-right dichotomy can not only be used coherently, but it is also central to 
understanding political change in the modem era. Left movements are associated with 
progressive political, economic and social change. They are characterized by support for, 
or enactment of changes that lead to a greater distribution of political, social or economic 
power. Throughout the last two hundred years, this has been the essence of left-wing 
politics. In contrast, parties and movements of the right have opposed greater distribution 
p f economic, political and social power, wishing to either preserve inequalities in power 
distribution or to actually intensify them. This has remained the essence of right-wing 
politics throughout the modem era.
The Three Forms of Distributive Power
Within the realms of the wider political arena, three forms of distributive power have 
proved of importance in the stmggle between the left and right and in their stmggle to 
gain hegemonic supremacy. Throughout the last two centuries social, political and
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economic power have all been contested by the two tendencies. Although, in the highly 
complex societies of the modem era, the three forms of distributive power clearly interact 
and overlap, to some extent the typical features of each can be identified separately.
Typically, within the realm of the left-right dichotomy, economic power can be seen 
as containing two important aspects - the distribution of economic wealth within a given 
society and the control of the means of production and distribution. Moves towards a 
more equal redistribution of wealth and collective control are associated with movements 
and parties of the left, in the belief that this will create a fairer society and one with a 
greater level of collective freedom. In addition there is likely to be less alienation and 
thus a more inclusive and well-functioning society.
Those on the right prefer to preserve the present inequalities of wealth and control or 
even further concentrate economic wealth within economic elites. They do so in the 
belief that such a scenario is either natural and inevitable, that it allows elites to invest 
greater levels of wealth thus benefiting wider society or that too wide a distribution of 
wealth removes the incentive to work productively. Distribution of wealth differs from 
the aim of enhancing the total wealth of a specific society or nation, a process more 
associated with generating collective power, though clearly this may also have far 
reaching effects on the nature of society. Only if  the extra levels of wealth were divided 
more equally within the society would the distribution of economic power factor become 
relevant
Redistribution of wealth through taxation and other forms of state intervention in the 
economy have been typically associated with social liberalism, social democracy and 
reformist socialism, although both at times have also advocated some form o f industrial 
democracy. However, often the struggle for the distribution of economic power has 
centred upon access to the means of production. In the 19th century, Liberals and 
Republicans sought to challenge the legal and social practices supported by the 
aristocracy that restricted the means by which wealth could be created. In the 20th 
century, with control of economic power within the workplace unequally distributed, 
Socialists, Communists and Anarchists/Syndicalists have periodically sought to achieve 
greater collective involvement in the running of industry. In general this has been
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opposed by the forces of the right, most commonly on the grounds that the preservation 
of private property is essential for the working of a successful economy and for the 
preservation of individual freedom.
Political power in the modem era has tended to revolve around access to the state, 
the ruling polity and the process of government. Clearly moves towards greater 
democratic suffrage, or qualitative improvements in the democratic process increase the 
distribution of political power, whilst moves towards dictatorship and its maintenance 
restrict the distribution of political power.
From the days of the French Revolution, the left has sought greater access to the 
mechanisms of political power - namely the ruling executive. In general, this has resulted 
in efforts to extend the democratic suffrage, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to 
achieve civil equalities and pursue wider access to the mechanism of state power. At 
times this has involved the establishment of constitutional rights as well as the formal 
process of extending the democratic process. In general, the aim has been to create a 
wider access to the levers of power.
In general, especially during the 19th century, the right has sought to keep control of 
the political process restricted to small, exclusive and privileged minorities. A belief that 
only these people could be trusted to understand and respect the responsibilities of power, 
whilst any extension in the distribution of power could lead to chaos and instability was 
prevalent. Even after the introduction of full democracy, the right has sought to keep this 
to a formal minimum, simply respecting the electoral process, whilst resisting any 
deepening of the democratic process, for instance, moves towards direct democracy.
Social power, though used in many ways, in this context revolves largely around the 
legislative process but also through the more ambiguous concept of cultural assimilation. 
In general, the left has sought to extend the level of social inclusion of once-marginal 
groups, be it through a process of instituting laws, such as those that legalized the 
economic activities of the industrial bourgeoisie and the trade-unions in the early modem 
era, or those attempting to extend equal rights to women, ethnic minorities and 
homosexuals in recent decades in order to create a more socially-inclusive society.
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Although equality before the law is a powerful factor in creating social inclusion, in 
general this has been accompanied by attempts to create an ideological or cultural climate 
in which such inclusions become socially acceptable to wider sections of society.
In opposition, the right has usually feared centrifugal social forces, preferring 
peripheral groups to accept the mainstream culture or existing hegemony. Opposed to 
egalitarianism, the right has preferred social exclusivity and opposed attempts toward a 
greater cultural and social pluralism, in the belief that existing traditions should be 
respected and that too much heterogeneity leads to disorder and instability. Existing 
institutions should continue to dominate their respective spheres of influence and that 
increased social diversity may eventually lead to the dissolution of the existing order and 
an end to respecting the leadership of the present order.
In general, the efforts of the left have been to create a more inclusive and pluralistic 
society in the three related spheres - the economic, political and social, whilst the right 
has tended to prefer a greater degree of exclusivity and uniformity within the three forms 
of power. From this the following definitions of the left and right can be derived and it is 
these that are used throughout the thesis.
Political Spectrum 
LEFT
Progressive - those aiming to, or enacting gradual progressive changes in the distribution 
of social, political and economic power, thus creating a more pluralistic, more inclusive 
and more equal society.
Radical - those aiming to, or enacting significant transformations in the distribution of 
social, economic and political power through rapid change. Their aim is to create a 
society that is considerably more inclusive, more pluralistic and more equal. 
Revolutionary - those aiming to, or enacting a total transformation in the distribution of 
social, economic and political power through revolutionary means. Their aim is to create 
a society that is as inclusive and equal as possible.
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RIGHT
Reactionary - those aiming to, or enacting changes that result in a reversal of previous 
distributions of power. They destroy progressive measures by means of concentrating 
power within narrower confines than those previously existing, thus creating a less 
pluralistic and more unequal and exclusive society.
Conservative - those aiming to, or enacting the preservation of the status quo in terms of 
the distribution of power. No significant changes in power distribution are considered or 
enacted. Given that the distribution of power is usually uneven within industrial/post­
industrial societies, this usually amounts to support for a certain degree of political, 
economic and social exclusion and inequality.
Summary
The above discussion shows that the distribution of power is central to the modem 
political process and the most appropriate criterion for drawing a distinction between left 
and right. The left-right cleavage has become the predominant cleavage in modem party 
systems since no other concept has concerned the political parties and movements of the 
modem era more than the distribution of power. Left and right are terms which, contrary 
to some recent speculation, are absolutely central to the understanding of modem politics, 
since both main tendencies have defined themselves around this issue.
For the most part, using attitudes towards the distribution of power to define the left 
and right does not lead to a significant break with the features traditionally associated 
with both the left and the right, rather it creates a more specific set of criteria.16 The left is 
associated with reform, egalitarianism, and radical or revolutionary change, but these all 
revolve around the distribution of power - to diffuse power through reform or radical 
change in order to create a more equal society. The right is associated with tradition, 
conservatism and inequality, all with the aim of restricting the distribution of power - to 
maintain the existing power stmctures and defend the status quo and a more elitist view 
of society.
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1 This history is based partly on the political trends described in Chapter 2, but also taken 
from; A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Tavistock Publications, 1964, pp.382-384; and 
from D. Caute, The Left in Europe Since 1789, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1966. Caute 
uses the concept of ‘popular sovereignty’ to define the left - i.e. those in favour of it - and 
thus excludes the more moderate Liberal and Republican movements of the 19th century 
from the left, since they were only in favour of limited extensions of ‘political popular 
sovereignty’. He seems to indicate that these movements belonged to the centre, though 
he offers no definition of the centre, neither of the right - though presumably the latter is 
constituted by those who oppose ‘popular sovereignty’.
He maintains that the left, originally made up of Radical Liberals, Socialists and 
Republicans, shifted its emphasis from ‘political’ to ‘economic popular sovereignty’ 
towards the end of the 19th century because the former had largely been achieved, and 
that the left from 1914 onwards (1905 in France) can only be identified by its 
commitment to the latter. Presumably this is also because most movements of the right 
and centre came to accept ‘popular political sovereignty’, and a dichotomy based on 
acceptance of popular political sovereignty would be almost meaningless. In making this 
shift of emphasis he also excludes Keynesians and Social-Democrats from the left, along 
with the largest sections of the Socialist parties, for they did not make the transition from 
supporting political sovereignty to supporting economic sovereignty. Only the left wing 
of the Socialist parties and small Marxist parties constitute the left in the 20th century, 
according to Caute, leaving the vast majority of the political spectrum in the centre or the 
right.
2 This was also the case with .Communist movements until the late 1920s, when the shift 
to Stalinism and the later polarisation of the Cold War saw these parties take on many 
characteristics more typical of the authoritarian regimes of the 19th century. In particular 
Communist parties in power were highly conservative and extensions in the distribution 
of power were often forced upon them. Where Communist parties remained in 
opposition, as in the developed and developing world, their rhetoric was more typical of 
that of the left. Whether this would have translated into the typical programme of left 
governments once in power has been widely questioned, since Communist parties were 
often under instructions from conservative elites in Moscow.
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The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Oxford University Press, 1993, 
associates the left with “demands for greater popular sovereignty and democratic control 
over political, social and economic life” pp.531-532. The right is characterized by its 
opposition to the left and is made up of parties and movements committed towards 
advancement of conservative economic, social and political ideas.
A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Tavistock Publications, 1964, pp.381-384, 
associates both the left and right with over a dozen typical features, far too many to be of 
use in defining the two concepts.
4 Fontana Dictionary of Modem Thought, A. Bullock & O. Stallybrass (eds), Fontana 
Press, 1977, pp.470-471, 747-748.
5 This is the line argued by Booth to explain the transition to managed economies in the 
1930s. It was considered electorally damaging for political parties to follow deflationary 
policies and cut levels of pay. A. Booth, ‘Britain in the 1930s: a managed economy? 
Economic History Review 2nd series XL 4 pp.499-522.
6 Bobbio arrived at a similar position. After discussing the concepts of equality and 
liberty he believed that only the former was useful in defining the terms left and right. 
However, Bobbio saw the left and right’s attitudes to equality as being more relative and 
antithetical in nature; the position taken by one side of the dichotomy being a response to 
that taken by the other. N. Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political 
Distinction, Polity Press, 1996.
7 M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1986, 
pp.22-32; Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.6- 
10.
8 M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993,
pp.1-2.
9 Taken from M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University 
Press, 1986, pp.6-7; Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 
1993, pp2-3; see also T. Parsons, Structure and Process in Modem Societies, Free Press, 
1960, pp. 199-225.
10 M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
pp.12-13.
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11 M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993,
p.16.
12 M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
Chapters 7 and 20.
M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1986, 
pp.22-24; Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.7.
14 M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
Chapters 7 and 20.
15 A similar case could also be made for ‘nationalism’, for although nationalist 
movements may have had a limited impact, the concept of nationalism itself clearly had 
an enormous impact on the social and political relations of the 19th century.
16 The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Oxford University Press, 1993, 
p.531, maintains “the Left has been associated with demands for greater popular 
sovereignty and democratic control over political, social and economic life”, a not 
dissimilar concept to a greater distribution of political, social and economic power.
268
APPENDIX B: DATING LONG-WAVE PERIODS
The Empirical Basis for Long-waves.
In order to follow any correlation between the political fortunes of the left and right, 
and long-wave economics it is first necessary to establish the dates to be used. Amongst 
long-wave researchers there is no universal agreement on the exact dates that each of the 
four long-waves span, though there is some degree of approximity (see Chapter 1). Some 
dates are more controversial than others; whilst certain dates, notably those of the second 
long-wave, appear to be widely accepted. The following discussion will explain the dates 
used throughout the thesis through the use of the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on long-waves, but also by use of an additional empirical account of the four 
long-waves that have occurred so far.1
This is far from easy though, for a number of reasons. Firstly, statistical data for the 
19th century is widely regarded as limited in accuracy. According to the methodology 
used, in particular when using weighted indexes, widely varying results can be obtained 
for levels of economic growth. This is particularly so in the early 19th century where an 
additional problem is also encountered. This period often marks the changeover from an 
agrarian to an industrial economy for many nations. Given the considerably different 
productive capacities of agrarian and industrial economies, even a poorly performing 
industrial economy (in a downswing for instance) should outperform a prosperous 
agrarian economy (in an upswing) giving the anomalous result of a downswing 
outperforming an upswing.
In a similar vein, van Duijn considered the problem of identifying long-waves whilst 
national economies were also experiencing the differing rates of growth typical of the 
different stages of Rostow’s stages of growth sequence, take-off periods supposedly 
recording faster growth than the maturity phase, also leading to possibly anomalous 
results. Ultimately, he considered that only the international level could be used to date 
long-waves, since this would eliminate national peculiarities.2
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Secondly, a problem is the way that much of the economic history data has been 
presented. Often it is compiled in such a way as to help resolve disputes within the 
literature of economic history. Much of the economic data for the 19th century has been 
presented to support positions within the debate centreing around Rostow’s stages and 
take-off theory, or in Britain on the ‘standard of living’ debate. In France it is used to 
compare development with other nations in order to explain France’s apparently slow 
economic development. Much of this data is presented to establish linear data sets, often 
specifically eliminating cyclical effects and is thus of little use to long-wave research.
Thirdly, there is the usual problem of accounting for political bias, those favouring or 
opposing capitalism tending to emphasize the tendencies which best highlight their own 
position. As such, economic crises, for instance, maybe almost completely ignored or 
downplayed, or alternatively presented as widely present or typical. Whilst there are also 
more specific problems. The existence of wars in particular makes it difficult to assess 
economic trends in certain periods given the often hugely disruptive effect of hostile 
confrontations.
Notwithstanding these problems, this appendix will attempt to establish a set of dates 
defining each long-wave and which can be used as a basis for the chronological history of 
Chapter Two. To do so, it will mostly draw on the existing empirical literature and data 
within the field of economic history, though certain theoretical concepts within the field 
of long-wave economics will also be used.
B.l First Long-Wave.
Of the four long-waves, the first is the least well defined. The dates most commonly 
used by long-wave theorists for the entire first long-wave are 1789/93-1848. Those for 
the end of the upswing are more diverse. Most accounts use 1813/14 since prices rose 
before this date and fell in the period afterwards until 1848. Screpanti uses 1820 as this 
marks the end of a period of proletarian unrest in Britain,3 whilst Mandel uses 1825 since 
he maintains the rate of profit in Britain fell from this point onwards until 1848.
Although price series for this early period show marked variations almost all agree 
that a strong surge in prices began around 1793 and lasted through to 1814. There then
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followed a prolonged though erratic decline through to 1848.4 However, recent 
theoretical work has shown that price movements are not entirely concomitant with 
changes in the long-wave,5 and the price surge may have had little to do with the internal 
workings of the economy. The years 1793-1814 coincide closely with the years of the 
Napoleonic Wars. The period of inflation may simply be the result of commodity 
scarcities brought on by the war at a time of rising demand.
Elsewhere, the first long-wave upswing is associated with the technological 
innovations that drove the Industrial Revolution, namely those in the textile and iron 
industries, famously in the work of Schumpeter.6 These innovations drove an 
entrepreneurial impulse that is usually seen as marking the beginnings of the industrial 
era and setting the British, and later world, economy on an industrial footing from which 
all subsequent developments followed. According to this schema, the initial impulse 
came to an end around 1815. The period that followed from 1815 to the 1840s has 
usually been seen as a period,
“characterized first of all by a steep and prolonged fall in prices...and by a fall in 
interest rates. The fall in prices weighed both on the profit margins of firms and on 
money wages, which fell notably. ( ) A second characteristic was the violence of short­
term cyclical fluctuations, with very pronounced booms, as in 1818, 1825, 1836 and 
1845, followed by violent slumps and long depression. These slumps and depressions 
often combined traditional aspects (i.e. high food prices due to bad harvests) with a 
modem look (i.e. over-production and unemployment). They plunged the working classes 
into utter penury and unleashed a wave of business bankruptcies.”7
In other words the economy in this period was suffering from wild fluctuations and a 
boom and bust economy, with declining prices and profits weighing heavily upon both 
industrial and agricultural sectors. However, the fact that the period also experienced 
periods of strong economic growth has led to revisionist accounts questioning the original 
gloomy picture of the 1815-1840s period. A number of accounts indicate that economic 
growth may have been stronger in the downswing period. Crafts et al. supplied figures for 
rates of growth of industrial production of 1.58% for 1790-1811 and 3.2% for 1811-31, 
although Cuenca Esterban using a different weighting index for the cotton industry 
supplied figures of 2.595% and 3.345% for the same periods.8 Van Duijn gives growth
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figures of 3.2% for 1782-1825 and 3.5% for 1825-45 and concluded there was little 
evidence for a first long-wave.9
After a review of the empirical data, Lloyd-Jones & Lewis commented that “What we 
can conclude from these various estimates is that the rate of growth during the Industrial 
Revolution is still an “open question”, and, rather than appealing to aggregate estimates 
of growth based on fragile empirical evidence, we might do better to develop “a deeper 
knowledge of what was happening in Britain during the industrial revolution”.” 10
The early nature of industrial capitalism and the paucity of reliable economic data do 
make this period especially difficult to evaluate concisely, and much of the evaluation of 
this early period is based on description rather than empirical data. The business cycle 
itself was only just beginning to appear within the industrialising regions of Britain, and 
was far from being a national or international phenomenon. The timing of the business 
cycle often varied from region to region, and even from town to town. Thus the use of 
dates for trade-cycles is somewhat haphazard, though those from the most strongly 
industrialising regions -Lancashire, Yorkshire, West Midlands - are probably the most 
significant, given the close association of industry and the business cycle.
In Britain during the early period, despite the Napoleonic Wars, the general business 
climate appears to be good. In terms of business cycles, Gayer et al., identified a series of 
major and minor cycles between 1793 and 1826, with major troughs in 1793, 1803, 1811, 
1819 and 1825, and peaks in 1802, 1810, 1818 and 1825.11 However, the period between 
1793 and 1803, is generally one of economic difficulties, notably between 1793 and 1797 
with erratic performance until 1803. After 1803, the effect of harvests is played down 
with the fortunes of the textile industry increasingly important in defining the business 
cycles - thus 1803 appears to mark the beginning of the ‘industrial business cycle’.
The fact that the years up to 1818 and from 1820-25 are generally recognised as boom 
periods for the British economy also questions whether Britain was in a long-wave 
downswing at this point. Most historical accounts indicate that the British economy 
continued to boom from 1820-25, with high levels of employment, rising real wages, a 
booming stock market, low interest rates and much financial speculation -  economic 
conditions more typical of a long-wave upswing.12
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The early period was also marked by an upsurge in political and industrial action only
ending with the Peterloo massacre of 1819 and the passing of the repressive Six Acts.
Screpanti marks the end of the upswing as 1820, largely on the basis of the widespread
1 1industrial and political unrest that existed from around 1808 until 1820. Even after this 
though, organised labour, according to labour history accounts enjoyed improving levels 
of union membership and organisation. In addition, Owen’s brand of co-operativism 
flourished within the artisan and craft union movement, and the agitation for trade-union 
legalisation gained support and success in 1824, unleashing a wave of strikes. In fact this 
period appears to be a prosperous one for workers.
According to Flinn,14 in an analysis of around a dozen price indexes for 1750-1850, 
prices revived after 1815/16 and again after 1820/22, falling sharply only in 1825. In an 
analysis of the movement in real wages, Flinn maintains that they just about keep up with 
price rises in the period up to 1813. From 1813-1825 overall prices declined by 65-80%, 
and whilst wages also fell, they fell far more slowly, leaving real wages at a level of 25- 
30% higher than prices (handloom weavers were an exception). From 1825 onwards, real 
wages either stagnated or rose only marginally. The period from 1813 to 1825 would, 
according to Flinn’s figures, be a prosperous one for the working class.
However, Flinn makes no mention of unemployment other than that the rise in real 
wages must have been compensated for either by a rise in unemployment or in employers 
accepting a loss of profits. Feinstein, however, assumes unemployment rates of 5% from 
1770 until 1815 and 8% from 1815-1848, and siding with the pessimists in the standard 
of living debate concludes that real wages progressed only very slowly over the entire 
period, although 1813/17 until 1833/37 showed a continuous improvement. This finding 
he believes corresponds with observations that for the working-classes the years from the; 
mid-1820s through to the 1840s were particularly difficult with mortality rates increasing 
and nutritional standards declining.15
The early period ultimately ended with a financial crash and banking crisis in 1825, 
partly because much of the stock-market speculation had been unwise. Thus despite the 
underlying decline in profits for manufacturers, if it occurred, it would be difficult to 
describe the period up to 1825 as an economic downturn, as is the case with most long­
wave theorists - Mandel being an exception. The economic and financial crisis in 1825 is
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also seen as impacting negatively on Britain’s trading partners, inducing recession in a 
number of countries.
The year 1825 was marked not only by a banking crisis and stock market crash, but 
also an employers’ offensive in Britain, and some evidence for this occurring elsewhere. 
The employers’ offensive would presumably result from the previous rise in real wages 
and a need to regain profitability. Labour history accounts regard unemployment and 
underemployment as rising significantly in the following period. The union and co­
operative movement did eventually mount resistance to these attacks during the period of 
1829-33/4, but the strike wave and general unionism, despite early progress, ended in 
crushing defeat. Recovery for the union movement only really occurred in the mid-1840s. 
This period coincides with an observation made by the Webbs that, “The period between 
1825 and 1848 was remarkable for the frequency and acuteness of its commercial 
depressions”, that is, “the serious declines of 1826,1829, 1837, 1842 and 1848”.16
• 17According to Matthews, the years 1826-33, despite two short-lived recoveries in 
1827-8 and 1830-1 that failed to gain momentum, were generally poor years for the 
economy with recovery from the crisis of 1825/6 only really occurring in 1833. A boom 
followed in 1835/6, fuelled by lower interest rates but came to an abrupt end in 1837, a 
short-lived and shallow recovery followed but quickly gave way to what is often 
considered the worst depression of the 19 Century in 1841-2. The following years did 
however, see a general improvement in the economy with the tentative rebuilding of the 
union movement, and the early development of New Model Unionism from around 1843 
onwards. The economic recovery peaked in 1846, followed by the recession of 1848 
which was comparatively mild and short-lived.
Elsewhere, economies were still overwhelmingly agrarian in nature. Empirical data is 
even less in evidence and less reliable than that in Britain, notably for the agrarian sector, 
and data that does exist tends to concentrate on the industrial sector which only accounted 
for a very small percentage of the economies of France, Germany and the USA. Overall 
growth rates were thus low and performance more a result of climatic variations than as a 
result of business cycles. France and Germany experienced economic crises in 1810/11, 
1816-17, 1830-1 1839-40 and 1845-7 as a result of poor harvests.18
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However, a number of trends have been noted. Evidence in the early period is sketchy, 
though there is a general consensus that both the French and German economies 
improved under Napoleon despite the crisis at the end of his reign. From here the trend 
appears to be downwards. Crouzet showed growth to be above trend in France though 
declining until 1825. Industrial production declined and then stagnated during the 1820s, 
rising only from 1830 onwards, slowly at first and then rapidly from 1840. Growth 
remained well below trend from 1825 to the mid-1840s, but was rising sharply from 
around 1840, though the events of 1847-50 induced a sharp deterioration.19 Although 
growth resumed from the 1830s, Price considers the years of the July Monarchy (1830- 
48) to be particularly difficult ones, ten of these years being beset by crisis. Crises of 
overproduction occurred in 1825-6, 1828-32, and 1846-7 with a commercial crisis in 
1837-42 added to the agricultural crises mentioned above. Many of these crises resulted 
from events in Britain.20 The German economy had also recovered from the slowdown 
after 1815 by 1830; industry grew in the 1830s, but more rapidly in the 1840s until the 
poor harvests of 1846-7 and the revolutionary period that followed.21
In the USA there is a general consensus that the economy improved until Jefferson’s
22trade embargo in 1807, though growth remained largely above trend through to 1818. 
The picture is less clear afterwards, David maintains growth accelerated at 1.96% per 
capita from the mid-1820s through to the mid-1830s, though Weiss has downgraded this 
to 1.2%, and at 1.6% per capita through to the mid-1840s. Growth was below trend for 
the 1820s but positive for the mid-1830s boom through to the panic of 1837, performance 
was then erratic until the latter half of the 1840s.24
Thus in terms of dating the upswing/downswing transition* no dates are entirely 
satisfactory. No country shows clear economic trends in accordance with long-wave 
theory, and van Duijn rejected the idea of a first long-wave, starting his long-wave 
sequence in the 1840s. Most economies show the typically slow growth of agrarian 
societies and variations marked by poor harvests. In the USA, the economic climate is 
generally good until 1819, depressed in the 1820s, booming between 1830 and 1837 and 
depressed or erratic until the mid-1840s. In France and Germany, the economy is
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improving through to the late 1810s, generally poor in the 1820s and although growing in 
the 1830s and 1840s, prone to crisis.
In Britain the entire period is one of a boom and bust economy, possibly with the 
strongest period of growth coming after 1819. In the early period major dips in the 
business cycle appeared in 1811 and 1819 and the economy expanded strongly through to 
1825. This period saw shorter depressions and apparently lower levels of unemployment. 
In general this period was less prone to crisis. From 1825 onwards the economy 
experienced a series of severe depressions with troughs appearing in 1825/7, 1831/32, 
1837/42. With the exception of the boom of the mid-1830s the period from 1825-42 is 
one of recurrent crisis. Prices are also falling and the working class experiencing high 
levels of difficulty. Recovery appears to have occurred after the deep depression of 1842, 
with the recession of 1848 being relatively mild in nature. In addition, the price trend was 
falling, damaging profitability and forcing wages down. Of the dates usually used by 
long-wave researchers 1825 appears the best, but is still problematic.
Given the close link between long-waves, the business cycle and the modem 
industrial economy and the fact that Britain was the only industrialising economy at this 
point, it seems appropriate to define the dates of the first long-wave by using the British 
economy. The dates for the first long-wave upswing are 1803-1825. Industrial business 
cycles for the early period would appear to be 1803-1811, 1812-1819 and 1820-25. The 
dates for the first long-wave downswing are thus 1825-1848. Appropriate dates for the 
business cycles seem to be 1826-32, 1833-1842 and 1843-48, the latter being the 
recovery period.26 This accords with Schumpeter's schema of both the upswing and
97downswing consisting of three business cycles each.
It is doubtful whether any endogenous long-wave trend can be observed elsewhere. 
The appearance of any long-wave trend in other, still agriculturally-based economies, 
would probably be a result of Britain’s pre-eminent trading position - with booms and 
depressions being exported through the rise and fall of trade and capital flows, but also 
existing alongside the rhythms of good and bad harvests. Thus, if long-wave economics
appear to be occurring in other economies, this seems to be primarily a result of the long-
28wave becoming established m Britain.
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B.2 Second Long-Wave
The dates usually given for the second long-wave seem to be almost universally
90accepted amongst long-wave researchers. The date for the start of the second long-wave 
upswing is usually put around 1848, whilst the end is around 1872/75. The end of the 
downswing is usually given as 1893/96. Traditionally the two periods have been known 
as the mid-Victorian boom (1848-73) and the Great Depression (1873-96), although both 
concepts have been challenged in revisionist accounts.
Hobsbawm has also given the earlier period the name the ‘Age of Capital’ (1848- 
1875). For Hobsbawm, “the extraordinary economic transformation and expansion of the
years between 1848 and the early 1870s was the period when the world became
capitalist and a significant minority of ‘developed’ countries became industrial 
economies”.30 Most long-wave researchers recognise this period to be one of strong 
economic growth, generally rising prices and wages, low unemployment and general 
prosperity. Industrialisation during this period spread to much of Western Europe and 
parts of North America. Van Duijn shows world industrial production peaking in the 
years 1850-56 and 1866-72.31 Dips in the business cycle came in 1857/8 and 1866/7,32 
were felt throughout the industrialised world, but both were relatively mild, short-lived 
and had only a limited impact on employment and growth levels.33 In particular, the years 
1850-56 and 1867-73 were periods of very rapid growth and economic boom.
In Britain, Kindleberger described growth as very rapid from 1851-66, recession in 
1867 and boom until 1873.34 This picture has been challenged however, largely on the 
basis that the period may not constitute a . coherent period. Most of the growth it is 
claimed came in the 1850s and after 1866, the period in between being fairly average in 
nature, though Mitchell shows steady economic growth in the years 1859-1866 
inclusive. This in itself would not refute the idea that the period constitutes a long-wave 
upswing and after a review of the economic literature on this period Lloyd-Jones & 
Lewis concluded that there was sufficient empirical evidence to consider this period as a 
long-wave upswing,.36
In France, Crouzet identified the period from 1840-1860 as showing the strongest 
period of growth in the long 19th century, with the economy slowing after 1860 and
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eventually stagnating after 1882.37 However, his work also showed that despite a 
slowdown in growth after 1860, growth remained above trend for most of the period 
through to 1876, apart from a sharp dip during the Franco-Prussian war. Thus growth 
remained largely buoyant even during a slowing of pace. In Germany the period is 
generally recognised as one of strong growth and an expanding economy to the point that 
Rostow used the years 1850-73 as those of the take-off period.38
The American economy does, however, appear to be something of an exception. 
Growth was strong until the panic of 1857, and although recovering, both growth and 
business activity were severely diminished during the period of the civil war. Although 
the economy accelerated and business activity improved from the mid-1860s onwards, 
growth remained below trend and it was not until around 1870 that the USA once again 
enjoyed a boom economy, though van Duijn shows industrial production peaking in the 
period 1864-73.39 This economic boom was enjoyed elsewhere, notably in Britain and 
Germany, though France suffering the consequences of the Franco-Prussian war and the 
Paris Commune only partially benefited.
The period from 1866-1873/4 - the third business cycle of the upswing - was marked 
by a period of prolonged and intense worker unrest across all industrialising countries, 
notably after 1869. Coinciding with the First International and the Paris Commune of 
1871, a militant strike wave struck both the core and periphery regions of the 
industrialised world.40 In general the strikes were successful in raising wages, improving 
working conditions and in reducing the length of the working day. The strike wave came 
to a halt shortly after the financial and banking crisis of 1873. This crisis began in 
Austria, but spread rapidly to Germany and USA in particular and saw widespread 
bankruptcy and rising levels of unemployment follow. Although its effects soon entered 
the British and French economies, the slowdown here was less dramatic. Thus 1873 is 
usually considered to mark the end of the second long-wave upswing.
The dates usually used for the second long-wave downswing are those of the Great 
Depression - 1873-1896 41 - a period of generally falling prices, falling profits, periods of 
very high unemployment and general economic malaise, all of which followed the 
financial crash of 1873. Economic growth slowed and Thomson considers the worst years
278
in Europe to have been 1873-9, 1882-6 and 1892-6.42 Van Duijn showed world industrial 
production reaching a trough in the years 1872-1883.43 However, the severity varied from 
country to country, and the period, despite its name, was not one of unrelenting 
depression, at least not economically speaking.
For the USA and Germany, 1873-9 were probably the worst years, as both 
economies suffered from prolonged depression, falling prices and persistently high 
unemployment. Van Duijn shows industrial production reaching a trough in Germany in 
the years 1872-82, though in the USA, in the years 1882-95.44 Kitchen attributed the 
longevity of the depression in Germany in the 1870s due to the initial difficulties of 
employers to break the power of organised labour, reduce costs and thus launch a 
recovery. An increase in protectionism after 1878 was the chosen method for reviving the 
economy.45
Both countries saw economic revivals from around 1880 onwards. In Germany the 
revival was short-lived, prompting calls from certain quarters for an imperialist expansion 
as a means of reviving the economy.46 The economy did boom for a short period in the 
mid-1880s but fell back into recession. In the USA, the recovery was particularly strong 
and this period marked the switch from an agrarian to a mainly industrial economy. 
Depression returned from 1884 onwards however, and although the economy grew once 
more, apart from a short-lived revival in the early 1890s, growth remained below trend 
until around 1898 47
In Britain the downswing was less evident initially, though export performance 
deteriorated as trading partners went into depression. The worst years came from 1878/9 
onwards, years .that saw a widespread employers offensive to break the power of the 
unions and unemployment rising to over 10%. Recovery followed though another
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recession in the years 1884-87 saw unemployment rise over 10% once more. Industrial 
production reached a trough in the years 1883-90.49
In France, the period from 1873-1897 has been described as one of persistent 
economic stagnation, though certain periods were worse than others.50 According to 
Crouzet, stagnation was predominant between 1882 and 1896, whilst growth was below 
trend in almost the entire period between 1876 and 1896 apart from brief spells in the 
early 1880s and early 1890s.51 After the crash of 1873 whilst economic malaise was less
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severe in France initially, it did see the launch of the Freycinet plan to stimulate the
♦ * S9economy through public infrastructure projects and railway construction. However, the 
plan had the effect of sucking in imports and damaging exports. In 1882, when the plan 
was abandoned, economic depression followed until 1886 together with a general trend 
towards protectionism which culminated in the Meline tariff of 1892.53
The rise of the third cycle from around 1888 onwards marked the ‘recovery period’ - 
the period marked by a mini-boom that gave rise to the so-called New Unionism in 
Britain and trade-union revivals came in all countries between 1888-92, falling back in 
the more depressed times of 1893-6. The USA - whose economy still had a large 
agricultural sector - probably experienced its sharpest depression of the period in 1893 - 
following a series of bad harvests at the same time as a downturn in the business cycle. 
From 1896 onwards, prices began to rise and the European economies showed an 
immediate and continued improvement in economic growth. This was also the case in the 
USA though unemployment was somewhat slower in falling from a high level of 18.4% 
in 1894 to single figures after 1898.54 The business cycle was highly volatile with 
relatively severe peaks in unemployment interspersed with periods of economic revival.55 
Moving from trough to trough, the business cycles appear to be 1873-79/80, 1880-84/5, 
and 1884/5-1895/6 - the troughs being 1873, 1879, 1884-5 and 1893.56
One ‘side-effect’ of the Great Depression, however, was the boost given to economies 
on the periphery of the world economy -notably those of Sweden, Russia, Argentina and 
Brazil, but also elsewhere. The failure to raise profitability within the industrialised world 
led to investors pouring money into periphery economies during the 1880s - a trend that 
led them to be temporarily counter-cyclical. Investment schemes ran into financial 
difficulties in the 1890s, however, leading to a series of financial crises, notably in 
Argentina and Brazil.57
B.3 Third Long-Wave
Dates given by long-wave researchers for the third long-wave are probably the most 
divergent.58 The third long-wave upswing is usually maintained to have begun between 
1893/8, most usually 1896. However, the end date is more controversial - usually given
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as either 1913/14 or 1920. Kondratieff originally used 1920 as this marked the peak in the 
price rise that had started in 1896. From 1920 through to the 1930s the trend was 
downward. The former figure is often used because of the outbreak of WW1 or because
tVimost economic historians use 1913 as the end of the long 19 century; data sets being 
presented using this as a dividing year. In other cases the use of 1913/14 maybe more 
political in nature. Mandel does so, his grounds for doing so appear to be guided by 
Marxist theory - the desire to place the Russian Revolution and the following 
revolutionary episodes within a period of economic crisis. The presence of the First 
World War (1914-18) clearly confuses the picture, with many researchers using the 
date’s 1914/20 as a compromise.
The presence of conflict makes 1914 the date that marks the end of the long 19th 
century but this is used more for political rather than economic reasons. The conflict did 
however cause widespread destruction within continental Europe leading to absolute 
declines in industrial output and poor economic figures in certain countries. Figures 
supplied by Maddison indicate that it was those countries closest to the theatre of conflict 
that suffered most, notably France, Germany, Denmark and Finland. Elsewhere, those 
further from the conflict such as Britain, the USA, Italy, Canada, Norway and Japan 
continued to experience growth, often rapidly.59 Maddison also indicated that poor 
figures for 1914 and 1919 probably resulted from the difficulties of switching to and 
away from war production. The period through to 1920 was still marked by low 
unemployment, however, averaging 1.65% in the UK, 3.2% in Germany and 4.8 % in the 
USA during the years 1914-20 inclusive.60 The war economies ran on maximum 
production and most countries experienced a post-war boom in either 1919 or 1920, 
though collectively Maddison gives low growth figures for 1919-1921.61 Prices rose 
dramatically after the war whilst demand was strong. Most countries experienced a 
concerted period of intense worker mobilisation and a marked pay explosion.
It is thus not surprising that many long-wave researchers have used 1914/20 as a 
compromise. The economic indicators for the period 1914-20 are mixed. However, the 
negative factors are clearly a result of an exogenous force, WW1, and away from the 
conflict many economies continued to boom and unemployment remained very low 
throughout the period. In addition, following Schumpeter’s theoretical model of three
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business cycles per upswing and with worker mobilisation and prices peaking around 
1920, there appears to be a good, though not entirely satisfactory, case for including the 
years 1914-20 within the economic expansion of the third long-wave upswing.
The year 1896 saw a rapid turnaround in the fortunes of the world economy.62 World 
industrial production rose from the trough of 2.7% in the early years of the Great 
Depression to average over 4% during 1892-1913.63 Economic growth until 1913 
averaged 3.24% amongst industrialised economies compared with 2.36% in the years
1873-1896 (see Table 2). France, Germany and the USA are all considered to have 
enjoyed strongly expanding economies in the period through to 1913, though Lloyd- 
Jones & Lewis consider Britain to have largely missed out on this expansion, with the 
exception of the financial sector and the export economy.64 This period not only 
witnessed a prolonged economic expansion, but also saw the industrial world expand in 
geographic scope. A number of countries that had commenced industrialisation in the late 
1880s - Russia, Sweden, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Australia were 
joined by others such as Spain, Italy and Canada. Together with the core economies, 
those countries untouched by war hostilities experienced a prolonged period of economic 
expansion until 1914/20.
In general, unemployment remained low in the period up to 1920 (see Table 1) when 
employment levels fell sharply, unemployment reaching 11.3% in the UK and 11.7% in 
the USA in 1921, the highest levels since the 1880s/early 1890s. The periods of recession 
were relatively mild, without unemployment levels reaching the peaks it had in the Great 
Depression, figures rarely reaching 7 or 8% in Britain, Germany or the USA even in the 
worst years.6'
The years 1896-1920 also witnessed a general rise in prices, which peaked sharply in 
the years 1915-20, notably after 1918. The latter is often attributed to the end of WW1,66 
but the period also coincided with an intense wave of worker militancy, strike waves, 
insurrectionary general strikes and attempted revolutions. The period of worker militancy 
varied from country to country, but began around 1910 and though it slackened during 
the early years of WW1, it renewed from 1917 onwards, reaching a crescendo in the
fnyears 1918-1920. It is more likely that the price inflation of the post-war years resulted
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from the rapidly rising wages, shorter hours and improved work conditions achieved by 
organized labour during this period.68
The pattern of the business cycle varies somewhat from country to country, and in 
particular is confused by the financial crisis of 1906 in USA. According to Schumpeter, 
depression came in the business cycle in 1903/04 with a second appearing in 1914 but 
which was cut short by WW1. He considers the years 1907-08 to be an ‘intermezzo’ 
caused by the financial panic of 1906, a panic that resulted from the faulty functioning of 
the financial system and that bore no relation to the actual economic situation. In Britain 
troughs came in 1903/04,1908/09 and 1913,69 though the second of these appears to have 
been induced by the downturn in USA. For the world economy downturns came in 
1902/04, 1908, 1914, and 1919-21.
The most appropriate date for the end of the third long-wave downswing would appear 
to be 1920, rather than 1914, and endogenous economic problems quickly developed 
during this and the following year. All economies experienced a sharp depression in the 
early 1920s, for some the first since the period of the Great Depression. Unemployment 
levels peaked sharply in Britain and the USA in 1921. The years that followed were 
marked by economic and financial instability, very high unemployment, falling prices, 
though also a period of hyperinflation in Germany,70 and slow economic growth notably 
in Europe, Japan and Latin America.71 In Germany unemployment reached 13.5% in 
1924 and 18% in 1926, whilst it averaged over 7% in the UK in the 1920s,72 the high 
levels, according to Broadberry & Ritschl, being a result of real wages outstripping 
productivity growth.73
Recovery followed between 1924-9, notably in USA, France and Scandinavia, though 
very poorly in Britain, USSR, Italy and Japan, but everywhere the recovery eventually 
proved unsustainable. In France, although growth expanded strongly from 1924 onwards, 
financial instability was not removed until 1926, following the implementation of the 
Dawes plan of war reparations. Germany’s recovery was largely financed through 
borrowing from American banks -  a result of the large capital outflows during WW1, 
whilst French recovery was based on war reparations paid by Germany. In the USA, 
recovery was initiated through tax cuts and lowering interest rates, though much of the
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extra money was used for financial speculation rather than more sound investment. The 
bubble economy ended with the Wall Street Crash of 1929. ‘The Slump’ of 1929-34, not 
only devastated the US economy, its effects were felt throughout the rest of the world 
economy.
In terms of industrial production the 1930s were the worst peacetime decade on record 
with world industrial production reaching a trough of 1.6% between 1929-37.74 In 
general, those countries that had suffered the least in the 1920s suffered the most in the 
1930s. France remained mired in depression between 1932-38 whilst unemployment
nc # .
averaged 18% between 1931-41 in the USA. Elsewhere unemployment remained in 
double figures almost everywhere until the outbreak of WW2, though in Germany only 
until 1936. In Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan economic performance was somewhat 
better than elsewhere, though recovery was relative rather than absolute. The introduction 
of managed economies throughout most of the developed world in the 1930s, allowed
7 f \governments to engineer a ‘recovery’ through price rises and increased demand. The 
generally hitherto straightforward correlation between prices and long-waves was thus 
broken.
The dates given for the end of the third downswing are usually 1940 or 1948. The 
different dates are usually a result of researchers viewing the differing experience of the 
European and North American economies during the Second World War (1939-1945). 
Whilst WW2 clearly gave a concerted boost to the USA economy around 1941/3, the 
military devastation of the war badly damaged the European and Japanese economies, 
with the result that their economies were not able to expand until after the conflict, 
usually from 1948 onwards. As a result some researchers have used 1945 as a 
compromise, also, conveniently, the end; of WW2.
However, in the light of long-wave theory and the tentative nature of the economic 
recovery from the dip of 1937/8 until the outbreak of war, the period from 1938 until 
1948 is better seen as the ‘recovery phase’ of the downswing. Despite this recovery phase 
being strengthened in USA by war production, the US economy fell sharply from 1945-7, 
largely a result of shifting to a peacetime economy and trend growth fell back sharply 
during 1945-50.77 Given the international nature of long-waves and taking the world
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economy as a whole, prosperity and the long post-war economic boom did not really 
begin to occur until 1948 onwards.78
The dips in the third long-wave downswing are those of 1919/21, 1930-34, 1937/8 and
791945-47. The first two were particularly protracted, the second being by far the worst, 
witnessed slow recoveries, saw very high levels of unemployment - a key feature of the 
whole period - and low levels of economic activity, and slow economic growth. Above 
all, the period between 1920 and 1948 is marked by economic instability and high levels 
of unemployment and these appear to be the best dates for the third long-wave 
downswing.
B.4 Fourth Long-Wave
The fourth long-wave upswing is commonly known as the post-war boom or Golden
SOAge o f Capitalism. Hobsbawm describes the years from 1945-1973 as the ‘Golden 
Years’, to be followed by ‘The Landslide’ after 1973. Most long-wave researchers agree 
that the long post-war boom of 1940/8 to 1970/3 marks the fourth long-wave upswing, 
though the price peak of 1979/80 has led some to use a later date.81 The period was 
marked by sustained economic growth across the international economy, increased 
industrial production and gradually rising international trade; rapidly from the late 1960s 
onwards, van Duijn shows world industrial production peaking at 5.9% between 1948-66. 
Employment and growth rates remained high throughout the entire period (see Tables 1& 
2), whilst interest rates and inflation rose slowly until the late 1960s when they rose more 
rapidly.
To some extent the correlation of three business cycles per upswing broke down 
during the fourth upswing. At the time there was much speculation that the use of 
Keynesian demand management techniques and other features of social democracy had 
eliminated the business cycle from the capitalist economy. Dips in world economic 
growth came in 1954 and 1958, but with no real slowdown until 1970-1 though even here 
growth averaged 3.7%. The world economy finally fell badly in the years 1974-5, 
averaging -  0.45% growth.82
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The period ended with a wave of worker militancy that most long-wave researchers
• 0*5date from 1968 until 1974. Although anti-capitalist tendencies occurred within the new 
industrial militancy, much of the strike activity was aimed at improving working 
conditions and raising wages. The latter were certainly successful, major economies 
seeing sharp increases in real wages.84
Most longrwave researchers use 1973 as the beginning of the fourth downswing. The 
end of the post-war boom was perhaps triggered by the oil crisis of 1973, and 
compounded by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, but others have considered
Q C
that it was the wage-push of the previous years that constituted the greater problem. 
However, in contrast to previous upswing-downswing transitions, the situation in 1973 
was somewhat different to before, with prices rising rather than falling at the beginning 
of a downswing. Attempts were made to pass on wage rises in the guise of price 
increases. When unemployment started to rise with the dip in the business cycle and the 
oil crisis in 1973, the result was stagflation, a period of rising unemployment, rising 
inflation and declining economic growth which characterised much of the 1970s.
Exacerbated by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods scheme, massive rises in the price 
of oil and a prolonged decline in the early 1970s of the stock-markets, the world economy 
entered the prolonged economic crisis of the fourth long-wave downswing. Since the 
decline of the world economy in 1973, economic growth has been markedly lower than 
during the previous 25 years (see Table 2). Although economies recovered somewhat in 
the mid-1970s, the worst of the downswing came with the depression of 1980-3 - 
unemployment levels reaching their highest levels since the 1930s. Unemployment 
remained high throughout the 1980s, (7% in the USA, 9% in the UK, 8.2% in Germany 
and 9.3% in France) despite a boom fuelled by low interest rates in the latter part of the 
decade. With a further recession from 1990-3, the period, in economic terms, was 
probably the worst since the 1930s.
The only region of the world economy to, temporarily, buck this trend was the 
peripheral economies of Southeast Asia. Boosted by foreign investment, these economies 
were able to grow counter-cyclically, in much the same way as the economic periphery 
did during the second long-wave downswing of 1873-1896. However, these economies
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eventually met the same fate as those of Argentina and Brazil in the 1890s, when they 
entered the economic and financial crises of 1997/98.
Dates for the end of the fourth long-wave downswing have not, in general, been 
forthcoming, from long-wave theorists, sometimes for theoretical reasons. Mandel,
o / r
calling the period from 1948 onwards ‘Late Capitalism’ and, believing that long-wave 
upswings are exogenously-inspired and a non-cyclical phenomena, clearly believed that 
this downswing represents the death throes of international capitalism, and thus there will
• 87be no following upswing.
Hobsbawm believes that the downswing probably came to an end in the mid-1990s 
and suggested that the economic crisis of 1997-8 might mark the end point.88 This would 
be borne out by using the guide of three business cycles per downswing, the fourth long­
wave downswing has had downturns in 1974-5, 1980-82, 1990-92 and 1998. Thus the 
fifth long-wave upswing should appear from around the year 1999 onwards. Such a 
prediction is concomitant with the idea that the third business cycle of the long-wave 
downswing is a recovery period. Many of the major economic problems of the fourth 
long-wave downswing - inflation, unemployment, high interest rates, - appear to have 
receded during the period of 1992-1998, notably in North America and parts of Western 
Europe.89 This then appears to be the ‘recovery phase’ of the fourth long-wave
• tVidownswing - the fifth long-wave, thus being due to start very late in the 20 century.
Thus the dates that appear most suitable for the four long-waves that have so far 
occurred are and that will be used throughout this thesis are:
Long-Wave Upswing Downswing (Recovery)
First 1803-1825 1825-1848 (1843-1848)
Second 1848-1873 1873-1896 (1888-1896)
Third 1896-1920 1920-1948 (1938-1948)
Fourth 1948-1973 1973-1998 (1992-1998)
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Table 1. Unemployment rates (%) 1855-1998
Britain France Germany USA
1855-1873 3.6 n.a. n.a. n.a
1874-1895 5.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1896-1920 3.37 n.a. 2.43 5.9
1921-1948 7 n.a. 12.16 9.6
1949-1973 2 1.6 3.36 4.8
1974-1998 7.36 9.53 7.6 6.67
Source: 1855-1993, B.R. Mitchell (1998, 1998); 1994-1998, Datastream.
Table 2. Economic Growth rates (%) 1840-1998
Europe
Total GNP per capita GNP
1842/44- 1867/69 2 1.2
1867/69- 1889/91 1 0
1889/91 -  1913 2.4 1.5
1913-1950 0.57 0
1950- 1973 4.5 n.a.
Source: Bairoch (1976) (1913-1950 excludes USSR).
Per capita national product (% change)
USA France Germany UK
1840- 1860 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.7
1860- 1875 1 1.1 2.1 1.5
1875- 1890 2.4 0.5 0.8 0.8
1890- 1.9 1.2 1.6
Figures for 1920-1939 and 1946-48. 
Figures for West Germany.
Figures for West Germany until 1990. 
Figures are for 1859-79.
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Year to year Percentage Change in Aggregate GDP 
of 16 Advanced Capitalist Countries.5 
1873-1896 2.36
1897-1913 3.24
(1914-1920 0.54)
1921-1947 2.36
1948-1973 4.73
1974-1989 2.76
Source. Maddison (1991)
Annual average compound growth rates
USA France Germany UK
1913-1950 2.84 1.15 1.06 1.19
1950-1973 3.92 5.02 5.99 2.96
1973-1992 2.39 2.26 2.3 1.59
Source: Maddison (1995).
Gross Domestic Product (% change)
USA France Germany UK
1950-1973 3.97 5.24 7.33 3
1974-1998 2.62 2.2 1.87 1.95 }
Source: 1950-73 The Economist (1982); 1974-1998 OECD (1992), United Nations
(1999).
5 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan after 1885, 
Netherlands afterl900, Norway, Switzerland after 1899, United Kingdom, USA.
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1 Existing empirical literature includes: M.N. Cleary & G.D. Hobbs, The Fifty Year 
Cycle: A Look at the Empirical Evidence, in C. Freeman, (ed) Long Waves in the World 
Economy, Butterworths, 1983. The authors find strong empirical evidence for the 
existence of long-waves in price series, long-term interest rates, world energy production 
and technological innovation. H.H. Glismann, H. Rodemer, & F. Wolter, Long Waves 
in Economic Development: Causes and empirical evidence, in C. Freeman, (ed) Long 
Waves in the World Economy, Butterworths, 1983. The authors found empirical evidence 
for the existence of long waves in fluctuations in the development of national product, 
investment, and employment. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, NLB, 1975, the author found 
empirical evidence for the existence of long-waves in fluctuations in growth of industrial 
output, volume of world trade, and long-term rate of interest.
2 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
3 Screpanti considered that each long-wave came to an end because of a period of 
widespread and generalised militant industrial unrest, which was responsible for the 
following economic downturn. E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring 
Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 7, no.2, pp.509-548.
4 M.W. Flinn, ‘Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850’, Economic History Review, 27/3 
August 1974, pp.395-411.
5 See for instance; E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, NLB, 1975; R. Lloyd-Jones & M.J. 
Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial Revolution, UCL Press, 1998; 
J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983; C. 
Freeman, (ed) Long Waves in the World Economy, Butterworths, 1983.
6 J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Volume I, McGraw-Hill, 1939.
7 F. Crouzet, The Victorian Economy, Methuen & Co. 1982. Crouzet then goes on to 
challenge this description.
8 Figures cited in R. Lloyd-Jones & M.J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the 
Industrial Revolution, UCL Press, 1998.
9 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
10 R. Lloyd-Jones & M.J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial 
Revolution, UCL Press, 1998, p.20.
290
11 A.D. Gayer et aL, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy 1790-1850 
Volume II, Clarendon Press, 1953, pp.531-550.
12 For example, E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working-Class, Penguin 
1968; R.K. Webb, Modem England: From the 18th Century to the Present, George Allen 
& Unwin, 1980.
13 E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 
7, no.2, pp.509-548; Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation, British 
Journal o f Industrial Relations, 1987,25, No.l, pp.99-124.
14 M.W. Flinn, ‘Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850’, Economic History Review, 27/3 
August 1974, pp.395-411.
15 C.H. Feinstein, ‘Pessimism Perpetuated: Real Wages and the Standard of Living in 
Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution’ The Journal o f  Economic History, Vol. 
58 No.3 Sept. 1998 pp.625-658.
16 S. & B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, (2nd. Edition), Longmans Green & Co. 
1920, p. 180.
17 R.C.O. Matthews, A Study in Trade-Cycle History: Economic Fluctuations in Great 
Britain 1833 -1842, Cambridge University Press, 1954, pp.202-224.
18 C.M. Cipolla, The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Emergence of Industrial 
Societies Part One, Collins/Fontana, 1973; J. Bouvier, Le Mouvement de profit en 
France au XIX siecle, Mouton & Co., 1965; J-P. Daviet, Nouvelle histoire economique 
de la France contemporaine: L’economie preindustrielle 1750-1840, Editions La 
Decouverte, 1993; C. Heywood, The Development of the French Economy 1750-1914, 
Macmillan, 1992; B.W. Poulson, Economic History of the United States, Macmillan, 
1981; G.M. Walton & R.M. Robertson, History of the American Economy (5th 
Edition), HBJ, 1983; G.M. Walton & H.Rockoff, History of the American Economy, 
HBJ, 1990.
19 F. Crouzet, ‘Un indice de la production industrielle fran^aise au XIX siecle.’ Annales 
Economies Societes Civilisations, 1970, No. 1 pp. 56-99; also M. Levy-Leboyer, 
‘Croissance economique en France au XIX siecle’ Annales Economies Societes 
Civilisations, 1968, No. 4 pp.788-807.
20 R. Price, An Economic History of Modem France 1730-1914, Macmillan, 1981.
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21 P. Mathias & M.M. Postan, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe Volume 
VII, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
22 J. Atack & P. Pasell, A New View of American History (2nd Edition), Norton & Co. 
1994.
23 T. Weiss, ‘Economic Growth Before 1860: Revised Conjectures’ in T. Weiss & D. 
Schafer (Eds.) American Economic Development in Historical Perspective, Stanford 
University Press, 1994.
24 J. Atack & P. Pasell, A New View of American History (2nd Edition), Norton & Co. 
1994.
25 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
26 Schumpeter arrived at the position that long-waves could, in certain respects, be seen 
as long-term business cycles. As such, they contained a periodisation of prosperity- 
recession-depression-recovery, with the recovery period coming late in the long-wave 
downswing. J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Volume I, McGraw-Hill, 1939. This 
schema was also followed by van Duijn, though the dates used for his recovery periods 
were not always identical to those of Schumpeter, J.J. van Duijn, ‘Fluctuations in 
innovations over time’, in C. Freeman, Long-waves in the World Economy, 
Butterworths, 1983.
27 Schumpeter maintained that each long-wave consisted of six short-term business 
cycles, three in each of the two phases. Presumably this helps to give a degree of 
temporal regularity and structure to long-waves. His dates for the First Kondratieff of 
1786-1842 are; 1787-1793, (depression in 1794), 1795-1805, 1805-1814, 1814-1823, 
1823-1833 and 1833-42; J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Volume I, McGraw-Hill, 
1939, pp.220-302. Most long-wave researchers have, however, used 1848 as an ending 
date for the first long-wave, and as such a different set of business cycle dates would be 
necessary.
28 A possible alternative explanation is that an ‘agrarian long-wave’ was in existence and 
coincided with the industrial long-wave being established in Britain.
29 Goldstein, averaging data from 33 long-wave theorists arrives at the dates 1848-1872 
for the upswing and 1872 to 1893 for the downswing. J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: 
Prosperity and War in the Modern Age, Yale University Press, 1988, p.67. Schumpeter
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used 1843 as his starting date in order to fit the period of railway building in the 1840s 
into his schema, but his use of this date has not been widely followed.
30 E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Abacus, 1975, p.43.
31 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
32 E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Abacus, 1975, pp.46-47, Hobsbawm 
considers the trough of 1856/7 to be the first truly international economic slump, p.85; R. 
Lloyd-Jones & M.J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial Revolution, 
UCL Press, 1998, p.66. The authors consider the years 1857 and 1866 to be one of 
financial crisis and economic stress within the British economy.
33 E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Abacus, 1975, pp.46-47.
34 C.P. Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain 1851-1950, Harvard 
University Press, 1964.
35 B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, Cambridge University Press, 1988.
36 R. Lloyd-Jones & M.J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial 
Revolution, UCL Press, 1998.
37 F. Crouzet, ‘Un indice de la production industrielle ffan9aise au XIX siecle.' Annales 
Economies Societes Civilisations, 1970, No. 1 pp. 56-99.
38 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto (3rd 
Edition), Cambridge University Press, 1990.
39 J. Atack & P. Pasell, A New View of American History (2nd Edition), Norton & Co. 
1994; A.W. Niemi Jr., U.S. Economic History (2nd Edition), Rand McNally, 1980; J.J. 
van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
40 E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, Abacus, 1975, pp. 138-141. Kelly 
and Screpanti date the strike wave from 1869-1875, J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial 
Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long-Waves, Routledge/LSE, 1998, p.89. E. 
Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, Review, 7, 
no.2, pp.509-548; Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation, British 
Journal o f Industrial Relations, 1987, 25, No. 1, pp.99-124. Cronin dates the crucial strike 
wave to 1871-1873, J. Cronin, Stages, Cycles and Insurgencies: The Economics of 
Unrest, in T.K. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, (Eds.) Processes of the World-System,
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pp. 101-118, Sage Publications, 1980; Industrial Conflict in Modem Britain, Croom 
Helm, 1979
41 The fact that industrial production continued to expand, often rapidly, throughout this 
period has led to revisionist accounts amongst historians claiming that the Great 
Depression is little more than an illusion. For a detailed and convincing refutation of this 
claim, see E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1987, pp.34-46.
42 D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, Penguin, 1966, p.390.
43 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
44 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
45 M. Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914, Croom Helm, 1978.
46 M. Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany 1815-1914, Croom Helm, 1978.
47 J. Atack & P. Pasell, A New View of American History (2nd Edition), Norton & Co. 
1994.
48 B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1993 (4th Edition), 
Macmillan Reference, 1998.
49 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
50 Y. Breton, A. Broder, & M.Lutfalla, La Longue Stagnation en France: L’Autre 
Grande Depression 1873-1897, Economica, 1997; M. Levy-Leboyer, La Deceleration de 
L’Economie Fran9 aise dans la second moitie du XIXe siecle5, Revue D ’Histoire 
Economique et Sociale 49 pp.485-507, 1971.
51 F. Crouzet, ‘Un indice de la production industrielle frangaise au XIX siecle.5 Annales 
Economies Societes Civilisations, 1970, No. 1 pp.56-99.
52 Y. Gonjo, Le “Plan Freycinet”, 1878-1882: un aspect de la ‘grande depression5 
economique en France. Revue Historique, 248, July-Dee 1972.
53 J.-J. Carre, P. Dubois & E. Malinvaud, French Economic Growth, Stanford 
University Press, 1975.
54 B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993 (4th 
Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998.
55 For the British economy, Sayers gives the following dates for troughs in the trade cycle, 
1879, 1886, and 1893, and for crests, 1882-3, 1889. R.S. Sayers, A History of Economic 
Change, 1880-1939, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.32.
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56 Schumpeter dates the Second Kondratieff as 1843-1897, though his followers have 
tended to revert to the more usual dates of 1848-1895/7. He dates the Juglar cycles 
(moving from prosperity - revival) as 1843-51, 1852-60, 1861-1869 (though these years 
he maintains are blurred by political crises and difficult to discern), 1870-1879, 1879- 
1888 and 1889-97.
Prosperity Recession Depression Revival
1. 1843-5 1845-7 1848 1849-51
2. 1852-56 1856/7 1858 1859/60
3. 1861 Too blurred to discern distinctly 1869
4 1870-72 1872 1873-77 1879
5. 1879-81 1881/3 1883-85 1886-8
6. 1889-91 1891/3 1893-5 1896/7
J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Volume I, McGraw-Hill, 1939, pp.303-397.
57E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, Abacus, 1987, pp.46-55.
58 Goldstein gives the average dates of 1893-1917 for the upswing and 1917-1940 for the 
downswing. J. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale 
University Press, 1988, p.67.
59 A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, No. 121, June 1977, pp. 103-137.
60 B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993 (4th 
Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998; B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: 
Europe 1750-1993 (4th Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998.
61 A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, No. 121, June 1977, pp. 103-137.
62 Hobsbawm discusses the differing explanations and implications of this rapid change in 
the rhythm of the world economy. E.H. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, 
Abacus, 1987, pp.46-55.
63 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
64 R. Lloyd-Jones & M.J. Lewis, British Industrial Capitalism since the Industrial 
Revolution, UCL Press, 1998; J.-J. Carre, P. Dubois & E. Malinvaud, French 
Economic Growth, Stanford University Press, 1975; M. Kitchen, The Political Economy
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of Germany 1815-1914, Croom Helm, 1978; J. Atack & P. Pasell, A New View of 
American History (2nd Edition), Norton & Co. 1994.
65 B .R  Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993 (4th 
Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998; B .R  Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: 
Europe 1750-1993 (4th Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998.
66 The tendency amongst writer’s to blame war on the events that follow it seems to be 
widespread but often contradictory. The fact that the end of the Napoleonic Wars brought 
price deflation, whilst the end of WW1 brought price inflation and the end of WW2 made 
little impact either way suggests that these may be greatly exaggerated.
67 Kelly and Screpanti date the strike wave from 1910-1920, J. Kelly, Rethinking 
Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long-Waves, Routledge/LSE, 1998, 
p. 89; E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies,
.Review, 7, no.2, pp.509-548; Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 
British Journal o f Industrial Relations, 1987, 25, No.l, pp.99-124. Cronin dates the 
crucial strike wave as 1919-1920, J. Cronin, Stages, Cycles and Insurgencies: The 
Economics of Unrest, in T.K. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, (Eds.) Processes of the World- 
System, pp. 101-118, Sage Publications, 1980; Industrial Conflict in Modem Britain, 
Croom Helm, 1979.
68 The period 1919-20 in Britain is surveyed by Dowie who indicates that the traditional 
demand-pull explanation for the inflationary peak is somewhat doubtful. A large decrease 
in hours in 1919 and a rise in real wages was unlikely to have been met by corresponding 
improvements in productivity in Britain’s ageing industries. He believes, cost-push 
explanations may prove more accurate. J.A. Dowie, ‘1919-20 is in Need of Attention’ , 
Economic History Review, Vol.28 No.3 pp.429-450.
69 Sayers gives troughs as 1903-4, 1908-9 and 1913. R S . Sayers, A History of Economic 
Change, 1880-1939, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.32.
70 Feldman wrote the definitive analysis of this event. In his investigation into the factors 
that led to this period of inflation he concluded that hyperinflation was not a result of war 
reparations. The inflation was caused by the improved position of the working-class, the 
ability of employers to pass on these costs in price rises and a refusal of any of the vested 
interests within Germany to contemplate financial sacrifices in order to deflate the
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economy. G. D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the 
German Inflation, 1914-1924, Oxford University Press, 1993. His position is largely 
supported by C. P. Kindleberger, in a review of the book, Chapter 15, The World 
Economy and National Finance in Historical Perspective, University of Michigan Press, 
1995; see also, K. Laursen & J. Pedersen, The German Inflation 1919-1923, North 
Holland, 1964.
71 The ‘Roaring Twenties’ appear to better describe the social decadence that was carried 
over from the upswing years, combined with a relief amongst the bourgeoisie that they 
had survived a period of war and revolution, rather than a serious appraisal of the 
economy.
72 B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1993 (4th Edition), 
Macmillan Reference, 1998.
73 S.N. Broad berry & A. Ritschl, “Real Wages, Productivity, and Unemployment in 
Britain and Germany during the 1920s” in J. Komlos & S.Eddie, Selected Cliometric 
Studies on German Economic History, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997.
74 J.J. van Duijn, The Long-wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
75 J-C. Asselain, Histoire Economique de la France: de 1919 a la fin des AnnEes 1970, 
Editions du Seuil, 1984; B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 
1750-1993 (4th Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998. B.R. Mitchell, International 
Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1993 (4th Edition), Macmillan Reference, 1998.
76 The general response of governments at this time has led to a degree of confusion 
amongst a small number of long-wave researchers. Failure to account for this has left 
some long-wave theorists with cycles that bear little resemblance to most other long­
wave accounts and to other economic realities. This, to a large extent, has shown that 
price changes are not entirely reliable as a guide to dating long-waves, as was previously 
supposed. See for instance, W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect, 
University of Texas Press, 1978, using only price data, Rostow calls 1935-51 an upswing 
and 1951-72 a downswing and 1972 onwards another upswing; and B.J.L. Berry, Long- 
Wave Rhythms in Economic Development and Political Behaviour, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1991.
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77 J. Atack & P. Pasell, A New View of American History (2nd Edition), Norton & Co. 
1994.
78 A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, No. 121, June 1977, pp. 103-137.
79 Schumpeter, writing in 1939, gives the following dates for the Third Kondratieff;
Prosperity Recession Depression Revival
1. 1898-1900 1901-03 1903/4 1904-6
1907-1908 Intermezzo
2. 1909-11 1912/13 1914
Interrupted by World War One
1929-34 .......
J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Volumes I and II, McGraw-Hill, 1939, pp.397-448 and
80 See for instance, A.Glyn, A. Hughes, A. Lipietz, & A. Singh, The Rise and Fall of 
the Golden Age in S. A. Marglin & J. B. Schor (Eds.), The Golden Age of Capitalism: 
Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Clarendon Press, 1990.
81 See J. Goldstein in Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modem Age, Yale 
University Press 1988, Chapter 10.
82 A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Quarterly Review, No. 121, June 1977, pp. 103-137.
83 Kelly and Screpanti date the strike wave from 1968-1974, J. Kelly, Rethinking 
Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long-Waves, Routledge/LSE, 1998, 
p. 89; E. Screpanti, Long Economic Cycles and Recurring Proletarian Insurgencies, 
Review, 1, no.2, pp.509-548; Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 
British Journal o f  Industrial Relations, 1987, 25, No.l, pp.99-124. Cronin dates the 
crucial period as 1968-1972, J. Cronin, Stages, Cycles and Insurgencies: The Economics 
of Unrest, in T.K. Hopkins & I. Wallerstein, (Eds.) Processes of the World-System, 
pp. 101-118, Sage Publications, 1980; Industrial Conflict in Modem Britain, Croom 
Helm, 1979.
84 The pay explosion saw earnings rise by around 47% in the UK and Australia, over 50% 
in Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands and New Zealand, over 60% in Finland and 
Greece and over 70% in Italy and Spain between 1970 and the first quarter of 1974. H.
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Phelps Brown, A Non-Monetarist View of the Pay Explosion, Three Banks Review, 
March 1975, No. 105, pp.3-24.
85 See for instance, A. Glyn, A. Hughes, A. Lipietz, & A. Singh, The Rise and Fall of 
the Golden Age in S. A. Marglin & J. B. Schor (Eds.), The Golden Age of Capitalism: 
Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Clarendon Press, 1990; R. Lloyd-Jones & M.J. 
Lewis, British industrial capitalism since the Industrial Revolution, UCL Press, 1998 
pp. 187-193.
86 Mandel believed that the Russian Revolution and the construction of the Soviet Union 
represented the first stage in the dissolution of international capitalism, the second stage 
arriving during the fourth long-wave downswing. Presumably the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 has severely disrupted this timetable.
87 Mager uses the dates 1949-1973-2003 for the fourth long-wave, though gives no reason 
for the latter date. N.H. Mager, The Kondratieff Waves, Praeger, 1987.
88 E.H. Hobsbawm, The New Century, Little, Brown & Co. 2000.
89 Faux and Mishel believe that the improving world economy in the 1990s, especially in 
the USA, has been achieved at the expense of income growth. Workers are now expected 
to work longer hours, and together with increased levels of productivity and declining 
income growth this has resulted in a return to high levels of corporate profitability. Per 
capita income growth in the G7 economies has been steadily declining since the 1970s 
resulting in only Germany and Japan recording per capita income growth rates of more 
than 1% per annum in the period 1989-96. J. Faux & L. Mishel, ‘Inequality and the 
Global Economy’ in W. Hutton & A. Giddens, (eds) On the Edge: Living with Global 
Capitalism, Jonathon Cape, 2000.
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